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Abstract
Cooperation is acting in the interests of one’s social group, often at a cost to yourself. When
the level of cooperation is observed in the laboratory, people cooperate more often, and at
higher levels than are predicted by standard theories. In this thesis I find two novel ways in
which cooperation on multilayered populations is increased. These models contribute to an
understanding of how people cooperate in real-world social situations, and help us to explain
why people cooperate as much as they are observed to do.
In each study I model the tension between the individual and the group using the public
goods game. This game is played on a structured population defined by a multilayered network.
Each layer represents a different sphere of influence on the player’s decision to cooperate or
defect.
The first model studies the effect of a player choosing whether to cooperate or defect on either
all layers simultaneously (synchronously) or on one layer at a time (asynchronously). Updating
asynchronously leads to increased cooperation across a number of different parameter regimes.
This demonstrates a new way in which cooperation can be increased in a system with multiple
influences, and also helps to understand exactly why cooperation is increased in multilayered
systems.
Inspired by empirical examples, the second model adds to the standard model of the public
goods game on networks in two ways. The first is to include conditional cooperators, and the
second is the addition of a layer of social influence. This combination of economic and social
influence has not been considered in previous models of the public goods game, and I find that
this additional layer of influence results in high levels of cooperation. In the final chapter,
I study these dynamics on more realistic network structures, with results echoing empirical
findings under certain parameters.
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1Technical terms
Table 1 contains the terms used in the rest of this thesis, and their definitions, whilst table 2
denotes the symbols.
Table 1: Technical terms used in this thesis.
Term Definition
Cooperation An act that benefits others at a cost to yourself.
Defection/Free-riding An act that considers only your own welfare.
Strategy Cooperation or defection, or how a player chooses whether to cooperate
or defect.
Payoff The return from a game, dependent on your own and others’ strategies.
Common pool resource A resource that has no fixed owner and can be accessed by all
(CPR) e.g. a fishing lake.
Public goods game An abstract representation of a social dilemma. Players donate to a “public
(PGG) good”, and receive a return dependent on the contributions of others.
Fixed cost per group A version of the public goods game where each player
(FCG) donates the same amount to each group in which they play
Fixed cost per individual A version of the public goods game where players have a single
(FCI) amount to donate, divided evenly between each group.
Well-mixed A population without structure, where the groups in which the game
is played are formed at random before each payoff calculation.
Node A person or other entity in a network.
Edge A connection between nodes in a network.
Neighbours Nodes connected by an edge.
Interdependent network A network of networks with connections between each.
Layer A single network in a network of networks or a multiplex.
Multiplex network A collection of networks. The nodes in each network correspond to the same
entity,but the connections between nodes are not necessarily
the same on each layer.
2Table 2: Mathematics symbols.
Symbol Definition
Enhancement factor, r Return from the public good in the public goods game.
(The larger the more favourable to cooperation.)
Scaled enhancement factor, η The enhancement factor scaled by group size.
Temptation to defect, b Standard parameter in the prisoner’s dilemma.
(The larger the less favourable to cooperation.)
Imitation strength, θ How accurately players imitate others.
Social influence, λ Probability of updating using the social layer.
i, j Index of each member of the population.
ai Player i’s strategy.
Pi Player i’s payoff.
ki The number of edges attached to player i in the network,
or player i’s degree.
l The iteration of the repeated public goods game.
pi,g(l) The payoff of player i playing in group g in iteration l.
t Number of generations.
ai Player i’s strategy.
ci,g(l) Player i’s contribution to the public good of group g in iteration l.
cg(l) The average contribution of all the players in group g in iteration l.
Nc(l) Number of players donating a whole unit to the public good.
Group size, G Number of players in a particular group.
v,w Index of each strategy in a bimodal population.
sv Strategy v, a strategy which may be played
by a member of the population.
Πv Payoff of strategy sv.
〈k〉 Mean network degree.
m Number of layers.
Pi,l Payoff of player i on layer l.
β Fermi noise parameter.
sli Strategy of player i on layer l.
g Group
N li,g Number of cooperators in group g of player i on layer l
ρ Frequency of cooperators
σi Frequency of strategy i
1
Introduction
In this thesis I develop two models that address how multiple influences affect renewable resource
use. Specifically, I consider the tension between what is good for a social group and what is good
for the individual. Real-world examples of these choices include the management of fisheries,
common grasslands for grazing livestock, or even Wikipedia. These resources can be used
responsibly at a cost to yourself - you could throw smaller fish back, or only graze a small
number of animals - or you could take as much of the resource as you can. The question is,
should you act for the good of the group at a cost to yourself, or cooperate, or act selfishly?
Under which circumstances a person cooperates is an important problem.
This thesis develops two models to help answer this question. Using numerical simulations I
build upon previous work to investigate cooperation on multilayered networks. I extend previous
work by testing how additional influences, be they economic or social, affect the number of
cooperators in a population. To do this I place individuals in multiple connected populations,
each representing either economic or social influence.
In the first model I investigate a novel influence on the frequency of cooperation in multilay-
ered networks. I find that how often players choose whether to cooperate or defect in each of a
number of connected economic networks alters how cooperative the entire population is. I show
that this factor needs to be considered when designing models of cooperation in multilayered
systems. The second model includes a layer of social pressure on top of the standard economic
layer. In addition, players choose how much to donate to the group conditionally i.e. they
choose how much to donate based on the donations of others in the group. There are three
factors that determine how cooperative each player is: the amount that players have previously
donated; how much they have accumulated in the game; and how cooperative others are. I find
that the inclusion of both conditional strategies and social pressure results in higher levels of
cooperation, and that the initial cooperativity of the population is a crucial factor.
In the rest of this chapter I describe the central concepts used in the rest of this thesis, and
3
4 1.1 Social dilemmas and game theory
the work that motivates these questions.
1.1 Social dilemmas and game theory
This thesis addresses social dilemmas: situations where there is a choice between an outcome
that favours others at a cost to the individual, and one that favours the individual at a cost to
the group. A good example of a social dilemma is the management of renewable resources in
local communities. In order for a renewable resource to be managed well each member of the
community must only use a fair amount. However, it is better for the individual if they consume
as much as possible. This dilemma leads to the “tragedy of the commons”. If everyone uses as
much of the resource as they like, then eventually it disappears and everyone suffers. This idea
was famously revived from the amateur mathematician William Forster Lloyd by Hardin [1].
In this paper he discusses those scenarios where technology does not help solve this problem,
and instead, social solutions are needed. For example, in the case of food consumption better
technology may increase yields, but after a while the population will rise to match these yields
and the problem is re-introduced. Understanding these social dilemmas helps us understand
renewable resource use and make suggestions as to how they can be used responsibly.
1.1.1 Games and the prisoner’s dilemma
Game theory is often used to analyse social and biological systems [2, 3], and in particular
social dilemmas [4]. Games are abstract representations of interactions between individuals,
and have the advantage of removing any extraneous issues from the problem and representing
the dilemma in its purest form. In games each player chooses a strategy. In social dilemmas
these are labelled cooperate or defect. Depending on the choice of strategy, each player receives
a payoff, and within these games it is assumed that each player desires as large a payoff as
possible. It is generally assumed that each player is identical, and uses the same criteria to
decide upon their strategy. It is only their final chosen strategy that differentiates them.
Games involving only two players are represented through a payoff matrix. This matrix
details the payoff allocated to each player depending on their choice of strategy and their op-
ponent’s. The payoff matrix for players with a choice between cooperate and defect is shown in
table 1.1, with player one’s choice of strategy shown in the first column and player two’s in the
first row. Player one’s payoff is the left value in each element of the array, and player two’s is
the right.
Different orderings of the payoffs will lead to different games, and can be structured to
replicate a social dilemma. This is achieved by ordering the payoffs for cooperation and defection
in such a way that the best course of action for the individual is to defect, but the best decision
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Table 1.1: The payoffs for the pairwise game.
C D
C R,R S,T
D T,S P,P
for the pair is to cooperate. In a social dilemma the order of these payoffs is T > R > P > S,
and when the payoffs are in this order the game is called the prisoner’s dilemma. Often this
is simplified (without qualitatively altering the results) and the strict ordering of the payoffs
relaxed to T = b, R = 1, P = S = 0, where b is greater than one and is called the ‘temptation
to defect’, and the game is named the weak prisoner’s dilemma. The key interactions in the
social dilemma are the cooperator-cooperator and cooperator-defector payoffs, and so these are
the important parameters in the weak prisoner’s dilemma. If a player selects defection, they
cannot increase their payoff against an opponent by switching strategy, and so in the one-shot
prisoner’s dilemma the best strategy to avoid exploitation is defection. The optimal strategy
for a player is often found using the Nash equilibrium. This is the strategy where neither player
can increase their payoff by changing strategy. Although not all games have a Nash equilibrium,
in the prisoner’s dilemma mutual defection is the Nash equilibrium.
1.1.2 The public goods game
The standard game for modelling social dilemmas for more than two players is the public goods
game. In this game players donate to a communal pot, or the public good. In this scenario a
public good is a resource where it is not possible to exclude others, and all share in its returns.
The returns from this communal pot are then shared between all players equally, whether they
contributed or not. Once again, players have the choice to either cooperate (donate to the public
good) or defect (donate nothing). The total donated by each of the players is then multiplied by
an enhancement factor to give a return on each player’s donation. This is then divided between
each of the players. If each cooperator donates one unit, the payoff of a defector is
PD = r
NC
G
= ηNC (1.1)
where NC is the number of cooperators in the rest of the group, G is the group size, r is the en-
hancement factor, and therefore η is enhancement factor scaled by group size. The cooperator’s
payoff is
PC = r
NC + 1
G
− 1 = ηNC + η − 1 = PD + η − 1. (1.2)
6 1.1 Social dilemmas and game theory
This equation shows that it is better for a player to cooperate if η is larger than one, and defect
if it is smaller.
Games [5, 6], and particularly the public goods game [7], are a good way in which to model
social dilemmas in resource use. The public good can be considered to be the management of
a resource, for example the time needed to care for a forest. Alternatively, it can be considered
to be the amount of resource not consumed by the individual, for example the amount of fish
left in the ocean: if a player takes as much as they can, they leave nothing for the public good,
and are therefore considered to be defectors.
Other methods for increasing cooperation in the public goods game have been explored,
including allowing players to opt out [8], introducing a minimum player wealth threshold for
participation [9] and asymmetric wealth distributions [10].
1.1.3 What do these games say about cooperation?
For both the prisoner’s dilemma and the public goods game (when η is smaller than one)
defection is suggested as the best strategy.
Finding the mechanisms that enable the evolution of cooperation when the strategy that
leads to the higher fitness in a one-shot game is defection has been a rich area of research for
the last few decades [11–13]. In an important piece of work Nowak [14] outlined the five key
mechanisms that lead to cooperation. These are
1. Direct reciprocity, or repeated interactions with the same players indicating whether a
player is a cooperator or defector.
2. Indirect reciprocity, or the sharing of knowledge of a player’s previous behaviour without
having played against them.
3. Kin selection, or being more likely to cooperate with those to whom you are related.
4. Group selection, or groups of cooperators having a higher evolutionary fitness than groups
of defectors, and therefore outcompeting them.
5. Network reciprocity, or playing against the same players repeatedly due to permanent
groups formed in a structured population.
In each of these the key factor is enabling cooperators to play cooperators more frequently
than they play defectors. However, an important point to make is that in each of the above cases
players are always trying to maximise their own payoff, with no other considerations included.
Another important factor is that groups of cooperators perform better than groups of de-
fectors since the defectors have no cooperators to free-ride on. However, a defector in a group
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performs better than the cooperators in the same group. This mechanism is used to explain
the dominance of cooperation (in [15] for example) in populations where players may switch
between groups. When a cooperator switches from a group mainly consisting of free-riders to a
group mainly consisting of cooperators the cooperator can generate much larger payoffs.
1.2 Networks
The previous section described just some of the work on the resolution of social dilemmas through
game theory. Many of these models assume either that everyone plays everyone else in the pop-
ulation, or that the population is infinite. Both of these assumptions are often inappropriate for
social and biological systems. Many studies have investigated the relationships between entities
in both social and biological systems, including the social relationships between individuals, and
found a measurable structure. So, if we want to model the real world accurately, it is important
to consider the structure of real-world populations.
A widely accepted way to represent structure in a mathematical model of a population is
through networks [16]. In networks each entity (a person or an organism in an ecosystem, for
example) is represented as a node, and each connection (those that each member of the network
works with, for example) is represented as an edge. The number of edges connected to the node
is described as the degree, and the degree distribution is one of the fundamental descriptors of
networks [17].
Networks range from a very simple lattice, to those that represent social networks more
accurately through a power-law degree distribution. Networks are a better description of many
aspects of the real world compared to a population where any member can interact with any other
(the well-mixed case), as measurements of empirical networks such as metabolic networks [18]
and the social network of bottle-nosed dolphins [19] show.
Networks of relationships between people are termed social networks. Some of the more
famous social networks include those of scientific collaboration [20], and the karate club [21].
Other examples of social networks are those formed in the American House of Representatives
[22] and even the structure of characters in the Marvel universe [23].
1.2.1 Networks of networks
People often do not just interact in one network, but many. For example, one of your social
networks may be your friends, and another your family. Empirical measurements have shown
that representing systems as multiple networks is accurate for many social and biological systems
[24]. In general there are two types of multilayered networks: interdependent and multiplex.
The central difference is that interdependent networks are networks of networks, where each
8 1.2 Networks
(a) Single network
(b) Interdependent network (c) Multiplex network
Figure 1.1: Examples of the single network (figure 1.1a), two interdependent networks, with the
interdependent edges connecting the left- and right-hand networks (figure 1.1b) and a two-layer
multiplex network (figure 1.1c).
node is a different entity; whereas in multiplex networks the nodes in each network are the same
entity, but with different relationships between the nodes in each network. Examples of each
are shown in figure 1.1.
1.2.1.1 Interdependent networks
Interdependent networks are combinations of networks connected by edges. Most work on
interdependent networks studies the resilience of these networks to cascading failure. Empirical
examples include utilities networks: electricity and the internet for example [25, 26]. Parshani
et al. [27] studied how the degree correlations across the networks of interdependent networks
affects the resilience to cascading percolation failures. It was found that if high degree nodes
link to high degree nodes, and low degree nodes link to low degree nodes (assortative mixing,
and a feature of a real world interdependent network of sea ports and airports) then this makes
the networks more resilient to attack.
1.2.1.2 Multiplex networks
Multiplex networks are those where the nodes on each layer represent the same entity, but the
relationships between them are different. For example, a multiplex may consist of the network
of email contacts and a network of phone contacts between a given set of individuals. The
nodes on each layer are the individuals, and the edges connect those that are emailed or phoned.
There are a number of examples of empirical multiplex networks. Cardillo et al. represented the
network of airlines and airports [28] where each node is an airport, and the edges on each layer
represent flights between these airports for different airlines. Also, Battiston et al. [29] formed
a multiplex of Indonesian terrorists: each node is a terrorist, and each layer is a different way
in which they may know one another (business, operations).
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Much of the work on multiplex networks develops technical measurements allowing com-
parisons between two multiplex networks, and their single layer equivalents. The most general
approach to this is by De Domenico et al. [30] and Sole´-Ribalta et al. [31]. Here they developed
a generalisation of the standard matrix approach to analysing networks by introducing tensor
notation. This notation can be collapsed to give the standard results for single layers. In addi-
tion to these, a number of operators can be introduced that can measure interesting multiplex
network quantities such as centrality (how important a node is) and clustering coefficients (how
many friends do I and my friends have in common). Random walks on these networks can also
be modelled through diffusion. This produces a very powerful generalisation of the standard net-
work results to multiplexes. De Domenico also developed software to plot and analyse multilevel
networks [32].
Multiplex networks have been formed computationally and compared to empirical examples.
Halu et al. [33] created a probabilistic ensemble of multiplex networks by maximising the entropy
of that ensemble. From here they were able to show that empirical networks contain much more
overlap between edges on each layer than is expected from randomly generated networks. Nicosia
et al. [34] propose a model that allows multiplex networks to grow organically, using preferential
attachment, and certain parameter values can generate either homogeneous or heterogeneous
degree distributions. Finally, they derive the condition for condensed states, where a node exists
that is connected to all of the other nodes in another layer.
Ways of measuring communities (regions of higher edge density) in multiplex networks have
also been explored. Mucha et al. [35] developed an algorithm to find communities. Iacovacci
et al. [36] created an information theoretic measure that can find the similarities between dif-
ferent mesoscale measures across different layers of a multiplex. In this case they looked at the
similarity between the communities on each of the layers, firstly testing the measure through
artificially built networks and then observing the communities that different areas of physics
have in common in the PACS collaboration network.
Other work includes Kivela¨ and Porter’s [37] investigation of the possible isomorphisms in
a multiplex network, whilst Cellai et al. [38] studied the phase transition between a multiplex
containing a giant component and one that does not for various overlaps between the edges. In
the case of the two-layer multiplex, increasing the overlap between the layers led to increased
resilience within the system. These results were backed up with numerical simulations.
Studies have also investigated dynamics on multiplex networks. Valdano et al. [39] modelled
disease spreading on time varying networks. Each layer of the multiplex represented the network
at a certain time, and by representing the time-varying network as a multiplex the authors
created a framework that accurately calculated the epidemic threshold for any network.
Cascades in multiplex networks are modelled in the general case by Lee et al. [40] by allowing
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certain nodes to activate when a critical threshold of active neighbours is reached, either on a
single layer, or on all layers, whilst cascades of debt in financial multiplexes are modelled by
Brummitt and Kobayashi [41].
1.3 Cooperation on networks
As described in the previous section, real systems are often best represented as networks. How
social dilemmas are altered in structured populations has been a rich vein of research for the
last couple of decades that provides a number of suggestions as to how they might unfold in
social systems.
When repeated games are played on networks the nodes represent the players and the edges
represent those that they play the game with. Players on networks change their strategy in
an attempt to increase their payoff. They do this either by imitating a better performing
neighbour, or by reproducing in proportion to their fitness. In both cases the probability of a
player’s strategy propagating is usually defined as a function of the payoff. In the prisoner’s
dilemma, a player’s total payoff from the network is calculated by summing each individual
interaction. When the public goods game is played on a network, often the groups of players
are defined as all those that share a common, or focal, node. Therefore, each player plays the
game in the group in which they are the focal node, and also each of their neighbours’ groups.
There are two different versions of the public goods game on a network, defined by how much the
player donates to each group. The first is the fixed-cost per group (FCG), where each cooperator
donates one unit to every group in which they play. The second is the fixed-cost per individual
(FCI), where each cooperator has only one unit to donate, and divides it evenly between groups.
The first to place the prisoner’s dilemma on a lattice were Nowak and May [42]. They found
that cooperation is increased in structured populations through network reciprocity, or the
repeated interaction of clusters of cooperators enabling them to resist exploitation by defectors.
The literature of games on networks is large. Two comprehensive reviews of games on
graphs [43] and group games on graphs [44] have been published in the last decade. What
is repeatedly observed in numerical simulations is that when games are played on networks, at
early times the number of cooperators decreases, as defectors gain larger payoffs in games against
cooperators. However, through chance small clusters of cooperators form on the lattice. Because
cooperators playing against cooperators perform better than defectors against defectors, these
clusters avoid exploitation by defectors.
A number of general mechanisms for the spread of cooperation in structured populations
are postulated. Nowak et al. [45] finds that in general for each population structure (including
networks) cooperation survives when cooperators can cluster together and repeatedly play one
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another. Ohtsuki et al. [46] found an analytic rule for the spread of cooperation on networks.
By studying the death-birth update rule (a node updates its strategy by “dying” and selecting
a new strategy at random from its neighbours’ strategies in proportion to the fitness of those
neighbour’s) they found that for a number of different architectures a single cooperator can
invade the system if bc > 〈k〉, where b and c are the benefit and cost of cooperation and 〈k〉 is the
mean degree of the network. Pairwise approximation rules for the existence of an evolutionarily
stable strategy (a strategy that cannot be invaded by another) for all 2×2 games were formulated
by examining whether a string of invaders will grow or shrink by the same author and Nowak [47].
He found that their formulation works well for random graphs of varying degree, but less well
for lattices due to the existence of loops in the system.
1.3.1 The effect of network structure
Having established that structured populations can increase cooperation due to network reci-
procity, many authors have studied how the network structure affects cooperation. In an at-
tempt to model cooperation on real-world networks more accurately, a number of papers have
shown that networks with heterogeneous degree distributions increase cooperation [48]. Santos
et al. [49] found that large degree nodes, or hubs, foster clusters of cooperators, and therefore
increase the effect of network reciprocity. Initially defectors perform well on these high-degree
nodes, but are victims of their own success as their neighbourhoods lose all cooperation. This
means that a cooperator can then invade the hub, seed a cluster and avoid exploitation by other
defectors.
Go´mez-Garden˜es et al. [50] confirmed this and showed that more heterogeneous degree distri-
butions result in increased cooperation by measuring the frequency of players that consistently
played either cooperation or defection after the system has reached equilibrium. They found
that in scale-free networks there is a single large core of pure cooperators that it is very difficult
to invade due to the large number of hubs. The smaller number of hubs on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
network is the reason for the lower frequency of cooperation in these networks.
The significance of hubs was confirmed by Rong and Wu [51]. They studied the impact
of degree mixing, or the correlation of neighbours’ degrees (labelled as assortative for positive
and disassortative for negative correlation) on cooperation in the public goods game on scale-
free networks. They found that assortative mixing suppressed the amount of cooperation in
the system due to the fact that two hubs are more likely to be connected, and this leads to a
reduction in the influence of a cooperator on one of these hubs.
Szolnoki and Perc [52] changed the probability of updating a strategy by allocating a “teach-
ing weight” to each individual. This teaching weight is dynamic, and increases as the strategy
of an agent is imitated. If the weight increases when either only cooperators or only defectors
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are imitated, the promotion of defectors proves to be best for cooperation. Once again, hubs are
key, as the large teaching weight players act as metaphorical hubs. Initially defectors perform
well, but as with the hubs on networks with heterogeneous degree distributions the cooperators
eventually dominate and seed clusters.
Chen et al. [53] also showed that hubs are important by investigating the prisoner’s dilemma
on a network consisting of complete network communities, with edges formed between nodes
with probability proportional to their degree. An increase in the mean degree of the network led
to reduced cooperation due to changes in the distribution of the hubs in the network: smaller
mean degree results in more distinct hubs which foster cooperation. Santos et al. [54] improved
on this finding by showing that any increase in “diversity”, be that in the degree distribution
or the number of interactions a player is involved in, increases cooperation. They played the
pairwise game on a number of different network topologies, varying S and T (sucker’s payoff and
temptation to defect in table 1.1) between ±1, therefore moving between four of the possible
games.
Perc [55] suggests that the public goods game is less affected by diversity because players
may play in many different groups. He increased heterogeneity in his model by playing the
public goods game on triangle, square and regular lattices. Diversity was introduced through
scaling a player’s payoff by a randomly selected amount from either an exponential or uniform
distribution. Cooperation was increased when the uniform distribution was selected, rather
than the exponential distribution, which is counter to the idea that more diversity is better for
cooperation.
Structure also affects the frequency of cooperation through the clustering coefficient, or the
probability of two of a node’s neighbours also being neighbours. Szabo et al. [56] studied the
effect of noise on the spatial prisoner’s dilemma on three different lattice topologies with degree
four. They found that when a structure contains overlapping triangles then cooperation can
survive in the zero noise limit, and cooperation exists at the highest values of the temptation
to defect when there are no overlapping triangles. Szolnoki et al. [57] did something similar
with the public goods game. After initially looking at lattices without overlapping triangles,
these are then implicitly introduced by altering the group size. For small group sizes the public
goods game exhibits qualitatively similar behaviour to the prisoner’s dilemma, but networks
with overlapping triangles (and so graphs with high clustering coefficients) show a divergence
between group and pairwise games.
1.3.2 Extensions to games on networks
Many studies have extended the games both in order to make them more applicable to certain
social or biological systems, and also to probe the conditions needed for increased cooperation.
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Common extensions are to alter either the way in which the payoffs are calculated, or how
players select another to imitate. Szolnoki and Perc [58] explored the public goods game on the
lattice, increasing both the radius of the group and also the radius of strategy imitation. The
effects of these changes are not straightforward, but network reciprocity is increased for very
large groups. These authors also introduce a critical number of cooperators needed before the
benefits of cooperation can be harvested [59], and in this case a small fraction of cooperators
can survive for small enhancement factors on structured populations due to enhanced network
reciprocity.
Liu et al. [60] extended the public goods game on a lattice by introducing heritability: the
total payoff of each player was calculated as a weighted sum of the current and previous payoffs.
It was found that if the past payoff was taken into account this led to higher frequencies of
cooperation. This was due to the fitness increase of a cooperator switching strategy to defection
is reduced, and so network reciprocity is strengthened.
Another extension introduces new strategies to model real-world cooperation more closely.
These fall into three categories: loners, or players that can opt out of the game for a constant
payoff [8, 61, 62]; punishing players, or those that reduce the payoff of a defector at a cost to
themselves [63,64]; and rewarding players that increase a cooperator’s payoff at a cost to them-
selves [65]. Each of these additional strategies is played on the lattice. The new strategies tend
to increase cooperation by acting as a barrier between clusters of cooperators and defectors.
Interesting cyclical dynamics are often observed between the strategies, as each strategy dom-
inates one other. Brandt et al. [66] introduced reputation in an interesting way by including
a probability of revealing a player’s strategy, and allowing others to temporarily switch their
strategy to exploit this. This introduction of reputation, along with punishment, leads to higher
frequencies of cooperation.
A further extension to the public goods game is introduced by Chen et al. [67]. Here, along
with introducing a threshold for cooperation, they change the function used to calculate the
contribution to the public good, also known as the benefit function. Rather than being linear in
the contributions of neighbours on the lattice the benefit function is sigmoidal. It was found that
for this continuous game for each cost-to-benefit ratio there was an intermediate threshold and
benefit function steepness that leads to the highest donations to the public good. The reason
for this is that low steepness leads to little benefit for cooperation, whereas large steepness leads
to standard cooperator/defector dynamics. To maximise their payoffs players should donate
enough to place the group over the threshold, but not any more than this. This is achieved in
these intermediate parameter regimes.
After Nowak and May had published their groundbreaking work on the prisoner’s dilemma
on a lattice, Mukerjee et al. [68] responded that the results are not as robust as suggested. They
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Figure 1.2: The bipartite structure used in [70]. The far left figure is the standard method of
representing the public goods game, the middle shows the groups individually and the far right
is the method used by the authors. Reproduced with permission from figure 2 in [70].
found that if only one player updated their strategy between payoff updates (rather than all
players, as in Nowak and May), cooperation disappeared. Roca et al. [69] in their review paper
similarly conclude that the choice of rules used in these models is often very important in the
maintenance of cooperation.
Go´mez-Garden˜es et al. [70] created a more accurate version of the public goods game by
introducing a bipartite structure to represent the groups: one set represents the players and
the other set represents the possible groups, and the network links each player to the groups in
which they play (as shown in figure 1.2). They tested this on empirical networks, and found
that this formulation of the public goods game led to higher levels of cooperation, although the
reasons for this are not clear.
To sum up, game theoretic models of cooperation are made more applicable by placing
them onto networks, and when games are played on networks cooperation tends to increase.
However, the robustness of these results is open to question, with cooperation often appearing
and disappearing depending on the rules chosen. If we want accurate models of cooperation on
networks we therefore need to consider the rules used carefully, and investigate how sensitive
our results are to the choice of rule.
1.3.3 Cooperation on hierarchical networks
In section 1.2.1 I explained that in many cases it is more accurate to describe systems as
interdependent or multiplex networks. It therefore makes sense to study how these networks of
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networks may affect cooperation. Cooperation has also been studied on hierarchical and multi-
layered networks. In hierarchical networks, players play in completely connected groups at the
lower level, before also playing in groups at increasingly higher levels [71, 72]. The results in
these studies are heavily dependent on the selected parameters, and there is no clear relationship
between the frequency of cooperation and the parameter values selected. J. Wang et al. [73]
play a multilevel public goods game (MPGG) where each subsequent level combines two previous
groups, until at the top level one large group consisting of all agents is formed. They found that
cooperation is strongest with weak in-group selection and strong between-group selection.
1.3.4 Cooperation on interdependent networks
When studying cooperation on interdependent networks, the game is played in the same way as
on single networks. However, as described below changes are made to either the game played
on each network, the number of edges between the two networks, or how the payoff is calculated
between the networks.
To create interdependent networks edges are formed between two separate networks, usually
with some probability p, and it is often found that cooperation is maximised at some intermediate
value of this probability. Jiang and Perc [74] introduced an interdependency by rewiring an in-
group edge to become a between-group edge with probability p. At intermediate values of p the
heterogeneity of the degree distributions between the networks is at its largest, and this is where
the highest frequency of cooperation is observed. Similarly, B. Wang et al. [75] studied the public
goods game on two interdependent square lattices with periodic boundary conditions, connecting
each corresponding node with probability p. Once again, there is an intermediate value of p that
results in the largest amount of cooperation. In both cases the additional edges increase the
heterogeneity of the network, thereby creating hubs for the cooperators and encouraging network
reciprocity.
The evolution of cooperation when different games are played on the interdependent networks
is also studied. In B. Wang et al. [76] the prisoner’s dilemma is played on one lattice network,
whilst the snowdrift game (a game where the payoffs are reordered so that T > R > S > P ) is
played on the other, with edges formed at random between the two networks. The intermediate
edge probability once again leads to the highest frequency of cooperation on the prisoner’s
dilemma network, but does not affect the frequency of cooperation on the snowdrift network.
This is due to the between-network edges encouraging cooperation, and therefore aiding the
resilience of cooperation on the prisoner’s dilemma lattice. Go´mez-Garden˜es et al. [77] played
the prisoner’s dilemma on two Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks of varying size, and played the snowdrift
game on the randomly formed edges between. Both numerics and analytics were studied, and
it was found that at low temptation values the networks polarised i.e. one network fixated to
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cooperation and the other to defection.
M. Santos et al. [78] played the prisoner’s dilemma on one layer and the snowdrift game on
the other, with edges formed between each layer at random, and the probability of imitating
a neighbour on the same layer or a different one was varied. For high probability of in-layer
imitation defection dominates on the prisoner’s dilemma layer, and cooperation on the snowdrift
layer. Cooperation in the system begins to equalise across the layers as the probability of
between-layer imitation increases. This is because the number of edges between layers is fewer
than those within, and so the final state becomes more homogeneous.
The case where the additional edges between networks alters the payoff of a player have
also been studied. X. Wang et al. [79] introduced an additional payoff for those players that
have a randomly assigned edge between two networks, and then played the prisoner’s dilemma
on these two networks. Only when each network has a homogeneous degree distribution does
the interdependence change the amount of cooperation in the system, and this is due to the
heterogeneity in other networks mitigating the heterogeneity introduced by the interdependent
edges. Z. Wang et al. [80] also studied two interdependent networks where directed edges are
created if the payoff of a player exceeds a critical threshold. The payoff of each player with an
external edge is calculated as the weighted sum of the payoffs from each layer. It is found that
there is a critical threshold where cooperation disappears, but below this threshold cooperation
is increased due to enhanced network reciprocity.
Huang et al. [81] played the prisoner’s dilemma on two lattices and the harmony game
(R > T > S > P ) between them, weighting the harmony contribution to the overall payoff. It
was found that higher weighting and more edges led to higher levels of cooperation. Finally,
Szolnoki and Perc [82] showed that if players take into account the strategies in the group
defined by the player in the same position on a separate lattice, cooperation is promoted. The
probability of one player imitating another is scaled through the acquisition of “information”,
or the number of other players in the corresponding group in the other lattice with the same
strategy.
In general, interdependent networks increase cooperation by supporting network reciprocity.
This is either through encouraging cooperative strategies in the other network, or through an
increase in the heterogeneity of the degree distribution.
1.3.5 Cooperation on multiplex networks
On multiplex networks (networks where the nodes are the same but the relationships differ
between layers) both the prisoner’s dilemma and the public goods game have been investigated.
In these networks, players can play a different strategy on each layer. Players calculate their
payoffs on each layer as if it were a single network, before summing the accrued payoffs across
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all layers. This then gives each player their payoff. To update their strategy they select a layer,
and then a neighbour on that layer at random, and compare payoffs, imitating a player with
higher probability if that neighbour has a better payoff summed across all layers.
Matamalas et al. [83] studied the evolution of cooperation on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi multiplex for a
wide range of 2×2 payoff matrix games. They plotted the final frequency of cooperation against
both S and T (sucker’s payoff and temptation to defect in table 1.1), finding that multiplexes
encourage the weaker strategy at each value of S and T to survive, and so encourage more mixed
populations. This is due to there being “coherent” and “incoherent” players (players that do and
players that do not play the same strategy across all layers) and found that it is the incoherent
players that enable the less fit strategies to survive as defectors on one layer generate a large
enough payoff to support cooperators on another. In an earlier work Go´mez-Garden˜es et al. [84]
also found that when the prisoner’s dilemma is played on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi multiplex cooperation
is increased at high temptations to defect, and once again it is the ability of players to select
different strategies across the layers which is important.
Z. Wang et al. [85] investigated multiplex networks where the payoffs of each player are
calculated as a weighted sum of both the individual payoffs and the average payoff of the neigh-
bours on each layer. They played the public goods game on two interdependent square lattices,
and found that this additional utility increased cooperation as the additional payoff from the
neighbours effectively increased the enhancement factor. In [86] the same authors calculate the
payoff of each player as
Ux = αPx + Px′ (1.3)
where Px and Px′ are the payoffs on layer x and x
′ respectively, Ux is the total payoff and α
is the connection strength between the networks, and also introduced a probability of forming
an edge between the two networks. They found that there is an optimal probability for the
formation of a between-layer edge, and this once again increases cooperation through the intro-
duced heterogeneity. However, this effect is only observed above a critical value of α. Z. Wang
et al. [87] tested the public goods game on a multiplex consisting of two lattices, once again
with each player’s payoff calculated through a weighted sum. They found that the additional
weighting added to the payoff allows cooperators to avoid exploitation by defectors by increasing
their payoff, and therefore increases network reciprocity.
In the previous examples each layer represented a separate game. In Z. Wang et al. [88]
the game network (where the payoffs are calculated) and the strategy imitation network are
on different layers of a multiplex. They studied how the degree correlations between the two
layers affect the final frequency of cooperation in the system, and found that the amount of
cooperation is reduced in the system when one layer connects nodes of similar degree and one
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layer connects high degree nodes with low degree ones.
In conclusion, networks (both single and multiple) increase cooperation through encouraging
cooperators to play one another repeatedly. This is achieved through cooperators forming clus-
ters, which can then avoid exploitation by neighbouring defectors. Any technique to increase
the robustness of these clusters results in increased cooperation. Networks of networks increase
cooperation either by increasing network reciprocity, or through the ability to play multiple
strategies across the layers.
1.4 Thesis structure
This thesis consists of two models of the public goods game on a multiplex network. In the first
model each layer represents a different economic network, and the effects of different strategy
imitation rules across the multiplex are investigated. The model and results are presented
together in chapter 2.
In the second model there are two major differences from the work previously described. The
first is the introduction of conditional strategies to the public goods game, whilst the second
in the introduction of social influence to the update of these strategies, combining two different
networks: a player’s economic relationships, and their social relationships. The model and
results for a combination of both of these changes are presented in chapter 3. In the following
chapters the results are then understood in more depth. Chapter 4 describes the behaviour
of a single group of conditional cooperatorsm and show that the expected payoff of a player
is calculated most accurately in a bimodal population. Chapter 5 describes the evolution of a
population of conditional cooperators in the unstructured economic layer, and shows that it is
the probability of a player having a higher payoff than another that is the key to understanding
the long time dynamics of the system. Chapter 6 shows that the network structure encourages
more cooperative strategies, whilst chapter 7 concludes with numerical simulations based on
more realistic population structures.
2
Asynchronous and synchronous update rules can increase
cooperation on a multiplex network
In this chapter I introduce and study the first model in this thesis, and investigate a novel
method for increasing cooperation in multilayered systems. I begin the chapter by discussing
the motivation for this work, before introducing the computational model used to investigate
the effect of update rules on cooperation. I present results for the public goods game, before
explaining why different update rules lead to different frequencies of cooperation. I finally
confirm my results by considering different versions and parameter regimes of the public goods
game and the prisoner’s dilemma.
2.1 Previous literature
2.1.1 Cooperation on single networks
Cooperation is studied on networks for two reasons. The first is that networks provide a mecha-
nism for the resolution of social dilemmas, particularly in the one-shot case where no cooperation
is observed in well-mixed populations. Networks therefore help explain the existence of coopera-
tion. The second reason is that due to the networked nature of our society, in order to understand
cooperation in many real social systems some structure must be added to the population. In
general, cooperation is studied on single networks by playing either the prisoner’s dilemma or
the public goods game. Each node is a player, and the edges of the network define who they
play the games against. The standard technique used to study cooperation on networks is to
play the game over thousands of time steps using computational numerical simulations.
As described in section 1.3, since Nowak and May first investigated spatial games by playing
the prisoner’s dilemma on a square lattice [42] the effect of networks on cooperation has received
a lot of attention [43]. In general, if the prisoner’s dilemma or the public goods game is played
on a network cooperation is supported at parameter values where it would not be observed in
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the unstructured (well-mixed) case. This is due to network reciprocity where cooperators form
clusters that enable them to resist exploitation by defectors. Since this initial work much inves-
tigation has shown how single networks maintain cooperation, in general through the increase
of network reciprocity.
The main mechanism to increase network reciprocity is through heterogeneous degree dis-
tributions [48, 49]. Here the game is played on networks with a different degree distribution
than a regular lattice: either random Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, where the distribution is Poisson
in nature, or scale-free where the distribution follows a power law. On these networks all play-
ers do not have the same number of neighbours, and network reciprocity is increased through
cooperators persisting on higher degree nodes. These seed more robust clusters of cooperators,
thereby increasing network reciprocity and the frequency of cooperation in the system.
2.1.2 Varying the number of strategy imitations on single networks
Standard models of cooperation follow two stages: first each player calculates their payoff de-
pending on their own strategy and the strategies of their neighbours in the network, and second
each player chooses a new strategy based on a number of factors (often a function of the payoff
difference between them and a randomly selected neighbour).
One of the many factors affecting cooperation on networks is the ratio of the number of
payoff calculations to strategy updates. In Roca et al.’s review of evolutionary game theory [69]
the authors suggest that results from numerical simulations are sensitive to the choices made
in how to update each player’s strategy, and how frequently these updates occur. Mukherji et
al. [68] were the first to study whether the number of payoff computations between strategy
updates affected the level of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma on the lattice. They found
that if players updated their strategies with a certain probability (asynchronously) rather than
all at once (synchronously, as in the Nowak and May model [42]) cooperation disappeared from
the lattice.
Further investigations of this effect were performed by Ali Saif and Gade [89]. They found
that there is a critical value of the probability of a player updating their strategy between
payoff updates where the system moves from complete defection to a mixed state, and that this
transition is first order, with chaotic dynamics. They varied the probability p of updating the
strategy of a player between 0 and 1 whilst playing the prisoner’s dilemma on a lattice, thereby
moving continuously between asynchronous and synchronous updates. Roca et al. [90] found that
if the number of interactions between strategy updates was increased between payoff calculations
higher levels of cooperation were observed. They studied a variety of 2 × 2 matrix games, and
found that changing the number of interactions between strategy updates is important to the
final frequency of cooperation.
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These investigations show that the level of cooperation is sensitive to the number of payoff
calculations between strategy updates, and to whether all players calculate their payoffs an
equal number of times between strategy updates. These studies provide valuable insight into
the accuracy of social dilemma network models, as it is important and helpful to understand
which factors are and are not important in the evolution of cooperation. Similar investigations
have not yet been carried out on multiplex networks.
2.1.3 Cooperation on multiplex networks
As described in section 1.3.5 the study of cooperation on networks has recently moved on to
networks with multiple layers, specifically multiplex networks [91]. On multiplex networks, each
node is present on many layers, but the relationships between them may be different on each,
and different strategies may be played on each layer. Once again the dynamics run in two
stages: firstly the payoffs are calculated, and secondly the players update their strategies. In
the previous literature, when the games are played on a multiplex network a player’s payoff is
the sum of their payoffs on each layer, and players update their strategy on a single randomly
selected layer between payoff updates.
The first study of the evolution of cooperation on a multiplex is the work by Go´mez-Garden˜es
et al. [84]. Here the prisoner’s dilemma is played on two Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks, and the strategies
are updated through imitation with probability proportional to the payoff difference. When
the number of layers is increased the amount of cooperation in the system decreases at small
temptation values (T in table 1.1), but as the temptation to defect increases cooperation is able
to survive in the multilayered network long after it has disappeared in the equivalent single layer
system. This is due to individuals - later named incoherent players - playing a different strategy
on each layer of the multiplex. These results were confirmed when a more extensive survey of
2× 2 payoff matrix games played on multiplexes was performed by Matamalas et al. [83].
2.1.4 A new question: strategy update rules on multiplex networks
Whilst the differences in cooperation between single and multilayered networks has received
some attention, there are many facets of these systems that still need investigation. Motivated
by previous work studying social dilemmas on multiplex networks, and the fact that cooperation
on single networks is sensitive to the number of payoff calculations between strategy updates, in
this chapter I show that cooperation on multiplexes is sensitive to the number of layers on which
players update their strategy between payoff calculations, and that updating the strategy on only
one layer between payoff updates in many cases leads to the highest frequency of cooperation.
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2.2 Methods
In this section I introduce the model used to investigate how the frequency of cooperation in the
public goods game on a multiplex network depends on the number of layers on which a player
updates its strategy between payoff updates.
2.2.1 The network
The game is played on a multiplex network, that is a multilayered network where the nodes
on each layer represent the same individual, but where the relationships between the nodes
are different on each layer. I will use an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network on each layer. Each layer is
created independently by moving through each possible pair of nodes and forming an edge with
probability
p =
〈k〉
N − 1 (2.1)
where 〈k〉 is the mean degree of the network and N is the number of nodes on each layer.
2.2.2 Calculation of the payoff in the public goods game
To study the spread of cooperation on the multiplex network the public goods game is played
by each of the nodes. In the public goods game players donate to a public good, shared by all
players in the group. Each player receives the same return from the public good, no matter
what they donate.
In this game there are two possible strategies: cooperation or defection. Players are divided
into groups, and then donate a certain amount to each group in which they play. The total
donated to each group is multiplied up by an enhancement factor, before being divided between
all of the members of that group. Player’s success in the game is indicated by their payoff, with
each player aiming for a larger payoff. When playing the public goods game on a multiplex, the
groups are defined to be those players that are connected to a common node. So, on each layer
player i plays the game in kli + 1 groups, where k
l
i is the degree of player i on layer l. Player i
donates an amount cli on layer l, and so the payoffs are
P i,lD = r
∑
j∈g c
l
j
G
(2.2)
s
P i,lC = r
∑
j∈g c
l
j + c
l
i
G
− cli (2.3)
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where j ∈ g are the other players from the population present in player i’s group, P i,lS is the
payoff of player i on layer l playing strategy S (cooperate or defect), G is the number of players
in the group and r is the enhancement factor (the return on the investment to the group). The
last term in equation (2.3) represents player i’s donation to the public good when playing as a
cooperator. This calculation is made on every layer, and then summed across all of the layers
to give each player their final payoff.
2.2.2.1 FCI and FCG public goods game
I study two versions of the public goods game: fixed cost per group (FCG) when each player
donates one unit to whichever group they are playing the game in i.e. cli = 1 for all groups, or
fixed cost per individual (FCI) where each player has only a single unit to donate and divides
this between all of the groups in which they play i.e. cli =
1
kli+1
where kli is the degree of node i
on layer l. Each of these variations alters the frequency of cooperation on a single layer network,
as studied by Santos et al. for example [49].
2.2.3 Strategy imitation
After calculating their payoffs the players attempt to alter their strategies by imitating a better
performing neighbour. On each layer on which the player updates their strategy a neighbour is
selected at random, and the player compares payoffs with that neighbour. In these multi-layered
dynamics a player may select a different neighbour on each layer. I assume that players would
like to update their strategy in such a way as to increase their payoff. In the Fermi imitation
probability player i imitates the strategy of player j with probability
q(si → sj) = 1
1 + e
−Pj−Pi
β
(2.4)
where Pi is the payoff of player i and β is a noise (or “temperature”) parameter that defines
how deterministic the dynamics are. In this case β = 0 leads to deterministic dynamics where a
player will always imitate a player with a larger payoff, and β →∞ leads to a player imitating
a neighbour with probability 12 . Unless otherwise stated, in the following simulations β = 0.5.
This update allows for the possibility that players are not completely rational and deterministic
in their choice, with the noise parameter controlling how rational they are.
2.2.4 Asynchronous and synchronous update rules
In this section I describe the difference between the asynchronous and synchronous update rules
studied in the rest of the chapter. The essential difference between the rules is that a player
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updates their strategy on a different number of layers after each payoff calculation. In the
asynchronous case each player selects one layer at random on which to update their strategy,
while in the synchronous update each player updates their strategy simultaneously across all
layers. Examples of each rule are shown in figure 2.1, where the nodes in the squares are those
updating their strategy at that time step. In order to compare the two rules I consider one time
step in the synchronous rule to be equivalent to m time steps in the asynchronous case (where
m is the number of layers), as this enables an equal number of strategy updates in both cases.
Therefore, the asynchronous simulations are run for twice as long.
(a) Asynchronous update (b) Synchronous update
Figure 2.1: An example of the asynchronous update (2.1a) and the synchronous update (2.1b)
rules. Vertical lines connect nodes representing the same individual across all layers, and hori-
zontal lines are the network edges on each layer. Blue nodes are cooperators and red defectors.
Nodes in the transparent squares are those updating their strategy in that time step.
It is important to be clear that on multiplex networks there are two components to strategy
updates. The first is the form of the imitation probability (as described in section 2.2.3),
which is usually a function of the payoff difference between two neighbouring players. These
strategy imitations occur between players on the same layer. The second component is the rule
used to choose on which layers strategy imitation takes place, and I henceforth refer to this as
either synchronous or asynchronous. It is the effect of the latter component that this chapter
investigates.
2.2.5 The algorithm and standard parameters
The numerical simulations that I will present are run using C++ code, compiled using the
Gnu C compiler in linux. Much of this work is published in [92], and the code can be found
10.5281/zenodo.204751. Unless otherwise stated, the number of nodes on each layer is N = 1000
and the mean degree is 〈k〉 = 3. Initially each player on each layer is assigned a strategy
(cooperate or defect) at random, which need not be the same on every layer. The networks
on each layer are formed independently according to the method described in section 2.2.1.
At each time step the players calculate their payoff using equations (2.2) and (2.3) on each
layer independently, with the groups defined by the edges in the network. The final payoff of
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player i is calculated by summing the payoffs over all layers i.e. Pi =
∑m
l=1 Pi,l where m is the
total number of layers and Pi,l is the payoff of player i on layer l. In order to update their
strategies on a given layer, players select a neighbour on their layer at random and compare
total payoffs, and the player imitates the neighbour’s strategy on that layer with probability
calculated using equation (2.4). To study the level of cooperation in the system for different
enhancement factors these dynamics are run for 20,000 updates of the whole system (20,000
time steps in the synchronous simulations, 40,000 in the asynchronous). This is long enough to
reach equilibrium. The average final frequency of cooperation is then calculated over the last
2,000 time steps. The results presented below are averaged over 10 iterations (or runs of the
dynamics), where for each run and for each update rule a new network and new initial strategies
for each node are generated. Each iteration of the simulations is plotted as a point, the mean
of all of the simulations is shown by the solid line.
2.3 Mean cooperation for asynchronous and synchronous update rules for the
FCI public goods game
In this section I initially plot the mean frequency of cooperation (the fraction of the entire
population across all layers acting as a cooperator in that time-step) for the FCI public goods
game, and show that there is an increase in cooperation when asynchronous updates are used.
Figure 2.2 plots the change in cooperation for a single run of the dynamics for each update rule,
and shows the difference in the frequency of cooperation at all time steps. Although the dynamics
are noisy, after an initial period of increasing or decreasing cooperation, they eventually oscillate
around a set value. To demonstrate that the dynamics reach an equilibrium, I run the dynamics
for 80,000 updates of the network. This is four times as long as the dynamics are run in the
simulations in the rest of the chapter, where the dynamics are run for 20,000 updates (and an
average taken over the last 2,000). The asynchronous dynamics fixate to their maximum possible
value, with all connected nodes playing as cooperators. However, because there are some nodes
with zero degree, these cannot alter strategy and so remain as defectors. The increasingly volatile
nature of the synchronous dynamics is due to the unstable nature of the clusters of cooperators
on the network: these clusters may be periodically invaded by defectors before increasing in size.
Figure 2.3 shows the mean frequency of cooperation across both layers plotted against the
scaled enhancement factor η = r〈k〉+1 for the fixed cost per individual (FCI) public goods game for
a two-layer multiplex with noise of β = 0.5. From this figure I see that updating the strategies on
each layer of the multiplex asynchronously leads to a higher frequency of cooperation compared
to updating synchronously. At enhancement factor η = 0.76 the difference between the mean
frequencies of cooperation is very large, with almost no cooperation present in the synchronous
26
2.3 Mean cooperation for asynchronous and synchronous update rules for the FCI public goods
game
−2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
log(Time), log(t)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n,
 ρ
 
 
Synchronous
Asynchronous
Figure 2.2: The frequency of cooperation on the two-layer public goods game plotted against
time for the asynchronous (solid black line) and synchronous (dashed red line) update rules
for fixed cost per individual (FCI). Simulations for enhancement factor η = 0.78, mean degree
〈k〉 = 3 and noise β = 0.5. The number of nodes on each layer is N = 1000 and the number of
layers is m = 2.
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Figure 2.3: The frequency of cooperation on the two-layer public goods game plotted against
the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈k〉+1 for the asynchronous (solid black line) and synchronous
(dashed red line) update rules for fixed cost per individual (FCI). Simulations for mean degree
〈k〉 = 3 and noise β = 0.5. Individual runs are plotted as crosses in the asynchronous and circles
in the synchronous case. The number of nodes on each layer is N = 1000 and the number of
layers is m = 2.
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update system, and between 30 and 100% in the asynchronous update, with a similarly large
difference seen for enhancement factor η = 0.78. Also, the value of the enhancement factor at
which the system changes from complete defection to a mixed state is higher in the synchronous
update case (η = 0.76 compared to η = 0.72). Similarly, the enhancement factor at which
the system changes from a mixture of strategies to complete cooperation is also higher for
the synchronous update. This demonstrates that asynchronous updating can act as a novel
mechanism to maintain cooperation at lower enhancement factors that has not previously been
considered.
I further explore the differences between the two rules by plotting the frequency of coopera-
tion on the layer with the higher (figure 2.4a) and lower (figure 2.4b) frequency of cooperation,
where the “higher” layer corresponds to the layer on which the highest frequency of coopera-
tion is observed in each simulation. This figure begins to explain why there is a difference in
outcome between the asynchronous and synchronous rules. In the plot of the high cooperation
layer nearly all runs at all parameter levels fixate to either cooperation or defection. The asyn-
chronous update rule fixates to cooperation more frequently than the synchronous rule for the
mid-range enhancement factors, thereby increasing cooperation in the whole system. Similar re-
sults are observed in figure 2.4b, where at low enhancement factors the synchronous rule fixates
to defection more frequently than the asynchronous layer.
2.3.1 Four layer results for the FCI public goods game
I repeat the simulations from the previous section for a four-layer system, with results plotted
in figure 2.5. In these simulations the asynchronous dynamics are run for four times as long
as the synchronous ones. Once again I observe that the asynchronous update rule results in
both a higher frequency of cooperation, and a different critical enhancement factor at which
the system moves from complete defection to a mixture of cooperators and defectors, thereby
confirming the results for the two-layer multiplex. I observe in this plot that the results from
each individual simulation are noisy at each enhancement factor. Because these simulations are
computationally intensive (with each run taking a number of hours) the number of nodes on
each layer is restricted, and because of this small fluctuations in the number of cooperators may
cause them to fixate to either cooperation of defection.
2.4 Explanation of the effect
I explain the results in section 2.3 by first showing that the probability of a cooperator imitating
a defector (and vice versa) is altered by the additional payoff computation in the asynchronous
case. I explain this change using empirical plots of the imitation probability, and then study
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(a) High frequency layer
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(b) Low frequency layer
Figure 2.4: The frequency of cooperation on the two-layer public goods game plotted against
the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈k〉+1 for the asynchronous (solid black line) and synchronous
(dashed red line) update rules for fixed cost per individual (FCI). The frequency on the layer with
the higher cooperation (figure 2.4a) and lower cooperation (figure 2.4b) are plotted, with the
higher and lower layer identified as the layers with the highest or lowest frequency of cooperation
at the end of the simulation. Simulations for mean degree 〈k〉 = 3 and noise β = 0.5. The crosses
and circles plot the individual runs for the asynchronous and synchronous dynamics respectively.
The number of nodes on each layer is N = 1000 and the number of layers is m = 2.
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Figure 2.5: The frequency of cooperation on the four-layer public goods game plotted against
the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈k〉+1 for the asynchronous (solid black line) and synchronous
(dashed red line) update rules for fixed cost per individual (FCI). Simulations for mean degree
〈k〉 = 3, noise β = 0.5, number of layers m = 4, and number of nodes N = 500. The crosses and
circles plot the individual runs for the asynchronous and synchronous dynamics respectively. In
these simulations the asynchronous simulations are run for four times as long as the synchronous.
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(a) An example of the synchronous update rule. The central node in the multiplex,
s, imitates player u and t in a single time step.
(b) An example of the asynchronous update rule. The central node in the multiplex,
s, imitates player u after the first payoff calculation, but does not imitate player t
in the second strategy update due to the change in payoffs.
Figure 2.6: A cartoon example of the difference in strategy imitation in the asynchronous and
synchronous update rule. In this example a central node with strategy s1 on the top layer and
s2 on the bottom is connected to a player with strategy u1 on the top and a player strategy t2 on
the lower layer. Figures 2.6a and 2.6b show how the focal player’s strategy may differ between
the synchronous and asynchronous update rules.
a mean-field version of the dynamics to show that it is the introduction of structure to the
population that is the critical factor. The size of the effect is reduced for deterministic dynamics,
but even if all possible sources of randomness are removed from the system the asynchronous
and synchronous rules result in different frequencies of cooperation.
2.4.1 Empirical imitation probabilities
To explain the differences between the two rules I show that if updates occur asynchronously
the probability of a cooperator imitating a defector is changed at high positive payoff differences
compared to the synchronous case. A cartoon of three players on the multiplex, s, t and u, is
shown in figures 2.6a and 2.6b. The strategies for player s are s1 on the top layer and s2 on the
bottom, and similarly for players t and u. Assuming initially that Pu and Pt are greater than
Ps, and that the dynamics are not too noisy (β is not large), figure 2.6a demonstrates the likely
strategies after a single time step, with player s imitating player u on the top layer and player t
on the lower layer.
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When updating using the asynchronous rule the neighbours’ strategies and payoffs may
change before player s has a chance to compare payoffs and imitate them, resulting in a difference
in imitation probability. In asynchronous updates, each player selects the neighbour to imitate
only once they have been selected, and so each node on each layer chooses their neighbour
independently after the payoff update. If this probability changes by a large enough amount,
player s may no longer imitate player t on the lower layer. Therefore updating the multiplex
asynchronously rather than synchronously may lead to different numbers of cooperators and
defectors after a single update.
I confirm this is the case by empirically measuring the probability of player i imitating the
strategy of each neighbour j for each payoff difference Pj − Pi for both the asynchronous and
synchronous update rules. I collect results from a single simulation for 1000 updates of the
entire network at an enhancement factor that exhibits a large difference between the two rules
(η = 0.76). I then calculate the probabilities by placing each measured payoff difference into a
bin of width 0.1. Figure 2.7 shows the probability that a player imitates a neighbour’s strategy
plotted against the payoff difference, with the plot on the left showing the probability of a
cooperator imitating a defector and the plot on the right showing the probability that a defector
imitates a cooperator.
As expected from the form of equation (2.4), for both update rules (figure 2.7) the proba-
bility of strategy imitation is high for positive payoff differences, and increases as the difference
increases, the reverse being true for negative payoff differences. The probabilities become noisier
at very low payoff differences, but this is due to the small number of empirical data points.
The synchronous update rule curve (the dotted red line) follows the form of the Fermi
imitation probability (equation (2.4)) for most payoff differences, as expected. In contrast the
asynchronous rule (the solid black line) does not follow equation (2.4) particularly well for
positive payoff differences. For most of the range of the positive payoff differences, both the
probability of a cooperator imitating a defector, and vice versa, is lower for each payoff difference
compared to the results for the synchronous update rule (although at negative and very small
positive payoff differences the two rules almost agree). Put more simply, in the asynchronous
case a player is less likely to imitate a better-performing neighbour than in the synchronous
case.
In the parameter range investigated here (η < 1), in the public goods game a better perform-
ing neighbour is likely to be a defector, and so cooperators are less likely to imitate defectors
in the asynchronous case. In these simulations the difference is taken between the two updates,
and this explains the variability between the two rules. This introduces an asymmetry in the
chance of a cooperator imitating a defector, and vice versa. This asymmetry is in favour of
cooperators imitating defectors less frequently than defectors imitating cooperators, and this
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Figure 2.7: The probability of strategy imitation on the two-layer multiplex for the asynchronous
(solid black line) and synchronous (dashed red line) update rules for fixed cost per individual
(FCI) public goods game. Results are taken from a single run of the dynamics with enhancement
factor η = 0.76, mean degree 〈k〉 = 3 and noise β = 0.5. Number of nodes on each layerN = 1000
and number of layers m = 2. Dashed blue line calculated using the Fermi rule (equation (2.4)).
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promotes the maintenance of cooperation. Hence, the asynchronous and synchronous update
rules lead to different frequencies of cooperation in the population due to the additional payoff
update in each time step in the asynchronous case, and this leads to a reduced probability of a
player imitating a better performing neighbour.
To sum up, the probability of a player imitating a neighbour is reduced in the asynchronous
case for an equal payoff difference, and this causes the increase in cooperation. I now show that
this change is caused by the sensitivity of the Fermi imitation probability to the group composi-
tion. I do this by artificially forming neighbourhoods and numerically calculating the imitation
probability. In these artificial groups a central cooperator and defector play in neighbourhoods
consisting of NC and ND cooperators respectively. The probability of a cooperator in a neigh-
bourhood consisting of NC cooperators imitating a defector surrounded by ND cooperators is
calculated using equation (2.4). Averaging these probabilities over all possible arrangements of
NC and ND across all layers an expected imitation probability is calculated. Figure 2.8 plots
this expected probability against ND for NC = 9, 10, 11 for the FCI public goods game for
parameter values where the largest difference between the two rules is observed (enhancement
factor η = 0.78). This plot shows that if the group composition changes e.g. from ND = 6
to ND = 16, the probability of a cooperator imitating a neighbouring defector is significantly
affected. Therefore, there is likely to be a large difference in the probability of a cooperator
imitating a neighbouring defector under synchronous or asynchronous updating.
These results are confirmed empirically by running a single iteration of the dynamics. Record-
ing that player i selects player j to compare payoffs at time step t enables the payoffs of the two
players to be measured at both t and t − 1 (for t greater than one). Writing these payoffs as
Pi(t), Pj(t), Pi(t− 1) and Pj(t− 1) and substituting them into equation (2.4), the change in the
probability of imitating a neighbouring strategy over two payoff updates is measured. A his-
togram plotting the difference in imitation probabilities between two neighbours for consecutive
time steps for the asynchronous rule is shown in figure 2.9 for η = 0.78.
In this histogram approximately 45% of the update probabilities change between the two
payoff updates (in the synchronous case this number would be 0%). Therefore, starting from
identical networks with identical strategies, the probability of a given cooperator imitating a
neighbouring defector (and vice versa) is different under the asynchronous and synchronous
update rules.
When the population is close to fixating to either cooperation or defection, very little change
in the group composition is possible. However, when the fraction of cooperation is approximately
50% there are even numbers of cooperators and defectors in the population, and so the com-
position of the groups can change by a large amount. This explains why the largest difference
between the two rules is observed at this frequency of cooperation (figure 2.3).
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Figure 2.8: The probability of a cooperator in a neighbourhood composed of NC cooperators
imitating a defector plotted against number of cooperators in the defector’s neighbourhood,
ND for the FCI public goods game. Imitation probability calculated for enhancement factor
η = 0.78, noise β = 0.5, mean degree 〈k〉 = 3 and across m = 2 layers.
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Figure 2.9: Histogram showing the measured change in imitation probabilities between players i
and j after a single payoff calculation for a cooperator imitating a defector (left) and a defector
imitating a cooperator (right) for the FCI public goods game. Simulation run for enhancement
factor η = 0.78, noise β = 0.5 on m = 2 layers with N = 1000 nodes on each. Simulations were
run for 500 complete updates.
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These results show that over a single update there is a difference in the imitation probability
between the two update rules for various payoff differences. I now show that this small difference
also explains the long term increase in cooperation in the asynchronous case.
2.4.2 Analytical mean-field cooperation
In this section I make a number of assumptions in order to derive an analytical approximation
for the frequency of cooperation for the two update rules. To do this I calculate the frequency
of cooperation in the mean-field case on a two-layer multiplex. Here, I assume the probability
of a player cooperating on each layer is the same as the frequency of cooperation in the entire
population, and that each group is formed at random at the beginning of each payoff calculation.
2.4.2.1 Mean-field calculation of the expected payoff
In the FCI public goods game player i donates 1ki+1 if they are a cooperator and zero if they are
a defector. The strategy of player i on layer l is sli and equals one for a cooperator and zero for
a defector. Player i therefore contributes
cli = s
l
i
1
ki + 1
, (2.5)
to each group in which they are playing. The payoff of player i in group g on layer l is
P li,g = r
cli +
∑
j∈g c
l
j
ki + 1
− cli (2.6)
= η
sli 1ki + 1 +∑j∈g
1
kj + 1
slj
− sli 1ki + 1 (2.7)
where once again j ∈ g refers to the players selected for group g, N li,g is the number of cooperators
in group g on layer l. I assume that each node has the same degree so denote that ki = 〈k〉 for
all i and so
P li,g = η
 sli
〈k〉+ 1 +
1
〈k〉+ 1
∑
j∈g
slj,g
− sli〈k〉+ 1 (2.8)
=
1
〈k〉+ 1(s
l
i(η − 1) + η
∑
j∈g
slj,g) (2.9)
=
1
〈k〉+ 1(s
l
i(η − 1) + ηN li,g). (2.10)
I assume that the 〈k〉+ 1 groups are identical, so N li,g = N li for all g and
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P li = (〈k〉+ 1)
1
〈k〉+ 1(s
l
i(η − 1) + ηN li ) (2.11)
= ηN li + s
l
i(η − 1) (2.12)
and summing across the two layers
Pi = η(N
1
i +N
2
i ) + (η − 1)(s1i + s2i ). (2.13)
To find the expected change in the frequency of cooperation between payoff updates I treat each
player across both layers as a single strategy. For each player on the two-layer multiplex there are
four possible strategies across both layers: cooperate-cooperate (CC); cooperate-defect (CD);
defect-cooperate (DC) and defect-defect (DD). I define player i’s strategy across both layers as
Si giving an expected payoff for player i
Pi = η(N
1
i +N
2
i ) +

2(η − 1) if Si = CC
(η − 1) if Si = CD
(η − 1) if Si = DC
0 if Si = DD.
(2.14)
2.4.2.2 Strategy imitation probabilities
The expected payoff of each player depends on the composition of its group. Therefore, the
probability of player i imitating player j consists of three parts: the probability of player i
selecting player j to imitate; the probability of the group compositions of each player on each
layer; and the probability that in each case player j imitates player i. The frequency of each
strategy in the population is
~σ(t) =

ρ(t)2
ρ(t)(1− ρ(t))
ρ(t)(1− ρ(t))
(1− ρ(t))2
 . (2.15)
where σx is the frequency of strategy x where x = 1, 2, 3, 4 corresponds to CC, CD, DC and
DD respectively, and as defined in previous sections ρ(t) is the frequency of cooperation across
the two layers at time t, and each element corresponds to strategy CC, CD, DC, and DD
respectively. The expected probability of player i imitating player j at time t is
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pij(t) = σiσj
〈k〉∑
N1i =0
〈k〉∑
N2i =0
〈k〉∑
N1j=0
〈k〉∑
N2j=0
wt(N
1
i )wt(N
2
i )wt(N
1
j )wt(N
2
j )q(Pj , Pi) (2.16)
where σi is the strategy played by player i and σj is the strategy played by player j, and
wt(N
l
i ) =
(〈k〉
N li
)
ρ(t)N
l
i (1− ρ(t))〈k〉−N li (2.17)
is the probability of a group composed of N li cooperators and
q(Pj , Pi) =
1
1 + e
−Pj−Pi
β
. (2.18)
is the Fermi imitation probability, from before.
2.4.2.3 Frequency of strategy change
If a CC player imitates a DD player the resulting strategy may be either CD or DC depending
on which layer is selected for strategy update. Hence, because in the following calculations each
player updates their strategy on only one layer, when one strategy imitates another the final
strategy is not the same as that imitated. Therefore, the probability of strategy i updating to
strategy j depends on the probability that strategy i imitates strategy k, which results in strategy
j. For example, the probability of strategy CC updating to strategy CD is the probability that
a CC player imitates a DD player or a CD player on the lower layer. If the rate at which player
i becomes player j at time t is given by vi,j(t) then
vCC,CD(t) =
1
2
pCC,DD(t) +
1
2
pCC,CD(t) =
1
2
(pCC,DD(t) + pCC,CD(t)) (2.19)
where the factor of a half is included as the correct layer must be selected for the strategy
imitation. Similarly, for each of the other strategy imitations
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vCC,DC(t) =
1
2
(pCC,DD(t) + pCC,DC(t)) (2.20)
vCD,CC(t) =
1
2
(pCD,CC(t) + pCD,DC(t)) (2.21)
vCD,DD(t) =
1
2
(pCD,DD(t) + pCD,DC(t)) (2.22)
vDC,CC(t) =
1
2
(pDC,CC(t) + pDC,CD(t)) (2.23)
vDC,DD(t) =
1
2
(pDC,DD(t) + pDC,CD(t)) (2.24)
vDD,CD(t) =
1
2
(pDD,CD(t) + pDD,CC(t)) (2.25)
vDD,DC(t) =
1
2
(pDD,DC(t) + pDD,CC(t)). (2.26)
The increase in the frequency of cooperation is given by the sum of the frequency of each strategy
change that leads to an increase in cooperation,
ρ+(t) = vCD,CC(t) + vDC,CC(t) + vDD,CD(t) + vDD,DC(t) (2.27)
and the decrease in cooperation is similarly
ρ−(t) = vCD,DD(t) + vDC,DD(t) + vCC,CD(t) + vCC,DC(t). (2.28)
Finally, the change in the frequency of cooperation is given by the initial frequency plus half the
net change caused by strategy imitation (due to selecting one layer at a time)
ρ(t+ 1) = ρ(t) +
1
2
(ρ+(t)− ρ−(t)). (2.29)
To calculate the mean-field frequency of cooperation this form is iterated, with the frequency
of strategy change calculated every update in the case of the asynchronous rule and every two
updates in the synchronous case.
2.4.2.4 Comparison between asynchronous and synchronous mean-field cooperation
I calculate the frequency of cooperation in the mean-field case for both the synchronous and
asynchronous update rules using the form described in the previous section for varying enhance-
ment factors.
Figure 2.10 plots the mean cooperation against the scaled enhancement factor for the mean-
field results described above (equations (2.14) to (2.29)). Numerical simulation results for the
asynchronous and synchronous update rules are plotted for two different group size distributions:
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regular (dashed lines) and heterogeneous (group sizes assigned as if they are part of an Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi network, solid red and black). For the numerical simulations new groups are formed at
each time step, and the simulations are run until cooperation fixates on each layer. The mean
of ten simulations are plotted for each network architecture, along with each of the ten runs.
Figure 2.10 shows that the mean-field approximation works well for the constant group sizes,
but disagrees when group sizes are heterogeneous. This shows that the approximations made in
formulating equation (2.14) are too broad to agree with well-mixed numerical simulations with
heterogeneous group sizes.
Comparing figure 2.10 with figure 2.3 we can also see the effect of the network structure on
the mean cooperation, with the critical enhancement factor needed for any cooperation to be
found on the network decreased below η = 1.
2.5 Results for the deterministic dynamics
The results in section 2.4 showed that the asynchronous rule increases cooperation because the
additional payoff computation helps insulate cooperators against invasion by defectors. This is
because the strategies of the neighbouring players change after a single strategy update, in many
cases changing the probability of a cooperator imitating a defector. In this section this finding is
confirmed by showing that the size of the effect is reduced when the dynamics are deterministic,
and that this reduction is due to the change in the gradient of the Fermi imitation probability.
2.5.1 Results for the varied enhancement factor for deterministic dynamics
Testing the importance of the update rule for other values of noise, figure 2.11 shows that for
FCI deterministic updates (β = 0) the asynchronous update rule once again leads to a higher
final frequency of cooperation over a range of enhancement factors. However, the differences in
figure 2.11 are much smaller than in figure 2.3, with the asynchronous and synchronous results
overlapping over the entire range of enhancement factors.
The calculations for the imitation probability curves presented in figure 2.8 were repeated,
this time for the FCI public goods game with no noise (β = 0) and the results are presented
in figure 2.12. Comparing the results with those obtained with noise β = 0.5, the imitation
probability curves in figures 2.12 do not change across a large number of cooperators than those
in figure 2.8. Therefore, if the number of cooperators in the neighbouring defector’s group
changes between payoff updates e.g. from ND = 12 to ND = 18, this has less of an effect on the
probability of strategy imitation, and so the choice of update rule has less of an effect on the
final frequency of cooperation.
The deterministic results are confirmed by empirical measurements of the change in imitation
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Figure 2.10: The mean cooperation plotted against the scaled enhancement factor for a well-
mixed population. Numerical simulations are run for regular (G = 5, dashed line plots the
mean) and heterogeneous (〈G〉 = 4, solid black and red lines plot the mean) group sizes for
asynchronous and synchronous updates. Analytics are calculated using equation (2.14) (blue
and green solid lines). Numerical simulations run for population size N = 225 on m = 2 layers
with noise β = 0.5. Simulations are run until each layer fixates to cooperation or defection.
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Figure 2.11: The frequency of cooperation in the two-layer deterministic public goods game
plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈k〉+1 for the asynchronous (solid black line)
and synchronous (dashed red line) update rules for fixed cost per individual (FCI). Simulations
are run for mean degree 〈k〉 = 3 and noise β = 0. The number of nodes on each layer is N = 1000
and the number of layers is m = 2.
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Figure 2.12: The probability of a cooperator in a neighbourhood composed of NC cooperators
imitating a defector plotted against the number of cooperators in the defector’s neighbourhood,
ND for the FCI PGG for enhancement factor η = 0.72 and deterministic dynamics (β = 0). The
mean degree of the network is 〈k〉 = 3 across m = 2 layers.
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Figure 2.13: Histogram showing the change in imitation probabilities between players i and j
after a single update of the payoffs for a cooperator imitating a defector (left) and a defector
imitating a cooperator (right) for the deterministic FCI public goods game. The enhancement
factor is η = 0.78, the noise parameter is β = 0. Simulations were run on m = 2 layers with
N = 1000 nodes on each. Simulations were run for 500 complete updates.
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probability after a single payoff update in the asynchronous update (figure 2.13). The imitation
probability does not alter over a single time step for many of the players in the population, and
therefore the difference between asynchronous and synchronous updates is diminished.
2.5.2 Explanation for the difference between noisy and deterministic dynamics
Motivated by the results in the last section, I investigate the importance of randomness to the
different outcomes from the synchronous and asynchronous updates. I show that even when all
randomness has been eliminated, the asynchronous and synchronous update rules still generate
different frequencies of cooperation. The possible sources of difference between each run of the
dynamics are:
1. The network. The asynchronous and synchronous dynamics are not run on identical
networks, since a new network is generated for each run and each rule.
2. The initial strategies. Again, the initial strategies are generated anew for each run.
3. The players selected to imitate are different at each time step for each rule. At time t
on layer l player i may select player j to imitate in the synchronous run, whereas in the
asynchronous case player i may select player k.
4. In the asynchronous case each player selects a layer to update on at random, rather than
all players updating on the first layer at time t and the second layer at t+ 1.
In the following simulations I remove these differences. As above, deterministic strategy
updates are implemented. To ensure that players select the same neighbours at each time step
for both update rules I generate a list of the selected pairs of players (i and j on each layer)
which is the same in both the asynchronous and synchronous simulations. The same list of
selected neighbours on each layer is used for both update rules, but in the asynchronous case
once strategies are updated for all nodes across one layer the payoffs are updated. This set is
used for the simulations at each enhancement factor.
I also remove the possibility that the choice of update layer in the asynchronous case affects
the impact of the different rules. I do this by updating the strategies of players on one layer at
time step t, calculating each player’s payoff, and updating their strategies on the other layer at
time step t + 1. Both layers are updated at time step t in the synchronous case. When this is
implemented the only difference between the asynchronous and the synchronous update rules is
that in the asynchronous case the players calculate their payoffs after all of the nodes in a single
layer update their strategies, whereas in the synchronous case both layers update their strategies
before the payoffs are updated. The dynamics are run on networks of random topology, with
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identical networks and initial strategies used for each run of the dynamics (for each enhancement
factor and for each of the update rules). In the following results the dynamics were run for 1000
complete updates of the system (2000 time steps in the asychronous case).
The results in figure 2.14 display the time evolution of the frequency of cooperation for
enhancement factor η = 0.78 for both the asynchronous and the synchronous update rules. As
usual, in these results the time axis is scaled in the asynchronous case so that one time step
corresponds to a complete update of the system.
Figure 2.14 shows that the frequency of cooperation at each time step is different for the
asynchronous and synchronous update rules. Therefore, even when the only difference between
the two simulations is that after updating a single layer the payoffs are updated in the asyn-
chronous, but not in the synchronous case, the two update rules lead to different frequencies of
cooperation at each time step.
From the results above it can be seen that the introduction of noise amplifies the difference
between the synchronous and asynchronous update rules. The randomness may be from a
larger noise parameter (β) or from selecting different neighours on different layers at each time
step. Increased randomness increases the size of the effect because when the composition of the
population alters between payoff updates, this alters the probability that one strategy imitates
another.
2.6 Results for the fixed-cost-per-group (FCG) public goods game
In this section I plot results for the second version of the public goods game, the fixed-cost-per-
group (FCG), and demonstrate once again that asynchronous updates result in higher frequencies
of cooperation for the same reasons as previously discussed. When the FCG public goods game
is used asynchronous updates again appear to increase cooperation, although now there is more
overlap between the individual simulations.
Figure 2.15 shows the effect of the choice of update rule when the players contribute one unit
to every group in the public goods game. Once again, when comparing the mean cooperation
across a number of different runs of the dynamics the asynchronous update rule leads to higher
frequencies of cooperation for a wide range of enhancement factors. However, comparing these
results to the FCI case in figure 2.3 more overlap exists between the individual runs in the
FCG case. Therefore, it is more difficult to say that the asynchronous rule definitively increases
cooperation.
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Figure 2.14: A single run of the deterministic dynamics for enhancement factor η = 0.78. For
both the asynchronous and synchronous update rules the same initial conditions (network and
strategy) are implemented. Also, each player selects the same neighbour to imitate at each time
step. The only difference between the two rules is that in the asynchronous case the payoffs of all
the players are updated after the strategies are updated on one layer, while in the synchronous
case this payoff update occurs after strategy updates across both layers. Mean degree 〈k〉 = 3,
number of layers m = 2 and number of nodes on each layer N = 1000.
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Figure 2.15: The frequency of cooperation on the two-layer public goods game plotted against
the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈k〉+1 for the asynchronous (solid black line) and synchronous
(dashed red line) update rules for fixed cost per group (FCG). Simulations are run for mean
degree 〈k〉 = 3 and noise β = 0.5. The number of nodes on each layer is N = 1000 and the
number of layers is m = 2.
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2.6.1 Why do different versions of the public goods game lead to a different size of
effect?
I calculate the imitation probabilities for the FCG public goods game (noise of β = 0.5, players
donate one unit to every group in which they participate) and plot the results in figure 2.16.
Comparing these results with those for the noisy FCI (figure 2.8), the imitation probability curves
in figures 2.16 are much steeper. This confirms previous results: if the imitation probability
function is steep, the difference between the asynchronous and synchronous update rules is
reduced.
Comparing the frequency of p(t)− p(t− 1) 6= 0 for asynchronous updates for the noisy FCG
(figure 2.17) and the deterministic FCI (figure 2.13) with the results for the noisy FCI (β = 0.5)
(figure 2.9), the scenario with the largest imitation probability change is the noisy FCI, followed
by the noisy FCG (β = 0.5) and finally the deterministic FCI (β = 0). Therefore, the choice
of update rule has the most impact for the noisy FCI, as here the probability of imitating a
neighbouring defector changes the most between payoff calculations. What these results show
is that when imitation probabilities are strongly dependent on the composition of the groups,
players’ outcomes are affected by the choice of update rule.
2.7 Results for the prisoner’s dilemma
In this section I show that the choice between the synchronous and asynchronous update rules
also affects the frequency of cooperation in a different social dilemma. I find that in the prisoner’s
dilemma, the form of the strategy imitation probability affects the difference in outcomes between
the asynchronous and synchronous update rules. The dynamics in this simulation are run for
100, 000 time steps each.
2.7.1 The two different strategy imitation probabilities
In this section results are plotted for two different strategy imitation probabilities. The first is
the Fermi imitation probability (equation 2.4), as used in the public goods game simulations.
The second is the imitation probability used by Go´mez-Garden˜es et al. [84] in their investigation
of the prisoner’s dilemma on multiplex networks, namely
q(si → sj) = Pj − Pi
bKmax
, (2.30)
where Kmax is the largest of the sums of the degrees across the two layers of the two players,
and where the inclusion of this term in the denominator ensures that the strategy imitation
probability remains between zero and one. This is labelled as the payoff difference imitation
probability for the rest of this chapter.
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Figure 2.16: The probability of a cooperator in a neighbourhood composed of NC cooperators
imitating a defector plotted against number of cooperators in the defector’s neighbourhood, ND
for the FCG public goods game for enhancement factor η = 0.72 and deterministic dynamics
(β = 0.5) and across m = 2 layers. The mean degree of the network is 〈k〉 = 3.
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Figure 2.17: Histogram showing the change in imitation probabilities between players i and j
after a single update of the payoffs for si = C, sj = D and si = D, sj = C for the FCG public
goods game. The enhancement factor is η = 0.78 and the noise parameter is β = 0.5 on m = 2
layers with N = 1000 nodes on each. Simulations were run for 500 complete updates.
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2.7.2 Numerical simulation results for the prisoner’s dilemma
I find that the asynchronous update rule increases cooperation for both strategy imitation prob-
abilities. However, the effect is very small for the Fermi imitation probability, and much larger
for the payoff difference imitation probability. This is once again explained by the sensitivity of
the two update rules to changes in the composition of the neighbourhood, as is shown in figure
2.19.
Figure 2.18 shows the final frequencies of cooperation for the asynchronous and synchronous
update rules for these two different strategy imitation probabilities. For Fermi imitations (figure
2.18a) the results are very similar to those found in the public goods game: for temptation
to defect between 1.61 and 1.86 the asynchronous update rule leads to a higher frequency of
cooperation compared to the synchronous rule, although the effect is not large. For the payoff
difference imitation probability (equation (2.30)) there is a larger difference between the two
rules for low temptation to defect, and little difference as the temptation to defect increases.
The difference between synchronous and asynchronous updating is explained by plotting the
imitation probabilities for a temptation to defect of b = 1.1 for both the Fermi and the payoff
difference cases. At this temptation to defect the frequency of cooperation is high, and so the
likely number of cooperators in the neighbouring defector’s group is large. Figure 2.19a shows
that using the Fermi imitation probability a change in the composition of a player’s neighbour-
hood does not change the probability of imitation (for large cooperation levels). Therefore, if
the number of cooperators in the group changes through the additional strategy update in the
asynchronous case, this does not lead to a large difference in imitation probability. This is not
what is observed in figure 2.19b, where there is a difference in the imitation probability between
each value of ND. Therefore, if the number of cooperators in a group changes, this leads to a
different imitation probability.
To sum up, as before the sensitivity of each of the imitation probability functions to the
change in neighbourhood composition is the key factor in the difference in outcomes between
the synchronous and asynchronous updates. This section has shown that this is true for two
different imitation probabilities and a different social dilemma to that studied in sections 2.3
and 2.6.
2.8 Discussion and conclusions
In this chapter I have demonstrated that whether a player updates its strategy on one layer
(asynchronous updates) or all layers (synchronous) between payoff calculations can affect the
frequency of cooperation, with asynchronous updates leading to higher levels. This is because
asynchronous updates allow cooperators to resist invasion by defectors by reducing the prob-
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(a) The Fermi imitation probability. β = 0.1.
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(b) The payoff difference imitation probability.
Figure 2.18: The frequency of cooperation in the two-layer PD plotted against the temptation
to defect for the asynchronous (solid black line) and synchronous (dashed red line) update rules
for the Fermi imitation probability (noise β = 0.1) (2.18a) and the payoff difference imitation
probability (2.18b). Simulations run on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with mean degree 〈k〉 = 3. The
number of nodes on each layer is N = 1000 and the number of layers is m = 2.
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(b) PD payoff difference imitation probability.
Figure 2.19: The probability of a cooperator in a neighbourhood composed of NC cooperators
imitating a defector plotted against number of cooperators in the defector’s neighbourhood, ND
for the PD Fermi and PD payoff difference imitation probability. Expected payoffs generated
for temptation to defect b = 1.1, mean degree 〈k〉 = 3 and across m = 2 layers.
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ability of a cooperator imitating a better performing defector. This effect is shown to be less
important for deterministic dynamics in the FCI public goods game and also the prisoner’s
dilemma.
Even when the differences between the asynchronous and synchronous update rules are kept
to the absolute minimum there are still differences in the frequency of cooperation in each
system. In the synchronous case if a selected neighbouring player has a higher payoff their
strategy is imitated after a complete update of the system. This is not necessarily the case when
an asynchronous update is used, because the payoffs of these neighbouring players are calculated
again after half the strategies have been updated, leaving the possibility that the neighbour’s
payoff is no longer larger, or that the probability of imitation is reduced.
In this chapter I found that many different factors affect the difference in cooperation fre-
quency between the asynchronous and synchronous update rules. These include the type of
game, how deterministic the dynamics are, and the form of the strategy imitation probability. If
the imitation probability is sensitive to changes in a player’s group composition, the additional
payoff calculation in the asynchronous case may notably alter the probability of a cooperator im-
itating a defector. The choice of rule is most important when the strategy imitation probability
strongly depends on the number of cooperators in a player’s group.
My results show that it is important to consider how to update the strategies when playing
games on multiplex networks. If the game, the network or the strategy imitation probabilities
(or a combination of all three) are sensitive to the group composition, this leads to different
frequencies of cooperation depending on how the strategies are updated, and results in models
that use different rules leading to different conclusions. Therefore, when designing coopera-
tion models involving multilayered systems, it is important to consider whether updates occur
asynchronously or synchronously across the layers.
3
A new multiplex model: an economic and a social layer
3.1 Background literature
In the previous model (described in chapter 2) each layer of the multiplex represented a separate
public goods game. Each player participated in each of these games, not necessarily playing the
same strategy on each layer. This chapter introduces a new version of the public goods game on
a two-layer multiplex, where now one layer is the standard network version of the public goods
game (which will be called the economic layer), and the other represents the social connections
of the population (labelled as the social layer). This work will show that when the social layer is
added to the economic layer, the strategy of each player can be significantly changed. The code
and data for the figures in this and subsequent chapters can be found at 10.5281/zenodo.801737.
The model that is described below can be thought of as the end result of a series of relaxations
from the strict assumptions of the standard public goods game. As described in the introduction
(chapter 1), in the standard public goods game each player can only play one of two strategies:
unconditional cooperation or unconditional defection. When a player changes strategy, they only
take the payoff of the player they are imitating into account, and would always like to increase
their payoff. When playing the game on networks they update their strategy by exactly imitating
their neighbour. However, recent empirical results suggest that many of these assumptions are
not accurate, and in order to better model cooperation some features of the real world must be
taken into consideration.
In this chapter I present the motivation, model and numerical results for a multiplex model
of conditional cooperation in the public goods game, where players update their strategies by
considering economic information from one layer, and social influence on another.
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3.1.1 Laboratory experiments on cooperation
3.1.1.1 Empirical measurement of cooperation on networks
As previously discussed, much of the work studying cooperation on networks is based on nu-
merical simulations of the public goods game and prisoner’s dilemma on networks (both lattices
and networks with more heterogeneous degree distributions). In the majority of these studies
cooperation persists on networks for parameter values where free-riders would be expected to
dominate, and the explanation for this is that cooperators group together to resist invasion by
free-riders, a process called network reciprocity. Data from a number of empirical experiments
has allowed comparison between real participants’ behaviour and the predicted effect of network
reciprocity found in these numerical simulations.
Rand et al. [93] investigated the importance of network reciprocity on static networks by
playing the prisoner’s dilemma with real participants. Here they found empirical evidence for
increased cooperation on networks where the edges are fixed for the duration of the experiment
if bc is greater than the degree of each node, where b is the benefit gained at a cost c, and k is
the degree of every node. This is due to cooperators forming clusters and avoiding exploitation
by defectors, as the theory suggests. In contrast, results from three experiments where real
participants play the prisoner’s dilemma whilst placed on a lattice were compiled by Grujic´ et
al. [94], and in each case network reciprocity was not observed. Instead they found the most
likely explanation for the mechanism by which players select their strategy is moody conditional
cooperation. Players using this strategy base their decision on whether to cooperate or defect
on both the number of cooperators in their group (defined by the network) and also their own
previous strategy. The larger the number of cooperators, the higher the probability that the
player will cooperate. This hypothesis was tested by Gracia-La´zaro et al. [95] through numerical
models. To do this players are assigned as unconditional cooperators, unconditional defectors
and moody conditional cooperators and play the prisoner’s dilemma both on a lattice and in
a well-mixed population. Initialising the model with different frequencies of each strategy the
equilibrium frequency of cooperation was both calculated and simulated. The underlying net-
work structure made little difference to the amount of cooperation in the system, demonstrating
the lack of network reciprocity in numerical simulations that include strategies inspired by the
way people play the game in the laboratory. If the empirically measured frequencies of strategies
were used in this model the analytical results agreed very well with those found in the labora-
tory. Thus this suggests that if we want to describe cooperation in the real world accurately
we must take into account the fact that players do not play an unconditional strategy blindly,
and that if conditional cooperators are included in this model standard results due to network
reciprocity disappear.
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Cimini and Sa´nchez [96] numerically modelled the evolution of these moody conditional
cooperators on the network using a number of update rules. These included not only payoff-
dependent ones, such as the Fermi update rule and unconditional imitation (where the strategy
of the best performing neighbour is imitated), but also more interesting rules where the payoffs
are not considered: the voter model (where players blindly imitate without considering payoffs),
and reinforcement learning (a rule where actions that have exceeded expectations in the past
are repeated more frequently). Interestingly, it is the last rule that generates populations with
similar proportions to those observed in the laboratory.
3.1.1.2 Empirical measurement of cooperation in the public goods game
A large number of studies have also investigated how people play the public goods game, con-
firming that players cooperate conditionally [97–101]. In Fischbacher et al. [97] a single-shot
public goods game was played with 44 participants. Each participant was asked how much they
would donate to the public good if the rest of the group donated a certain amount on average.
The results of this experiment are shown in figure 3.1 averaged over all the participants, and
figure 3.2 for each of them individually. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that the heuristics that players
used to decide how much to donate were heterogeneous: the players were either free-riders (play-
ers that donate nothing to the public good) or some more interesting conditional cooperator,
where players donate slightly less than the group average. It was found that 50% of participants
were conditional cooperators, and that conditional cooperation could be a good explanation for
the fact that in repeated public goods games the amount of cooperation decreases over time.
Essentially, although there may initially be a lot of cooperation this will decline as the presence
of free-riders means the average contribution level decreases as the game is played repeatedly,
resulting in conditional cooperators behaving in an identical way to free-riders.
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Figure 3.1: Results from Fischbacher et al. [97]: the individual’s contribution is plotted against
the group’s contribution in an empirical public goods game, with the strategies categorised and
averaged over the whole population. (Reproduced with permission from figure 1 Fischbacher et
al. [97]).
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3.1.2 Previous models of conditional cooperation
The literature described in the previous section suggests that when playing the prisoner’s
dilemma on a network, or the public goods game in groups, players cooperate conditionally.
The evolution of conditional cooperation in the public goods game has been investigated by
Guttman [102]. A player’s contribution to the public good consists of two parts: a conditional
and an unconditional part. The author introduced a “matching rate”, mi to each player in
the population, which defines their response to donations by the others in the group. Player i
donates
xi = bi + ai +mi
∑
j 6=i
aj (3.1)
to the group, where ai is the continuous donation of player i, and bi is the unconditional contri-
bution. Each player’s fitness pii is given by a combination of return from the public good f(x)
and the consumption of a private good yi such that
pii = f(x) + yi. (3.2)
After each round of the game the population reproduces in proportion to their fitness. Through
analytical investigations of the stability of a mutant in the population the author finds that the
optimal matching rate is unity for all players when players know the others’ strategies (a result
confirmed by numerical simulations). He also found that complete knowledge of how others are
playing decreases the stable matching rate to below unity.
Conditional cooperators were included in a model of cooperation by Szolnoki and Perc [103]:
here they introduced a number of conditional strategies into the public goods game on a lattice.
In this game cooperators will donate to the public good conditional on the number of other
cooperators in their group (defined by those they neighbour on a lattice). Each player is assigned
a threshold, and if the number of other cooperators in their group exceeds this threshold then the
player will donate. In this way, if a player’s threshold is zero, they are essentially an unconditional
cooperator, and if their threshold equals the number of neighbours they are a free-rider. It was
found that introducing these strategies on the lattice could eliminate unconditional defectors as
boundaries consisting of conditional cooperators would form between unconditional cooperators
and defectors. The conditional cooperators were not exploited by the defectors, but could
accumulate a large payoff from the cooperative clusters. Conditional cooperators therefore have
a large fitness advantage over both cooperators and defectors.
These ideas were extended in Zhang and Perc [15], who introduced continuous strategies:
players decide how much to donate to the public good depending on how much the others
in their group have also donated. Each strategy is represented by a mapping between the
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Figure 3.3: A selection of the conditional cooperation strategies in the public goods game as
defined by Zhang and Perc [15] (Reproduced with permission from figure 8b in [15]).
amount donated by the group and the corresponding amount for the player, making it possible
to represent a strategy as a piecewise function on the unit square. By dividing the unit square
into quarters twenty-seven strategies were considered in this model (examples of eight of these
strategies are shown in figure 3.3). Players are separated at random into well-mixed groups
to generate their payoff, with players allowed to move between between groups with a certain
probability. Because a group of cooperators outperforms a group of defectors, but a single
defector in a group outperforms the other cooperators in that group the dynamics observed
in this model depend strongly on the interaction between inter- and intra-group competition.
These two competing selection pressures result in a dominant strategy that free-rides for low
contributions, but then conditionally cooperates for higher contributions. This strategy performs
well because if it is placed in a group with low cooperation it can do well in the inter-group
cooperation, whereas if it is in a cooperative group this group can dominate the intra-group
competition.
3.1.3 Empirical evidence of conditional cooperation and resource use
The work reviewed in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 suggests that people tend to cooperate condi-
tionally when playing the game in the laboratory, and that the mathematical models that have
incorporated this show an increase in cooperation compared to the standard games on networks.
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The question still remains, however, why is it that people cooperate conditionally at all, and
is there any variation in how cooperative people are? Many empirical studies, in both the lab-
oratory and the field, have tested how different communities play the public goods game. In
general, the studies tend to select from two different groups: university students (often from
economics degree programmes) and communities involved in the day-to-day management of a
resource that mimics the public goods game. Comparisons between these two groups can then
extract how social preferences differ between those that regularly manage a renewable resource
and those that do not.
For example, Carden˜as [98] compared how villagers from rural Colombia and students from
Bogota´ cooperate in an empirical public goods game. The game was split into two parts:
initially a standard public goods game was played with all groups before introducing either
communication or external regulation in the form of fines imposed by either the experimenters
or others in the game playing group. It was found that the villagers were more cooperative
under face-to-face treatment than the students, and in all cases even regulation with no fine
(players could identify free-riders but could not impose a penalty) led to increased cooperation.
How much members of a community cooperate has also been found to correlate with how
well they use a renewable resource. Gelcich et al. [99] studied a group of Chilean fishers using a
common pool resource game in the laboratory (analogous to the public goods game). The groups
were drawn from communities with strong or weak unions, or no unions at all, and also from
communities that were either very reliant or not reliant at all on the fishery for their income. The
common pool resource game consisted of twenty rounds split into two regimes: the first without
regulation, and the second with. In the unregulated regime the high-performing unions chose
to harvest less than low- and non-unionised groups. When regulation was introduced in the
form of confiscation of payoffs from randomly selected overharvesters, this made no difference to
the non-unionised players, but did reduce over-harvesting in the unionised cases. It was found
that how reliant the community was on the resource made little difference to how much they
cooperated. The authors suggest that if you are a member of a union, and especially a high
performing one, then over time you may have internalised the norms that lead to regulation
being seen as a positive action. It may also reduce your response to a player free-riding for a
short time, therefore keeping cooperation at a high level.
Rustagi et al. [100] extended this work to investigate whether the real-life behaviour of
participants can be mapped onto how they play these games in the laboratory, repeating the
work by Fischbacher et al. [97] (described in section 3.1.1) with 49 groups, each of which manages
an area of forest in Ethiopia. The proportions of each strategy in each group were measured,
and plotted along with how successful the group were at managing the forest, given by the
potential crop trees (PCT) per hectare (figure 3.4). It was found that the frequency of conditional
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cooperators differed between groups, and that the number of conditional cooperators in each
group was correlated with successful management of the commons. Controlling for factors such
as group size and market distance they find that for every 10% increase in the number of
conditional cooperators there is an increased harvest of five PCT per hectare. A number of
possible reasons for the differences in the proportion of conditional cooperators in each group
were suggested, including the distance of the managed forest area from the market (and therefore
how much the resource is worth), and the length of time that the group have been operating for.
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Carpenter and Seki [101] played a public goods game with Japanese shrimp fishers and stu-
dents. The fishers were taken from two groups, those that operate in a cooperative by pooling
resources, and those that do not. The social preferences of the players were once again measured
using the same game and methods designed by Fischbacher et al. [97], and compared with pro-
ductivity. An example of the cumulative distribution functions for the two key strategies (pure
cooperators and conditional cooperators) for the three groups is shown in figure 3.5: the fishers
were more cooperative than the students, but the non-pooling fishers were more conditionally
cooperative, whilst the pooling fishers were more unconditionally cooperative. Carpenter and
Seki were then able to link these preferences in the game to the fisher’s productivity, show-
ing that the more cooperative fishers caught more shrimp. Interestingly, the participant’s age
affected cooperation, with older players proving more unconditionally cooperative.
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What these studies show is that there is some relationship between how conditionally coop-
erative players are in the laboratory and how well they manage a resource in the real world, and
that therefore their social preferences are consistent across at least two scenarios. Specifically,
there are two factors that influence how cooperative players are in the laboratory: the first be-
ing real-life experiences akin to the public goods game, and the second membership of a group
where cooperation is strongly enforced. If free-riding is discouraged by others in the group, then
cooperation is higher in the laboratory. It is also important to note that in each of the cases
information about others’ behaviour was available to many of the participants as they manage
the resource in a very public way. In the real world information about how others play can be
found either through direct interaction or through social knowledge in the group. Clearly then,
the payoff is not the only factor that influences how much individuals choose to donate to the
public good.
3.1.4 Non-payoff based strategy imitation models
Previous models have investigated the possibility that some players update their strategy (only
unconditionally in this case) through blind imitation. Szolnoki and Perc [104] split a population
into two types: those who update their strategy by comparing payoffs in the standard way, and
those who copy the majority strategy in their neighbourhood (with a certain probability), called
conformists. The fraction of conformists in the population was varied for each run, along with the
player network and which players were assigned as conformists. It was found that cooperation
can be maximised if it is the low degree players who act as conformists. This is because network
reciprocity in a heterogeneous network is increased by cooperators positioned on hubs. However,
if these hub players are assigned conformists, the effect is dramatically reduced.
Vilone et al. [105] tested the effect of including strategy imitation rules that both did and did
not depend on the neighbour’s payoff. Players updated their strategy through blind imitation
with probability q, and imitating the player with the best performing strategy with probability
1− q. The dynamics were run on both Erdo˝s-Re´nyi and random scale-free networks, and it was
found that mid-range probabilities of updating through blind imitation increase the amount of
cooperation. At parameter values that discourage cooperation increased probability of blind
imitation slows the rate that the system fixates to defection, and in some cases leads to non-zero
equilibrium frequency of cooperation. When the existence of behaviour analogous to moody
conditional cooperation is tested for it is found that when q = 0.3 the dynamics do indeed
replicate those empirical findings, and that the network topology is not important. However,
the authors point out that these measurements are in the transient phase, as all dynamics
eventually fixate.
A hybrid of conditional cooperation and social preferences was studied by Y. Wang and Chen
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[106]. Here they studied social preferences in the public goods game by including two different
types of cooperators and defectors: independent and non-independent. The independent players
can be thought of as unconditional and do not change their minds about how they play the
game, whilst the non-independent players can be considered to be conditional cooperators, each
of them allocated a social preference value s ∈ [0, 1], where s = 1 and s = 0 correspond to
cooperation or defection respectively. Payoffs for each group are generated using the standard
public goods game, but there are two ways for a player to update their strategy depending on
whether groups contain unconditional strategies. If groups consist of only conditional players,
neighbour’s strategies are imitated with probability in proportion to their payoff. In groups
containing unconditional players the conditional players update their social preference towards
the overall social preference of the group. If at any point the social preference of a conditional
player fixates to 0 or 1 then these players become unconditional. Running these dynamics on a
lattice it was found that the introduction of unconditional players led to fixation of cooperation
for very low enhancement factors.
Lugo and Miguel [107] built a model where both the payoff (garnered by playing against
agents on a separate layer of a multiplex) and the number of players with the same/different
strategy on the layer on which the node is placed. It was found that coordination on these
networks only occurs when the payoffs are taken into account i.e. the players are sceptical of
the wisdom of the crowd.
Very recently Amato et al. [108] investigated a model on a two-layer multiplex, where on
one layer a 2 × 2 matrix game is played, and the other acts as the opinion layer, on which
it is assumed that defection is anti-social and cooperation is encouraged. They find that the
addition of the opinion layer leads to either full cooperation across the multiplex or polarisation
of cooperation and defection across communities. Players update their strategy on the game layer
in the standard way: a randomly selected neighbour is imitated with probability proportional to
their payoff, whilst updates occur on the opinion layer by adopting the strategy of a randomly
selected neighbour. Cooperators are imitated with probability β (defectors with probability
1− β), whilst strategies are imitated between layers with probability γ. In both the well-mixed
and structured dynamics three distinct regions of behaviour are observed in the S − T plane
(where S and T are parameters as defined in table 1.1). At T smaller than one and S larger
than zero defectors disappear on both layers, whereas for T larger than one (and any value of
S) only a mixed state of cooperators and defectors is stable. For the remaining values a mixture
of cooperation and defection across both layers is observed. When network structure is added
the size of the complete cooperation phase increases, decreasing the mixed behaviour phase.
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3.1.5 Conclusions based on the literature
In summary, to describe human cooperation realistically players should be considered to coop-
erate conditionally [94, 97, 98]. Recent work has begun to include conditionality into numerical
models, either in the well-mixed case [102,15] or on a lattice [103]. Alongside this, some authors
have begun to consider that it may not only be payoff considerations that motivate strategy
choice within these games [105,106,108,95]. However, I can find no work considering the impact
of social influence on the conditional public goods game.
A number of empirical papers show that how conditionally cooperative players are varies
across the population [99–101]. This variation, that can explain some of the behaviour observed
in the laboratory, has two causes: players’ experience of interacting with a public good/common
pool resource, and what those in their community feel about cooperation and free-riding.
The model presented in this chapter sets out to explain where these variations may have
come from by testing two hypotheses. The first is that playing the public goods game for
varying lengths of time results in different frequencies of conditional cooperators. The second is
that the inclusion of social influence increases how cooperative players are within this model.
3.2 Conditional cooperator model
In this chapter I introduce a model that can begin to explain how it is that different strategies for
playing the public goods game are observed. As described above, factors such as how frequently
the analogies of the public goods game are played in the participants’ real life, and how long it
is played for, affect the players behaviour in the laboratory. Specifically it is found that more
frequent interactions with renewable resource systems alter the proportions of the frequencies
found when the players are asked to play the public goods game in the laboratory. Below I
describe a model that investigates which of these factors are important.
I investigate how the inclusion of conditional cooperators in the public goods game affects
the amount of cooperation in a population, and how the inclusion of social pressure affects the
frequency of conditional cooperation. Can heterogeneous distributions of strategies exist when
conditional cooperators are included in the public goods game? If both a player’s gains from har-
vesting the resource, and the attitude of those around them towards cooperation influence how a
player behaves, what does this do to the frequency of conditional cooperators, and cooperation
in general? This model is designed to answer the following questions:
1. If agents consider both their payoff, and the deviation of their behaviour from those around
them, how does this affect contributions and frequencies of conditional cooperators in the
public goods game? This has not been considered on a multiplex network before.
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2. What if the size of the economic and social networks are very different? How do the
different sizes of the two networks affect the probability that a defector can survive? When
is it better to be a defector?
3. Does the number of times that a group interacts before a player updates its strategy affect
the final strategies of the players? Repeated conditional cooperation in the public goods
game has not previously been considered.
I assume that the public goods game is a good model for management of the common pool
resource in the players’ everyday lives, and that players’ beliefs about fairness are expressed
both in how they live their lives and how they play the game in the laboratory (as described
in [99–101] in section 3.1). Therefore, in the model each agent plays the public goods game
as a metaphor for the management of a common pool resource. In this game the players will
generate a payoff by playing the game against a subset of the population (either randomly
selected groups or defined by a network) repeatedly, and the strategy used to play the game will
be an expression of their social preferences, beliefs about fairness, and their desire for economic
payoff. The strategies can change over time and it is assumed that the timescale for strategy
change is short enough that there is a noticeable effect. It is also assumed that this change
can be affected both by their economic payoff, and by the opinions of others and therefore the
players will update their strategies in response to two factors: how well those they play the game
with are performing economically, and the mean strategy of their neighbours. It is important
to note that the social groups may not be the same as the groups in which they play the game.
This work extends previous models of the public goods game played on networks by allowing
each node in the network to play strategies conditional on what others donate rather than on
how many other players are willing to cooperate. Models with strategies motivated by empirical
work performed in both the laboratory and the field have only previously been investigated by
Zhang and Perc [15] and Guttman [102] (as described in section 3.1.2). In the model developed in
this chapter the conditional cooperators will be placed onto more realistic social networks rather
than in meta-populations as in [15]. Finally, I study the differences caused by the introduction
of social pressure on conditional cooperation. This extends work by Jiang et al. [109] who have
introduced social pressure, by investigating its effects in the case of conditional cooperators, and
also by allowing the social and economic networks to be different.
3.3 The conditional public goods game on a multiplex consisting of an eco-
nomic and social layer
In this model each agent is represented as a node on a multilayered network consisting of two
layers: the economic layer and the social layer. In the economic layer the edges define those that
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each node plays the game against and gains a payoff from. Each node plays in multiple groups:
the group that the node is focal to and the groups in which each of the node’s neighbours is focal.
The social layer defines those the player knows the strategy of, but does not necessarily play
against. Because each player knows the strategy of those it plays against, the payoff network is
a subnetwork of the social network.
To build this network I first replicate the economic network into the social layer, because
as mentioned above if an individual is in a player’s economic network, they are also in their
social one. The degree distribution of the social network must obey that found in a standard
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network i.e. following a binomial distribution with the mean degree defined as the
mean degree parameter of the social network, 〈ks〉. If the mean degree of the social network
is larger than that found on the economic one, additional edges may need to be added to each
node. I achieve this by selecting a list of edges from a binomial distribution, and then assigning
them to each node on the social layer (ensuring that their degree is not smaller than that on
the economic layer). After this, there are now a number of unconnected edges associated with
each node on the social layer, which are matched up to form the social network.
3.3.1 Conditional cooperator payoffs
In the model each player donates between 0 and 1 to the public good. The strategy of each player
defines how much is donated to the group and depends on how much each of their neighbours
previously donated to the group. The strategies are represented by the parameter a ≥ 0 which
describes how conditionally cooperative a player is. Free-riders play strategy a = 0 whilst very
cooperative players play strategies a  0. In order to cover the full-range of behaviour found
in the empirical papers discussed in section 3.1, the possible strategies in the model must range
from the free-rider, to the very cooperative. Because the amount donated is conditional on the
average donations by the rest of the group, in order to ensure that some players donate one unit
to the group in most circumstances the maximum strategy must be quite large. Therefore, for
most of the results presented in this thesis strategies range between 0 < a < 5.
Each agent plays the same strategy for a single generation consisting of L iterations of the
game, where from now on L is referred to as the generation length. The payoff Pi of player i at
the end of each generation is defined as the sum of their payoffs in each iteration in each group
Pi =
ki+1∑
g=1
L∑
l=1
pi,g(l) (3.3)
where ki is the degree of node i and pi,g(l) is the payoff of player i playing in group g at iteration
l. Each player has a maximum of one unit to donate in each group, and so at each iteration of
the game player i contributes either
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ci,g(l) =
aicg(l − 1) if cg(l − 1) <
1
ai
1 otherwise.
(3.4)
where ai is the player’s strategy and cg(l− 1) is the average contribution by all of the players in
the group in the previous iteration. Examples of five strategies are shown in figure 3.6, where
Nc denotes the number of players for that group contribution that donate ci = 1.
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Figure 3.6: An example of the contribution of player i (ci,g) for each average group contribution
cg, calculated using equation (4.1). Each player’s strategy ai is shown in the legend. The regions
divided by a dashed red line denote regions of the x-axis (average group contribution, cg) which
contain Nc players donating one unit to the group.
In the public goods game the payoff of player i is calculated by multiplying the average group
contribution (cg(l)) by an enhancement factor r, and subtracting the amount donated by player
i in that round:
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pi,g(l) = r
ci,g(l) +
∑
j∈g cj,g(l)
G
− ci,g(l) = rcg(l)− ci,g(l). (3.5)
where j ∈ g are the players from the population present in player i’s group.
3.3.2 Strategy update at the end of each generation
At the end of each generation each player can update their strategy using information from either
the economic or the social layer. Updates on the economic layer are designed to mimic a rational
self-interest, and therefore a player will change its strategy in an attempt to increase its payoff
by imitating a better performing player. To update its strategy through payoff comparison each
player in the population selects a neighbour in the economic network at random and compares
payoffs derived in the previous generation. If the payoff of the selected player is higher, then
player i will move its strategy in the direction of player j by a certain amount
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) + θH(Pj > Pi)(aj(t)− ai(t)) (3.6)
where t indicates the generation, H(x) is the Heaviside step function
H(x) =
1 if x > 00 if not (3.7)
and θ is the imitation strength. If θ = 1 then player i imitates the strategy of player j exactly,
whereas if θ = 0 then the player’s strategy does not change at all. Updating on the social layer
is designed to mimic a player’s desire not to break the average behaviour of the community.
Updates occur by moving the player’s strategy towards the average of the neighbours’ strategies
on the social layer such that
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) + θ(a¯i(t)− ai(t)) (3.8)
where a¯i(t) is the mean of player i’s neighbours’ strategies in the social layer. The strategies
will be updated through comparison on the economic layer with probability 1− λ, and through
the social layer with probability λ, where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
The advantage of this model is that for certain parameter values and initial conditions the
original public goods game can be recovered. If the initial strategies are selected from a bimodal
distribution where the lower strategy a = s0 = 0 and the larger strategy a = s1  1, and if
the initial contribution is such that cg(0) >
1
s1
and s1 ≥ G (to ensure that players never act
conditionally) then the s0 players will play as unconditional defectors and the s1 players as
unconditional cooperators. If the updates only occur using the economic layer λ = 0, and if the
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imitation strength is θ = 1 only cooperators and defectors will exist in the population, and they
will be imitated exactly. It is this desire to build a model that is a generalisation and extension
of the public goods game that means that no noise is included in the strategy update.
3.3.3 The algorithm
The model algorithm is as follows:
3.3.3.1 Initialisation
1. Initialise the payoff network by creating an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network. Form an edge between
each pair of nodes with probability p =
〈kp〉
N−1 where N is the number of agents in the model
and 〈kp〉 is the mean degree of the payoff layer. (Note: this will leave a certain number of
nodes with degree ki = 0 for small mean degree).
2. Form the social layer by generating a list of degrees to be assigned to each node in the
social layer according to the binomial distribution (N, 〈ks〉N−1) where 〈ks〉 is the mean degree
of the social network. Ensure that the total degree is even by adding an additional edge if
required (this is because the additional edges allocated to each node must have a beginning
and an end).
3. Assign each of the degrees from the list to the nodes in the network at random, allowing
for the fact that ksi ≥ kpi where ksi and kpi is the degree of node i on the social and payoff
layers respectively.
4. Replicate the payoff network into the social network.
5. Calculate the number of additional edges required by each node on the social network.
6. Starting with the node in the social layer requiring the largest number of additional edges,
select another node at random still requiring edges and create an edge.
7. Repeat until all nodes have the correct degree.
8. Uniformly assign a random strategy to each player i in a range between ai = 0 and a maxi-
mum strategy large enough that for many contributions the player acts as an unconditional
cooperator. For the dynamics described in this chapter I use 0 < ai < 5.
The algorithm described above is always successful at creating a network with the required
degree distribution. Figure 3.7 plots the degree distribution of an example social layer with
N = 1000 nodes and mean degree 〈ks〉 = 8 along with the theoretical degree distribution
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(binomial with N = 1000 and p = 〈ks〉N−1). This plot confirms that the algorithm does indeed
replicate the correct degree distribution.
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Figure 3.7: An example of the degree distribution of an example social layer (black crosses)
with N = 1000 nodes and mean degree 〈ks〉 = 8 along with the theoretical degree distribution
(dashed blue line, binomial with N = 1000 and p = 〈ks〉N−1).
It is important to note that this algorithm results in some nodes on each layer having zero
degree i.e. not connected to any other nodes, a result of the small mean degree. These nodes
have been left in the network in order to preserve the degree distribution of the networks.
3.3.3.2 The dynamics
The dynamics of this model has two parts. The first is the accumulation of payoffs, and the
second is the strategy update.
1. Groups are defined by the economic network edges. To calculate the payoff the different
groups on the network are selected by moving through each player and adding its nearest
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neighbours in the network to the focal player’s group. Therefore, each player is placed into
the ki + 1 groups that they belong to.
2. Calculate the payoff of each player.
(a) Calculate the payoff for a single generation of length L using equation (3.5) in each
group. At the beginning of each generation each individual is assigned an initial group
contribution cg(0), selected at random from a uniform distribution between zero and
one.
(b) Calculate the total payoff of each player using equation (3.3).
3. Update each player’s strategy by generating a uniform random number rλ in [0,1].
(a) If rλ ≥ λ compare payoffs with a randomly selected neighbour on the economic layer.
If Pj > Pi update strategy ai using equation (3.6).
(b) If rλ < λ update the strategy on the social network using equation (3.8).
4. Repeat for 20,000 generations.
In the rest of this chapter I present the results from numerical simulations of this model
and connect them back to the empirical results discussed in section 3.1 In the following three
chapters I then investigate the model to understand the results in more detail.
3.4 Multiplex model results
In this section I present numerical simulation results from the model described in section 3.3 for
two scenarios:
1. the conditional cooperator public goods game on the economic network only (probability
of social layer update λ = 0),
2. updates using both the social and economic layers (probability of social layer update
λ = 0.1).
Unless otherwise stated, in the following simulations the number of nodes in each layer is
N = 250, and each run of the dynamics is for 20, 000 generations, with an initial contribution
cg(0) selected at random at the beginning of each generation. In graphs that plot the average
of a number of simulations each data point is an average of ten distinct, randomly initialised
runs of the dynamics. The final value is averaged over the last 2000 generations to average out
any noise, and the error bars on these points are a single standard deviation of the ten distinct
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runs. Two measures of cooperation are used in the results that follow. The first of these is the
average contribution of each player to each group in which they are playing over each iteration.
If the amount donated by player i in iteration l to group g is ci,g(l), and because a player with
degree ki plays in ki + 1 groups, the average contribution is
〈c〉 =
∑N
i=1
∑ki+1
g=1
1
ki+1
∑L
l=1 ci,g(l)
LN
(3.9)
where L is the generation length. The second is the mean strategy in the population
〈a〉 =
∑N
i=1 ai
N
(3.10)
where ai is player i’s strategy.
3.4.1 Inclusion of the social layer
Figure 3.8 plots the mean contribution 〈c〉 against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1
(the enhancement factor in equation (3.5) over the mean group size) for the economic layer
only (probability of selecting the social layer to update a player’s strategy λ = 0) and for the
multiplex (λ = 0.1). The imitation strength is θ = 0.1, the generation length is L = 10 and the
mean degree on the economic layer is 〈kp〉 = 4, whilst on the multiplex the mean degree of the
social layer is 〈ks〉 = 8. Plotted for comparison is the mean contribution for the standard public
goods game on the economic layer. This is played in the way described in section 3.3.2, with
θ = 1 and only two strategies present in the population.
It can be seen that when players update through information from the social layer as well as
the economic layer (figure 3.8 blue circles) large contributions are observed all the way down to
η = 0.025. Even when updates only occur on the economic layer (black crosses) players signif-
icantly contribute to the public good when η > 0.2. This is in contrast to the standard public
goods game on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network (the red star points in figure 3.8), where cooperation
only appears on the network at η = 0.7, and in only very small amounts. It is important to
note here that the probability of strategy update through the social layer is only λ = 0.1, so the
influence of the average social behaviour is relatively low, and yet even this low level of influence
has a dramatic effect on the amount of cooperation in the system.
The larger contributions by the players for λ = 0.1 in figure 3.8 are explained by examining
the contributions by a single group at each iteration l. Contributions cg(l) are plotted for a
group of five players G = 5 composed of strategies selected at random1 (figure 3.9), and results
are shown for two groups with different mean strategies: a¯ < 1 (solid black line) and a¯ > 1
(dashed blue line), where a¯ is the mean strategy of the group.
1Random selections are made to avoid any unintended bias in the results.
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Figure 3.8: The mean contribution 〈c〉 plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1
for conditional cooperators on the multiplex. The mean strategy is compared for the economic
layer only (λ = 0, black crosses) and the two-layer multiplex with probability of updating on
the social layer λ = 0.1 (blue circles). The dynamics are run for mean degree 〈kp〉 = 4 on the
economic layer and 〈ks〉 = 8 on the social layer. Simulations are run for imitation strength
θ = 0.1 and generation length L = 10. Number of nodes on each layer N = 250. Also plotted
are results for the standard public goods game.
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Figure 3.9: The group contributions cg(l) plotted against the iterations l for a single group of
size G = 5. Two different group mean strategies are plotted: a¯ = 1.232 (solid black line) and
a¯ = 0.676 (dashed blue line).
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I observe in figure 3.9 that for a mean strategy larger than one the mean group contribution
increases to a large value (cg(10) ≈ 0.8), but when the mean group strategy is smaller than one
the mean group contribution decays to zero very quickly. It is important to note therefore that
the contribution by a player is not just dependent on its own strategy, but also highly dependent
on the mean strategy of the other players in the group. If player i has a large strategy e.g. ai > 2,
but is surrounded by free-riders (a ≈ 0) then this player donates a small amount to the group
despite its large strategy. This plot also shows that if a group is formed at random from a
population where 〈a〉 < 1 there are no group compositions where players donate everything.
The critical value that decides how cooperative a group (and a population) is 〈a〉 = 1.
The mean strategy is plotted for the entire population in figure 3.10 against the scaled
enhancement factor. When η < 0.25 and updates occur using both layers (λ = 0.1) the mean
strategy is larger than one, and so the amount contributed by each player increases towards
ci,g(l) = 1 for the longer generations. In contrast, for λ = 0 the mean strategy is much smaller,
and so the contributions decline towards zero. Small standard deviations are observed for the
mean contribution (figure 3.8) for λ = 0.1 for a wide range of enhancement factors η, showing
that the final contribution is consistent across each simulation. For 0.125 < η < 0.225 the
results are much noisier. This is because for these values of η some of the mean strategies are
larger than one, and some are smaller. Strategies that are slightly less than or more than one
generate very different contributions, as they either increase or decrease over the iterations, and
so a wide range of contributions is observed. For η smaller than approximately 0.2 the mean
strategy decreases from a maximum of 〈a〉 ≈ 2 to 〈a〉 ≈ 1.2. This also causes a dip in the mean
contribution in figure 3.8. The reason for this is not clear, but it may be that the importance of
the economic layer increases as η increases. As an aside, the reason that the mean contribution
is never exactly one (figure 3.8) is because the initial contribution cg(0) is random and rarely
equal to one. Even if a player’s strategy is larger than one it takes a few iterations before the
player is donating everything to the group.
To demonstrate how the mean strategy and contribution change over the generations, figure
3.11 plots the mean strategy and contribution against the number of generations for a single
run of the dynamics for both the economic layer only (λ = 0) and for selection on the social
layer 10% of the time (λ = 0.1). The enhancement factor used in this plot is η = 0.5. This plot
shows that the dynamics quickly approach an equilibrium. When the social layer is included
(λ = 0.1) the mean strategy approaches a single value, with no variation after a large number
of generations, behaviour confirmed later in figure 3.13.
The difference between the mean strategy for updates using only the economic layer compared
to both layers is explained by considering the distribution of strategies in the population, and
how it changes across the generations. For updates on the economic layer only (figure 3.12)
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Figure 3.10: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1 for
conditional cooperators on the multiplex. The mean strategy is compared for the economic
layer only (λ = 0, black crosses) and the two-layer multiplex with probability of updating on
the social layer λ = 0.1 (blue circles). The dynamics are run for mean degree 〈kp〉 = 4 on the
economic layer and 〈ks〉 = 8 on the social layer. Simulations run for imitation strength θ = 0.1
and generation length L = 10. Number of nodes on each layer N = 250. Also plotted are results
for the standard public goods game.
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Figure 3.11: The mean strategy 〈a〉 (upper plot) and contribution 〈c〉 (lower plot) plotted
against the logarithm of the number of generations for conditional cooperators on the multiplex.
Results for both the economic layer only (λ = 0, solid black line) and the two-layer multiplex
with probability of updating on the social layer λ = 0.1 (dashed blue line). The dynamics are
run for mean degree 〈kp〉 = 4 on the economic layer and 〈ks〉 = 8 on the social layer. Simulations
run for imitation strength θ = 0.1 and generation length L = 10. Number of nodes on each layer
N = 250.
3.4 Multiplex model results 85
1 2 3 4
0
5
10
15
ai
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Time = 1
1 2 3 4
0
5
10
15
ai
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Time = 10
1 2 3 4
0
5
10
15
ai
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Time = 100
1 2 3 4
0
5
10
15
ai
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Time = 1000
Figure 3.12: The distribution of strategies after t = 1, 10, 100 and 1000 generations. Plotted from
a single run of the dynamics updating using the economic layer only (λ = 0) for enhancement
factor η = 0.5, generation length L = 10 and mean degree 〈kp〉 = 4. The imitation strength is
θ = 0.1 and the number of nodes on each layer N = 250.
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the distribution of strategies is initially uniform (t = 1, top left plot), but as the number
of generations increases the distribution narrows to finish broadly centred around the mean
(t = 1000, bottom right plot). Although there are a few isolated very high and very low
strategies, these are likely due to a small number of degree ki = 0 nodes in the network which
are never able to change strategy. The wide spread of strategies observed in figure 3.12 is
found firstly because in structured populations players only imitate their neighbours, and often
form regions of similar strategies (as shown later in section 6.2.3.1); and secondly because a
player’s payoff is not necessarily correlated with its strategy, and so there is not one strategy
that dominates the population. This is because a large strategy in a group with a small mean
strategy will generate a small payoff, as each player will donate less and less at each iteration;
the reverse is true for a small strategy in a group with a large mean strategy.
Although it is not so straightforward to say that ‘cooperators do better than free-riders’
or the other way round, and predicting which strategies dominate the population is difficult,
it is generally true that on average the larger the enhancement factor the better the payoff
for larger a due to the increased return from a player’s contribution. What this means for
the final distribution of strategies on the economic network is that in each small region of the
network one strategy performs better than the others (although which strategy this is depends
strongly on the composition of each of the groups) and each of the neighbours tend towards this
strategy. For increased enhancement factor the mean of this wide distribution is larger. This
issue is addressed in more detail in future chapters, where through simplifications more precise
definitions of the better strategies are formulated.
Figure 3.13 shows the distribution of strategies for strategy updates using information from
both the economic and social layers (λ = 0.1). Comparing the distributions for the economic
layer only (figure 3.12) with those including social influence (figure 3.13) for early generations
(t = 1 and 10, the top two plots) the distributions are very similar, with strategies spread
uniformly. However, as the number of generations increases the distribution in the multiplex
case becomes much narrower, eventually centring on just one or two strategies. Therefore,
the effect of the social influence is to homogenise the population to a single strategy. This
occurs because nodes will tend towards their local mean, and over time these local means are
homogenised across the entire multiplex. Therefore, the effect of introducing the social layer on
the distribution of strategies is to have them tend to a single value. Because the strategies are
initially selected at random from a uniform distribution, each player’s local neighbour’s mean
strategy is approximately the mean of this distribution. This is true for all nodes, and so when
updating via the social layer each individual is likely to update towards the population mean.
This is the reason that the social layer attracts the mean strategy towards the initial population
mean.
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Figure 3.13: The distribution of strategies after t = 1, 10, 100 and 1000 generations. Plotted
from a single run of the dynamics updating using both the economic layer and the social layer
(λ = 0.1) for enhancement factor η = 0.5, generation length L = 10 and mean economic network
degree 〈kp〉 = 4 and mean social network degree 〈ks〉 = 8. The imitation strength is θ = 0.1 and
the number of nodes on each layer N = 250. Note the change in the frequency scale in each
plot.
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So, the dynamics on the social layer attract the population towards the mean of the ini-
tial population, whereas the strategies on the economic layer tend towards a mean strategy
dependent on the enhancement factor. It is these two competing effects that result in the
mean strategy observed when social influence is included in the model. For the simulations
whose results are plotted in figure 3.10 at each enhancement factor the initial population mean
(〈a〉 = 2.5) is higher than the equilibrium strategy on only the economic layer. For this reason
the introduction of social pressure increases the mean strategy. Increasing the enhancement
factor reduces the difference between the two cases because the mean strategy on the economic
layer approaches the average of the initial population.
These dynamics also explain why cooperation is observed at lower enhancement factors
compared to the standard public goods game for both values of λ. Both network reciprocity
and the increase in the mean strategy due to social influence result in strategies larger than one.
This process is reinforced because conditional strategies are less easily exploited by free-riders.
If a conditional strategy is in a group with free-riders, over a number of iterations it reduces its
contributions to the public good.
3.4.1.1 Narrower range of initial conditions
The numerical simulations described above demonstrate the effect of the social layer on con-
ditional cooperation. The mean strategy found by the dynamics when strategy updates occur
only on the economic layer is shifted towards the mean of the initial strategy distribution when
the social layer is introduced. I also showed that the social layer can have a dramatic effect on
the frequency of cooperation in the population even when this influence is small. I now show
the importance of the initial conditions to the final mean contribution and strategy in figure
3.14, where the initial strategies are selected randomly from a narrower uniform distribution
0 < ai < 2. The top graph (figure 3.14a) plots the mean contribution against the scaled en-
hancement factor for the same parameter values as in figure 3.8 whilst the bottom graph (figure
3.14b) plots the mean strategy.
I compare the contribution for the wide and the narrow initial distributions (figure 3.8 and
3.14a respectively) and find that the mean contribution for narrow initial conditions is lower
for all enhancement factors compared to the wide distribution. In contrast to the wide initial
conditions, the addition of the social layer does not increase the amount contributed. Once again,
this can be explained by examining the mean strategy of the population (figure 3.14a) for the
narrow distribution. For both narrow and wide (figure 3.10) initial distributions of strategies
large mean strategies are observed for very low enhancement factors when the social layer is
introduced. However, because the mean of the initial distribution of strategies is much lower
than one (〈a〉 ≈ 0.5) the final contribution tends to zero. Therefore, there is little difference
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(a) Mean contribution plotted against scaled enhancement factor.
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(b) Mean strategy plotted against scaled enhancement factor.
Figure 3.14: The mean contribution (figure 3.14a) and strategy (figure 3.14b) plotted against
the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1 for conditional cooperators on the multiplex. The
mean strategy is compared for the economic layer only (λ = 0, black crosses) and the two-layer
multiplex with probability of updating on the social layer λ = 0.1 (blue circles), with initial
strategies selected at random from a unifom distribution 0 < a < 2. The dynamics are run for
mean degree 〈kp〉 = 4 on the economic layer and 〈ks〉 = 8 on the social layer. Simulations run
for imitation strength θ = 0.1 and generation length L = 10. Number of nodes on each layer
N = 250.
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in contribution between λ = 0.1 and λ = 0, even though there is a big difference in the mean
strategy in the population.
3.4.1.2 Comparison of different economic and social layer degrees
Figure 3.15 plots the mean strategy against the enhancement factor, and compares networks
where the mean degree of the social layer is larger than that on the economic layer (〈ks〉 =
8, 〈kp〉 = 4, blue circles) and when the two degrees are equal (〈ks〉 = 〈kp〉 = 4, black crosses). I
find that the larger mean degree on the social layer has little effect on the final mean strategy in
the population when compared to the equal degrees on each layer. This shows that additional
edges in the social network do not increase the effect of the social layer.
3.4.1.3 Generation length
I reduce the generation length L to a much shorter number of iterations (L = 2), plot the mean
strategy against the enhancement factor and compare the short generation length to the longer
one (L = 10) (figure 3.16). I observe that because the dominant factor is the pressure from the
social layer the different generation lengths do not affect the mean strategy. Payoffs generated
through the additional iterations, and how this alters the mean strategy on the economic layer,
have little influence over the final strategy.
To recap, the addition of the social layer to the economic layer moves the mean strategy of
the population found when the dynamics are only run on the economic layer towards the mean
of the initial distribution. If this mean strategy is larger than one, a significant difference in
the contributions is observed when the social layer is added. The social pressure exerted by the
social layer is strong, and is not weakened by altering either the mean degree of the social layer,
or changing the generation length.
3.4.2 Median and random imitation rules
To model the influence of the average social behaviour of the rest of the population in the previous
sections I selected the mean of the neighbours on the social layer. Whilst this is a natural form
for the social updates to take (a player surveys those around them and takes the mean), it is not
the only possible way, and it is interesting to observe whether different formulations of the social
update rules alter the final strategy. In this section I test two additional strategy update rules
on the social layer. As a reminder, the strategies are updated using the social layer according
to the rule
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) + θ(a¯i(t)− ai(t)). (3.11)
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Figure 3.15: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1 for
conditional cooperators on the multiplex. The mean strategy is compared for different degrees
on each layer (〈ks〉 = 8, 〈kp〉 = 4, blue circles) and equal degrees (〈ks〉 = 〈kp〉 = 4, black crosses).
Simulations run for generation length L = 10, imitation strength θ = 0.1 and layer selection
probability λ = 0.1. Number of nodes on each layer N = 250.
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Figure 3.16: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1 for
conditional cooperators on the multiplex. The mean strategy is compared for long generation
lengths (L = 10, black crosses) and short generation lengths (L = 2, blue circles). The dynamics
are run for mean degree 〈kp〉 = 4 on the economic layer and 〈ks〉 = 8 on the social layer.
Simulations run for imitation strength θ = 0.1 and layer selection probability λ = 0.1. Number
of nodes on each layer N = 250.
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where the player’s strategy ai(t) moves towards the mean of its neighbours a¯i(t). I now run
the dynamics for two alternative social updates: either targetting the median of the group, or
selecting a random neighbour’s social strategy (essentially the voter model). The latter is similar
to the way in which updates are performed on the economic layer, but on the social layer the
payoff of the randomly selected neighbour is not taken into consideration.
The mean strategy for the three formulations of the social update rules are plotted against
the enhancement factor in figure 3.17. I observe that which social update rule is chosen in
this case makes little difference to the mean strategy within the population. Due to the small
groups and random nature of the initial conditions this is not surprising for the mean and the
median. However, the fact that on a structured population selecting a neighbour at random
on the social layer and blindly imitating it gives the same results as imitating the mean of the
social neighbours is interesting. What these results show is that it is not the minutiae of the
social dynamics that are important for the final mean strategy and contribution, but instead the
initial distribution of strategies. It is also key to consider the fact that because the strategies
are bounded below at a = 0, any rule that depends on the state of the population rather than
bias towards a particular strategy (a payoff based rule where free-riding maximises the payoff,
for example) will increase cooperation, as long as the initial distribution of strategies is large
enough. It is the wide range of a, that is the key to the change between the different social
update rules converging to the same mean strategy. Therefore, one further investigation could
be to study weak conditionally cooperative strategies i.e. strategies selected from a distribution
0 < a < 1.5. In this case different social update rules may result in different mean strategies,
and different levels of cooperation.
3.5 A discussion on noise
One issue with these models is that it is not possible to alter the range of strategies present
in the population, and that the equilibrium strategy may be an artefact of this. One way to
remove this is to add noise to the strategy update rule. In many of the models described in
chapter 1 and run in chapter 2 noise is introduced through the strategy imitation probability.
In the model described in this chapter each player updates their strategy towards a randomly
selected neighbour’s strategy in a deterministic way. The question therefore remains: should
noise be introduced in this model in a similar way to those previous ones?
There are two possiblilities for the implementation of noise in the strategy imitation. The
first is to add a small amount of noise to the updated strategy after imitation. I test the effect
of including this noise by modifying equation (3.6). The strategy in generation t+ 1 is now
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Figure 3.17: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η = r〈kp〉+1 for
conditional cooperators on the multiplex. The mean strategy is compared three different social
update rules: the mean of the social neighbourhood (blue circles), the median (black crosses)
and selecting a member of the social neighbourhood at random and imitating their strategy (red
stars). The dynamics are run for mean degree 〈kp〉 = 4 on the economic layer and 〈ks〉 = 8 on
the social layer. Simulations run for imitation strength θ = 0.1, imitation in the economic layer
λ = 0.1, generation length L = 10. Number of nodes on each layer N = 250.
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ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) + θH(Pj > Pi)(aj(t)− ai(t)) + (σ) (3.12)
where (σ) is a random number selected from the normal distribution N(0, σ2). These noisy
dynamics are run for two different values of the noise standard deviation, σ = 0.1 and 0.5.
Figure 3.18 plots the mean contribution and strategy against the number of generations for
λ = 0, with the deterministic dynamics also included. The simulations are for generation length
L = 10 and enhancement factor η = 0.5. Results for λ = 0.1 are plotted in figure 3.19. In
both of these figures I observe that for small additional noise (σ = 0.1) the final mean strategy
and contribution do not vary by large amounts. For large noise there is a significant difference,
however. What this suggests for the introduction of this type of noise to the model is that when
the noise is so large that the strategy imitations are essentially random, the final strategy differs,
but at lower levels the addition of noise is not significant. Interestingly, in neither case is the
noise increasing the amount of cooperation, and therefore introducing new strategies into the
population.
The second possible implementation of noise is through a probabilistic strategy imitation
rule e.g. the Fermi strategy imitation rule (equation (2.4)). This was not included because the
additional strategy imitation rule, and the extra parameter that comes with it, would hinder
understanding the dynamics of the game on the network.
An interpretation of not including either implementation of noise is that the game players
are all rational: they either want to maximise their payoff, or move towards the average social
behaviour of their group. The introduction of noise does not therefore add a significant dimension
to these studies.
3.6 Conclusions
The results presented in this chapter show that the inclusion of social considerations in a player’s
strategy in the public goods game can have a significant effect on the amount contributed to
the public good, and that this may occur even if the average social behaviour is only considered
10% of the time. Whether this effect leads to a significant increase in cooperation is heavily
dependent on the initial strategies in the population. If initial strategies are spread over a wide
range of values, with many of them larger than one, considering the average strategy of their
neighbours in the network will increase cooperation in the system for very low enhancement
factors. However, if these initial conditions are very small, with very few of them larger than
one, then the social norms average social behaviour does not affect the amount donated, even
though they may increase the final mean strategy. In general, the effect of considering the
average strategy of the other players, with no consideration of the player’s payoff when playing
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Figure 3.18: The mean strategy 〈a〉 (upper plot) and contribution 〈c〉 (lower plot) plotted against
the logarithm of the number of generations for conditional cooperators on the multiplex. Results
for added noise in the strategy imitation with standard deviation σ = 0.1 (dashed blue line)
and σ = 0.5 (solid red line) are plotted along with the results for no noise (solid black line).
The dynamics are run for probability of updating using the social layer of λ = 0, mean degree
〈kp〉 = 4 on the economic layer and 〈ks〉 = 8 on the social layer. Simulations run for imitation
strength θ = 0.1 and generation length L = 10. Number of nodes on each layer N = 250.
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Figure 3.19: The mean strategy 〈a〉 (upper plot) and contribution 〈c〉 (lower plot) plotted against
the logarithm of the number of generations for conditional cooperators on the multiplex. Results
for added noise in the strategy imitation with standard deviation σ = 0.1 (dashed blue line)
and σ = 0.5 (solid red line) are plotted along with the results for no noise (solid black line).
The dynamics are run for probability of updating using the social layer of λ = 0.1, mean degree
〈kp〉 = 4 on the economic layer and 〈ks〉 = 8 on the social layer. Simulations run for imitation
strength θ = 0.1 and generation length L = 10. Number of nodes on each layer N = 250.
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the conditional public goods game is to homogenise the final distribution of strategies. This
homogenisation is very strong, and is not affected by changes in the degree of the social network,
or the number of iterations the game is played for. If the initial mean strategy in the population
is large, then this will increase cooperation and discourage free-riders. However, these very
cooperative strategies must exist in the population already in order for this to occur.
These results agree with the general findings of other models in this area. Conditional
cooperation in the public goods game does lead to an increase in cooperation, and players do
evolve to play conditionally [102, 15]. Also, the introduction of an update rule that does not
take the payoff into account results in more cooperative strategies [105,106,108,95].
In this chapter the mean degree of the network (〈ks,p〉=4) is much smaller than the number of
nodes (N = 250). The fact that across such a sparse network the population approaches a single
strategy is surprising, and this is true no matter which variation of social pressure is selected,
and even when social pressure is considered for just 10% of strategy decisions. Comparing these
results with the empirical findings discussed in section 3.1 this is not what is found in the real
world. Empirical results suggest a wide heterogeneity in the way that people play the game in
the laboratory. The reason for this disparity may be the network structure. In the real world
people are more closely connected to certain communities compared to those outside of their
communities. In that case, although the pressure in one community may lead to the convergence
onto a single strategy, each community may converge to a different mean strategy. Finally, what
my results are telling us is that even if a player has a rational goal (in this case a large payoff),
a very small amount of social pressure may take them far away from this.
The dynamics described in this chapter are very complicated, with many different factors
affecting the degree of cooperation in the system. In order to understand in more detail what
is and is not important in increasing and decreasing cooperation I deconstruct each facet of the
model in the following chapters. This begins with analysing the expected payoff of a player in
the conditional public goods game, before going on to calculate the expected mean strategy of
a population, and the effect of both the single economic network, and the consideration of the
average strategy to the system in the form of the social layer.
4
Single group contributions
In the following chapters I explore the dynamics of the model outlined in section 3.3 and explain
in more depth the central results in chapter 3. The aim of these chapters is to understand the
form of the mean cooperation and strategy curves plotted in the previous chapter (figures 3.8 and
3.10) by breaking the model down into its constituent parts. The model dynamics consist of two
stages: the calculation of each player’s payoff, and the update of their strategy through either
economic or social imitation. To gain a more general understanding of the mean cooperation
and strategies plotted in chapter 3 I develop analytic forms for a strategy’s expected payoff in a
number of different parameter regimes: short and long generation lengths, and small and large
initial contributions.
In this chapter I calculate the payoffs of a single group over a single generation. I first calcu-
late the contribution and payoff of a strategy in each iteration in section 4.1, before calculating
the expected payoff of a strategy placed in a group formed at random from a population with
either a uniform (section 4.2) or a bimodal (section 4.3) distribution. I find that the accuracy
of the expected payoff compared to numerical results varies between different distributions of
strategies: for bimodal distributions the expected and numerically calculated payoffs of a player
agree more closely than for uniform ones.
In chapter 5 I use the player’s expected payoffs to describe the evolution of strategies in a well-
mixed population over a number of generations. Finally, I describe the evolution of strategies
on both the single economic network and the economic and social multiplex in chapter 6.
4.1 Payoffs of a single group over a single generation
To begin, I calculate the expected payoff for a player in a single group over a single generation
in the conditional public goods game. I show that whilst finding an analytic form for any group
composed at random is difficult, some approximations can be made to gain understanding of
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strategies with higher payoffs. As a reminder, if the mean group contribution is cg(l − 1) in
iteration l − 1, then player i with strategy ai contributes
ci,g(l) =
aicg(l − 1) if cg(l − 1) <
1
ai
1 otherwise
(4.1)
in iteration l. Since how much each player donates depends on the mean group donation in the
previous iteration, and because in the well-mixed population the groups are reformed at the
beginning of each generation, there is an issue about how much each player should assume has
been donated initially. To put this another way, what should the value of cg(0) be? To reduce
the number of random variables in the model, I assume throughout the rest of this chapter
(unless otherwise stated) that the initial group contribution cg(0) is the same for every player
in every group. To achieve this I set ci(0) = cg(0) for every player i in the population. The
value of cg(0) is the same for every group in the population, and in future dynamics across
generations this is always the same. I decide on the value of this parameter in order to ensure
certain behaviour i.e. small values ensure conditional behaviour whilst large values mean that
many players act unconditionally.
Letting the number of players in a group donating ci(l) = 1 (the number of completely
cooperative players) be Nc(l) then
cg(l) =
Nc(l) +
∑
ai(l)<
1
cg(l−1)
ai(l)cg(l − 1)
G
. (4.2)
If I define the sum of the strategies of all players in the group donating less than ci(l) = 1
divided by the group size as
ag(l) =
∑
ai(l)<
1
cg(l−1)
ai(l)
G
, (4.3)
then
cg(l) =
Nc(l)
G
+ ag(l)cg(l − 1) (4.4)
where G is the group size. It is important to note that the value of Nc(l) and hence ag(l) can
change at each iteration as different players donate either less than or exactly one unit depending
on the amount donated in the previous iteration. The payoff of player i at iteration l is
pi,g(l) = rcg(l)− ci,g(l). (4.5)
where r is the enhancement factor as defined in section 3.3 and cg(l) and ci,g(l) are calculated
iteratively using equations (4.4) and (4.1) respectively. Figure 4.1 plots the evolution of the group
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of the group contribution cg(l) plotted against the iterations l for a group
size G = 5 composed of strategies ai = 2.42, 0.47, 1.28, 1.75, 2.55. Numerical simulations (black
crosses) and analytics resulting from the repeated application of equation (4.4) (dashed blue
line) are plotted.
contribution cg(l) for a group composed of five players with strategies ai = 2.42, 0.47, 1.28, 1.75
and 2.55 by iterating equation (4.4) ten times (and using cg(0) = 0.1).
I use this equation to derive expressions for a player’s payoff for three distinct parameter
ranges: small initial contributions and short generation lengths; large initial contributions and
short generation lengths; and small initial contributions and long generation lengths. These
parameter ranges are selected to give a good cross-section of the possible behaviours of a group
of players. The small initial contributions and short generation lengths are chosen to ensure that
all players donate less than one unit to the group. The other two parameter regimes introduce
players that are completely cooperative: either because their donations have increased because
they play for many iterations (small initial contribution, long generation lengths); or because
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the initial donation is large enough that they donate one unit in the early iterations (large initial
contribution and short generation lengths).
4.1.1 Small initial contributions and short generation lengths
For sufficiently small initial contributions cg(0) and short generation lengths L players always
donate less than one. If all players donate less than one to the public good at every iteration
then Nc(l) = 0 and the average strategy ag(l) = ag for all iterations. The contribution in group
g with size G at iteration l is then
cg(l) =
∑
i∈g aicg(l − 1)
G
= agcg(l − 1). (4.6)
Since ag(l) now remains the same for each iteration, and so ag(l)→ ag, the group mean contri-
butions are given by
cg(1) = agcg(0), (4.7)
cg(2) = agcg(1) = agagcg(0) = a
2
gcg(0), (4.8)
and in general
cg(l) = a
l
gcg(0). (4.9)
The payoff at each iteration is
pi,g(l) = ra
l
gcg(0)− ci,g(l) (4.10)
= ralgcg(0)− aicg(l − 1) (4.11)
= ralgcg(0)− aial−1g cg(0) (4.12)
= cg(0)a
l−1
g (rag − ai) , (4.13)
and the total payoff for player i over a generation is
Pi,g =
L∑
l=1
cg(0)a
l−1
g (rag − ai) (4.14)
= cg(0)
(
1− aLg
1− ag
)
(rag − ai) (4.15)
using the standard summation of a geometric series. As a special case when L = 2 the payoff is
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Pi,g = cg(0)
(
1− a2g
1− ag
)
(rag − ai) (4.16)
= cg(0) (1 + ag) (rag − ai) . (4.17)
4.1.2 Larger contributions and short generation lengths
For short generation lengths but large initial contributions some players now donate everything
to the group: ci(l) = 1 for some i and consequently Nc(l) 6= 0 for some l. Therefore equation
(4.4) must be used. For L = 2,
cg(1) =
Nc(1)
G
+ ag(1)cg(0), (4.18)
cg(2) =
Nc(2)
G
+ ag(2)cg(1), (4.19)
=
Nc(2)
G
+ ag(2)
(
Nc(1)
G
+ ag(1)cg(0)
)
. (4.20)
This can be iterated as many times as needed, but in order to compare this with the result in
the previous parameter range I keep it to L = 2. Therefore the total payoff of player i is
Pi,g = pi,g(1) + pi,g(2) (4.21)
= rcg(1)− ci,g(1) + rcg(2)− ci,g(2) (4.22)
= r(cg(1) + cg(2))− (ci,g(1) + ci,g(2)) (4.23)
= r
(
Nc(1)
G
+ ag(1)cg(0) +
Nc(2)
G
+ ag(2)
(
Nc(1)
G
+ ag(1)cg(0)
))
− (ci,g(1) + ci,g(2))
(4.24)
= r
(
Nc(2)
G
+ (1 + ag(2))
(
Nc(1)
G
+ ag(1)cg(0)
))
− (ci,g(1) + ci,g(2)). (4.25)
4.1.3 Small contributions and long generation lengths
Finally, I calculate an expression for a player’s payoff for long generations and small initial
contributions. As in the previous section the value of Nc(l) and ag(l) may change in each
iteration as the amount contributed by the group, cg(l), increases or decreases. For L = 10 each
player’s exact payoff is calculated by iterating equation (4.4) from l = 1 to l = 10. However, an
approximation is made to understand the behaviour for small contributions and long generations
a little better. The approximation made is that each player behaves the same (donating less
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than or one unit), depending on whether their strategy is larger than or smaller than one, as
explained below.
I observe that the mean group contribution in figure 4.1 eventually reaches an equilibrium
value, cg(∞). The analytics for the group contribution in each iteration (and therefore each
player’s payoff) is calculated by applying equation (4.4) for ten iterations. From equation (4.4)
cg(l) =
Nc(l)
G
+ ag(l)cg(l − 1). (4.26)
I define the contribution at equilibrium as cg(l) = cg(l − 1) = cg(∞) so that
cg(∞) = Nc(∞)
G
+ ag(∞)cg(∞) (4.27)
cg(∞)(1− ag(∞)) = Nc(∞)
G
(4.28)
cg(∞) = Nc(∞)
G(1− ag(∞)) . (4.29)
To calculate this exactly the number of players donating everything at equilbrium (Nc(∞))
must be known. This will depend on both the strategy of each player in the group, and also the
amount donated in the previous iteration. It is not possible to find this using only the group
composition, and so I make an approximation. I know that players with strategy ai smaller than
one will never donate one unit. Therefore, I assume the number of players donating one unit
Nc(∞) are the remaining players in the group, or all those with strategy larger than one.
Since in this parameter range the initial contribution is small, every player initially con-
tributes less than one, and so I divide the group contribution into two regimes: the first where
the players in the group donate less than one (and therefore total payoffs obey equation (4.15)),
and the second when the group donates cg(∞). I denote the number of iterations at which the
group reaches cg(∞) as lc, and assume that before this point every player in the group is donat-
ing less than one unit. I also assume all players with strategy larger than one shift to donating
one unit in the same iteration. This is a reasonable approximation as the number of iterations
lc is small, and so the difference in the number of iterations between each player donating one
unit to the group is small. Using equation (4.15) the total payoff is calculated as
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Pi,g =
lc−1∑
l=1
pi,g(l) +
L∑
l=lc
pi,g(l) (4.30)
=
lc−1∑
l=1
(rcg(l)− aicg(l − 1)) +
L∑
l=lc
rcg(∞)− ci(∞) (4.31)
=
lc−1∑
l=1
(rcg(0)a
l
g − aicg(0)al−1g ) +
L∑
l=lc
rcg(∞)− ci,g(∞) (4.32)
= cg(0)
(
1− alc−1g
1− ag
)
(rag − ai) + (L− lc + 1)(rcg(∞)− ci,g(∞)). (4.33)
where the first terms are taken from the payoff for lc − 1 iterations and ag is the mean strategy
of the whole group (this equation is left in this form to emphasise the contributions before and
after the critical iteration, lc). Equating the equilbrium donation (equation (4.29)) with the
donation where all players are conditional (Nc = 0) at l = lc I find
cg(0)a
lc
g = cg(∞) (4.34)
lc =
log
(
cg(∞)
cg(0)
)
log ag
. (4.35)
To calculate each player’s payoff I substitute the calculated mean strategy of a group (ag)
into equation (4.33), setting cg(0) = 0.1, and as previously discussed approximate cg(∞) using
equation (4.29). I compare the exact iterative form (equation (4.4)) and numerics for a single
group in figure 4.2. The payoff of each player in a group (size G = 5) is plotted against the
generation length L for scaled enhancement factor η = 0.5, with the player’s strategy written in
the title of each subplot. The approximation in equation (4.33) is a good one, and the difference
between the approximation and the numerical and exactly calculated payoffs is small. Note that
in figure 4.2 the approximation and exactly calculated payoffs agree at small iterations, and only
deviate at larger ones. This is because at small iterations (l smaller than lc) the players are all
cooperating conditionally, and so the approximation and the exact calculation are equivalent.
In the following sections, the forms for the payoff of strategy ai (equations (4.17), (4.25) and
(4.33)) are used to calculate expected payoffs of groups of players selected at random, first from
a uniform strategy distribution and then from a bimodal one. I show that in each case these
forms calculate the payoff very accurately if the composition of the player’s group is known. If
the group is selected at random from a population, bimodal populations lead to a closer match
between the expected and numerically calculated payoffs. This closer match will therefore help
when deriving an analytic version of the dynamics in future chapters.
106 4.2 Uniform strategy distributions
0 5 10
0
2
4
6
8
Generation length, L
Pl
ay
er
’s 
pa
yo
ff
Player’s Strategy = 1.51
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
20
Generation length, L
Pl
ay
er
’s 
pa
yo
ff
Player’s Strategy = 0.03
0 5 10
0
2
4
6
8
Generation length, L
Pl
ay
er
’s 
pa
yo
ff
Player’s Strategy = 1.95
0 5 10
0
5
10
Generation length, L
Pl
ay
er
’s 
pa
yo
ff
Player’s Strategy = 1.4
0 5 10
0
5
10
15
Generation length, L
Pl
ay
er
’s 
pa
yo
ff
Player’s Strategy = 0.71
 
 
Numerical
Approximation
Figure 4.2: The payoff of each player in a group of size G = 5 plotted against generation
lengths for scaled enhancement factor η = 0.5. Numerical payoffs (black crosses), exact analytics
(equation (4.4), dashed blue line) and approximated payoffs (equation (4.33, dashed red line)
are plotted. Initial contribution cg(0) = 0.1.
4.2 Uniform strategy distributions
The previous section calculated the strategy of a player in a single group where the value of each
other player’s strategy is known. Now the groups are formed at random from a population of
players whose strategies are selected from a uniform distribution. I use the forms found in the
previous section for the payoff for each of the three parameter regimes (equations (4.17), (4.25)
and (4.33)) and calculate both the exact payoff for a specific group and the expected payoff of
each player in a population.
To calculate the expected payoff I assume that each group is constructed of one player with
strategy ai and G − 1 other players each selected at random from a population with mean
strategy µ. Therefore, I approximate the average strategy in the group as
aˆg =
ai +
∑
j∈g aj
G
(4.36)
≈ ai + (G− 1)µ
G
. (4.37)
where j ∈ g are those players selected from the population present in player i’s group. In each
of the following figures strategies are selected from a uniform distribution 0 < a < 3.
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Figure 4.3: The payoff for each player in a single group with enhancement factor η = 0.5
and size G = 5: numerical (black crosses), calculated exactly using equation (4.15) and the
empirical mean of the group ag (dashed blue line), and approximated using equation (4.15) and
the approximated mean of the group, aˆg, using equation (4.37)with µ = 1.5 (dashed red line).
Initial contribution cg(0) = 0.1.
4.2.1 Single group selected from a uniform strategy distribution
I test this approximation for a single group by plotting each player’s payoff against different
generation lengths L. I calculate the player’s payoff numerically, whilst also plotting the ana-
lytical payoff (using equation (4.15)) when ag is calculated exactly by taking the mean of the
strategies present in the group, and when ag is approximated using equation (4.37) in figure 4.3.
The first two forms differ in their calculation as the numerical simulations calculate the repeated
contribution, multiplying by the strategy each time, whilst the analytic payoff is calculated only
once, using the geometric sum. Although these forms are essentially equivalent, both are plotted
in order to examine the effect of the different methods of calculating ag. The group is selected
at random from a uniform population of strategies 0 < a < 3 and therefore µ = 1.5.
If ag is calculated by averaging the strategies in the group, the payoff calculated using
numerical equation (4.15) agrees with the payoff of each player exactly for all L, but when ag
is approximated by the population mean, µ, as aˆg, the numerical results agree only for small
generation lengths. The reason for this disagreement is that in this group ag = 1.95, which is
very different from the population mean µ = 1.5. The closer the agreement between the G− 1
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other players and the population mean, the closer the approximation is to equation (4.15). The
approximation is shown in figure 4.4 to be improved for group size G = 25. This is because ag
is closer to µ due to a larger sample size from the population.
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4.2.2 Well-mixed population selected from uniform strategy distributions
The previous figures demonstrate that if the composition of the group is known the payoff of a
player can be calculated exactly, but it is difficult to calculate this payoff if only an approximate
value of the mean group strategy is known. In the following figures the approximation in equation
(4.37) is tested for the expected payoff of each player in an entire population of size N = 250
in short/long generation lengths and small/large initial contribution parameter regimes, where
the payoffs are calculated via equations (4.17), (4.25) and (4.33). Once again I show that if
the composition of the group is known the payoff can be calculated exactly, but that using the
approximation does not give good agreement.
4.2.2.1 Expected payoff for uniform strategy distribution for short generation lengths L = 2 and
small initial contributions cg(0) = 0.1
In this parameter regime I select an initial group contribution of cg(0) = 0.1 and generation
length L = 2. The payoff is measured and plotted in figure 4.5 for each strategy in a population
of size N = 250 and separated into groups of size G = 5, with enhancement factor η = 0.5. The
payoff for each player is calculated exactly using equation (4.17) by measuring ag (circles) and
approximated using equation (4.37) where µ = 1.5 (dashed red line). Once again, I observe that
the payoff is calculated exactly when the average of the other strategies in a group is known, but
when an approximation is made for the sum of the other strategies the payoff is less accurate.
It is important to note that, as shown in this figure, calculating the payoff accurately is
strongly dependent on knowing the value of ag. When the strategies are selected from a uniform
distribution the distribution of mean strategies in any group is wide. This wide distribution
therefore means that the group contributions at each iteration cg(l) can take many possible
values. Since a player’s donations (and therefore payoff) depend on cg(l), there is consequently
little correlation between a player’s strategy and payoff.
Figure 4.5 demonstrates that calculating the expected strategy by assuming that all other
group members play the same strategy does not produce an accurate approximation. The
inaccuracy of this approximation is caused by the wide spread of strategies in the population,
as shown by the introduction of a single player with strategy a0 into two different populations:
either a homogeneous population of players with a single strategy a = 0.45 (a randomly selected
value1); or a population of randomly assigned strategies 0 < a < 0.9. In both cases the mean
of the population is the same (µ = 0.45) and so the approximate mean group strategies aˆg are
equal. I calculate player i’s payoff Pi using equation (4.17) (L = 2) in both cases and plot them
1To ensure that my numerics were not biased by the selection of a special case, each time I ran the numerical
simulations the strategy a was randomly generated.
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Figure 4.5: The payoff of each player in a well-mixed population N = 250 group size G = 5 after
a single generation plotted against their strategy for enhancement factor η = 0.5 and generation
length L = 2. The black crosses show the numerically calculated payoff, the black circles the
payoff calculated using equation (4.17) with ag known, and the dashed red line calculates the
payoff through equation (4.17) approximating aˆg using equation (4.37) with µ = 1.5. Initial
contribution cg(0) = 0.1.
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against the numerical values for two different enhancement factors η = 0.5 and 0.85, and group
sizes G = 5 and 25 in figure 4.6.
When the population consists only of players with a single strategy ai = 0.45 (black crosses),
equation (4.17) agrees exactly with the numerical simulations. When the strategies are selected
from a uniform population the agreement between equation (4.17) and the numerics is less good.
Equation (4.17) is heavily dependent on the value of ag, and therefore is only accurate when ag
is calculated exactly or approximated closely. The effect of the enhancement factor and group
size on the accuracy of the approximation is unclear from these plots, as the scale in each case
is different. However, as the group size increases the fractional error between the single and the
varied mean strategy is observed to decrease.
The above numerics confirm that it is possible to calculate the payoff of a player exactly if
the strategies of all other players in the group are known, but that when the average strategy
in the rest of the group is significantly different from the population mean it is difficult to
approximate the expected payoff. This confirms what was alluded to in the previous chapter: a
player’s payoff is only loosely correlated with their strategy, and this is due to the wide range of
group compositions possible from a uniform population. So, whilst the forms derived above are
accurate, they do not help to understand which strategies generate high payoffs in a population.
4.2.2.2 Expected payoff for uniform strategy distribution for i) short generation lengths L = 2
and large initial contributions cg(0) =
1
3 and ii) long generation lengths L = 10 and
small initial contributions cg(0) = 0.1
The accuracy of the approximation for the mean group strategy aˆg (equation (4.37)) is shown
in figure 4.7a for short generation lengths L = 2 and large contributions cg(0) =
1
3 , and in
figure 4.7b for long generations L = 10 and small initial contributions cg(0) = 0.1. The exact
analytic form (circles) calculates the payoff exactly using the known strategy values, whilst the
approximation (dashed red line) is made by assuming once again that each of the other players
in the group plays strategy µ, where µ is the mean population strategy. The group contribution
at each iteration is defined by equation (4.4). This is approximated as
cg(l) =

(
(G−1)µ+ai
G
)
cg(l − 1) if µ < 1cg(l−1) and ai < 1cg(l−1)
G−1
G +
ai
G cg(l − 1) if µ > 1cg(l−1) and ai < 1cg(l−1)
1
G +
(G−1)µ
G cg(l − 1) if µ < 1cg(l−1) and a >i 1cg(l−1)
1 if µ > 1cg(l−1) and ai >
1
cg(l−1)
(4.38)
depending on whether the player or the rest of the group are donating everything they have.
Figure 4.7 demonstrates that calculating the expected strategy from a uniform population
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(a) Enhancement factor η = 0.5, group size G = 5
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(b) Enhancement factor η = 0.85, group size G = 5
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(c) Enhancement factor η = 0.5, group size G = 25
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(d) Enhancement factor η = 0.85, group size G = 25
Figure 4.6: The payoff plotted against strategy for a player placed in a population consisting of
either i) a homogeneous single strategy a = 0.45 population (dashed red line) or ii) a population
of randomly selected strategies with mean µ = 0.45 (blue circles). Numerical results (black
crosses) are plotted for two different enhancement factors and group sizes. The analytic line is
calculated using equation (4.17). The population size is N = 250.
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(a) Generation length L = 2, initial contribution
cg(0) =
1
3 .
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(b) Generation length L = 10, initial contribution
cg(0) = 0.1.
Figure 4.7: The payoff of each player in a well-mixed population N = 250 with group size G = 5
after a single generation plotted against their strategy for enhancement factor η = 0.5 and
generation length L = 2, with large initial contribution cg(0) =
1
3 (figure 4.7a) and generation
length L = 10, with small initial contribution cg(0) = 0.1 (figure 4.7b) . The black crosses show
the numerically calculated payoff, the black circles the payoff calculated using equation (4.25)
with ag known at each iteration, and the dashed red line is calculated through iterations of
equation (4.4) using the approximation for aˆg given by equation (4.37) with µ = 0.45, before
substituting into equation (4.5).
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using this approximation does not give good agreement with the numerics. Therefore, a better
approximation is made in the next section.
4.3 Bimodal initial strategy distributions
The previous results show that the approximation I used to construct the expected payoff when
a population of strategies are distributed uniformly does not give accurate results. In order
to generate analytical results for the mean strategy at equilibrium I now investigate an initial
strategy distribution that gives good agreement between numerics and analytics for the expected
payoff of a group. Therefore, in this section I select the strategies from a bimodal population
consisting of two strategies, a = s0 and a = s1, and find a much more accurate approximation
of the expected payoff. I assume each group contains strategy ai plus G − 1 other strategies,
selected at random to be either s0 or s1. The mean strategy of the group is defined as
ag(ai, n) =
ai + ns0 + (G− 1− n)s1
G
(4.39)
where n is the number of strategy s0 players present in the rest of the group. Because the
probability distribution of each group is binomial the expected payoff of player i is
P¯i = cg(0)
G−1∑
n=0
(
G− 1
n
)
ρn0 (1− ρ0)G−n−1Pi(ai, n) (4.40)
where ρ0 is the frequency of strategy s0 in the population and Pi(ai, n) is the payoff for a player
with strategy ai in a group with n strategy s0 players. As before, I now test this approximation
for a number of parameter regimes, but this time the calculated expected payoff shows much
better agreement with the numerics.
4.3.1 Expected payoff for bimodal strategy distribution for short generation lengths
L = 2 and small initial contributions cg(0) = 0.04
The first parameter regime is for short generation lengths L = 2 and small initial contributions
cg(0) = 0.04 (this value has been changed as the range of values from which the strategies are
selected has increased), and I therefore use equation (4.17) to calculate the expected payoff as
P¯i = cg(0)
G−1∑
n=0
(
G− 1
n
)
ρn0 (1− ρ0)G−n−1 (1 + ag(ai, n)) (rag(ai, n)− si) . (4.41)
I plot the expected payoff P¯i against s0 (figure 4.8) using both numerical simulations and equa-
tion (4.41) for a population size N = 250 that consists of equal numbers of s1 = 1.21 (a randomly
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selected value2) placed in groups of size G = 5 for scaled enhancement factor η = 0.5.
For low values of s0 the distribution of payoffs for each strategy is very narrow and equation
(4.41) agrees with the numerical results very well (figure 4.8). As s0 increases the agreement
between the approximation and the numerics is less exact, and the distribution of strategies
widens, but there is still good agreement.
4.3.2 Expected payoff for bimodal strategy distribution for short generation lengths
L = 2 and large initial contributions cg(0) =
1
3
Following the same argument as in section 4.1.1, I calculate the payoff of a player with strategy
s0 in a population with only two strategies, s0 and s1 = 1.88. For a group containing n players
with strategy s0, ag(l) and Nc(l) take four possible values:
(ag(l), Nc(l)) =

(
ns0+(G−1−n)s1+s0
G , 0
)
if s0 <
1
cg(l−1) and s1 <
1
cg(l−1)(
ns0+s0
G , G− n
)
if s0 <
1
cg(l−1) and s1 >
1
cg(l−1)(
(G−1−n)s1
G , n
)
if s0 >
1
cg(l−1) and s1 <
1
cg(l−1)
(0, G) if s0 >
1
cg(l−1) and s1 >
1
cg(l−1) .
(4.42)
I substitute these values into equation (4.25) to find the payoff. The payoff for a player with
strategy s0 is compared to these equations in figure 4.9a, where it is seen that once again there
is good agreement between the analytics and the numerical simulations. The best agreement
occurs in the central portion of the plot, where some players act conditionally for some, but not
all, of the generations. Also plotted are results for small initial contribution and large generation
length (figure 4.9b) where the contribution is calculated by iterating equation (4.4) repeatedly.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter I have developed analytical forms for the expected payoff of a player in a single
generation. I have found that the expected payoff of a player with a certain strategy can be
calculated accurately when the composition of the group in which they play is known. When
the composition of the group must be estimated results are more accurate when the population
from which the group is selected is bimodal rather than uniform. In the next chapter I use these
approximations to derive the evolution of the mean strategy in a well-mixed population.
2As previously, each time I ran the numerics a new value was selected to ensure that the results were not
biased towards a certain value.
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Figure 4.8: Payoff of player strategy s0 in a well-mixed population size N = 250 consisting
of equal numbers of s0 and s1 = 1.21. The group size is G = 5. The enhancement factor is
η = 0.5 and the generation length is L = 2 with initial contribution cg(0) = 0.04. The numerical
simulations are plotted as black crosses and the expected payoff, calculated using equation (4.41),
is plotted using a dashed blue line.
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(a) Generation length L = 2 and initial contribution
cg(0) =
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(b) Generation length L = 2 and initial contribution
cg(0) =
1
3 .
Figure 4.9: Payoff for a player with strategy s0 in a well-mixed population size N = 250
consisting of equal numbers of s0 and s1. The group size is G = 5, the enhancement factor
is η = 0.5. Plots are for generation length L = 2 and the initial contribution is cg(0) =
1
3
(s1 = 1.88, left) and generation length L = 10 and the initial contribution is cg(0) = 0.04
(s1 = 1.56, right). The numerical simulations are plotted as black crosses and the expected
payoff, calculated using equation (4.25), is plotted using a dashed blue line.
5
Evolution of the mean strategy in a population
In the previous chapter I accurately calculated the expected payoff of a player when the popula-
tion consists of just two strategies. I now use this to examine the evolution of the mean strategy
across many generations. The population in this chapter is well-mixed, with new groups formed
at the beginning of each generation. The initial strategies in this model are selected from a
bimodal distribution and the central assumption is that as players update their strategies the
distribution remains broadly bimodal. This assumption enables an accurate model of the change
in the mean strategy over multiple generations. Two different strategy imitation scenarios are
considered. First, in section 5.1 I consider exact strategy imitation. Then, in section 5.2 approx-
imate strategy imitations for three different parameter regimes are considered. An expression
for the strategy at equilibrium is found, and the behaviour of the well-mixed dynamics are
explained. I find that the key factor in the population mean strategy is the ratio of the proba-
bilities of a player of one strategy imitating another of a higher or lower strategy, and for certain
parameter values this ratio accurately predicts the equilibrium strategy.
I calculate the mean strategy in a population by updating each player’s strategy as described
in section 3.3 (equation (3.6)). To do this, I first need to calculate the expected payoff in each
generation. For the rest of this chapter the number of players in the population is N = 250, and
the initial population is selected from a bimodal distribution. Let ai(t) be the strategy of player
i at generation t, and assume that initially half the players are free-riders ai(0) = s0(0) = 0,
and half are very cooperative ai(0) = s1(0) = 5. When each player in the population plays one
of only two strategies the initial mean strategy of the population is
a¯(0) = ρ0(0)s0(0) + ρ1(0)s1(0) (5.1)
where ρv(0) is the initial fraction of the population playing with strategy sv(0), and is set to
ρv(0) = 0.5.
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In this chapter i and j index the players in the population, and therefore range from 1 to N .
The indices v and w correspond to the bimodal strategies that may be selected, and therefore
take the value of either 0 or 1. As a reminder, players update their strategy by imitating a
randomly selected player (if that player’s payoff is higher) according to
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) + θH(Pj > Pi)(aj(t)− ai(t)). (5.2)
Since the population is initially bimodal the updated strategy of those that play the lower
strategy in generation t = 1 is
s′0(1) = s0(0) + θ(s1(0)− s0(0)) (5.3)
and
s′1(1) = s1(0) + θ(s0(0)− s1(0)) (5.4)
for those playing the higher one, where the prime indicates the new strategy of those players
that imitate a player of a different strategy. There are two possible extremes for the imitation of
a strategy between two players in this model. The first is that a player imitates another exactly
(θ = 1), and the second is when a player moves towards the better performing player’s strategy
by a fraction of the difference between the two strategies (θ smaller than one). I now study the
well-mixed finite population dynamics, firstly for exact imitation (θ = 1) and then for a small
imitation strength (θ = 0.1).
5.1 Exact strategy imitation (θ = 1) for well-mixed dynamics
In this section I show that the standard public goods game is recovered using the model described
in section 3.3 for certain parameter values. I show this by plotting the mean strategy against
increasing enhancement factors for numerical simulations, and also derive an analytical form for
the evolution of the mean strategy.
5.1.1 The mean strategy plotted against enhancement factor
In the standard public goods game each player plays as either a cooperator or a defector i.e. each
player donates everything they have, or nothing. To achieve this, in the following simulations
the parameters are for short generation length L = 2 and large initial contribution cg(0) = 0.5.
When the strategies obey s0(t) = 0 and s1(t) >
1
cg(0)
(where cg(0) is the initial contribution) the
lower strategy players are free-riders, never donating anything, and the higher strategy players
always donate one unit to the public good. Therefore, this model is effectively the standard
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Figure 5.1: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η with bimodal
initial conditions s0(0) = 0 and s1(0) = 5, for numerics and analytics for exact imitation (θ = 1)
only. The initial group contribution is cg(0) = 0.5, the population size is N = 250, the generation
length L = 2 and the group size G = 5.
public goods game with unconditional cooperators and defectors. As in chapter 3, in figure 5.1
the mean strategy after 20, 000 generations (averaged over the last 2000) is averaged for ten
simulations and plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η. Error bars show the standard
deviation across the ten simulations. Since there is no variation between runs in these results
the errors are zero, but visible error bars are plotted in subsequent figures. These dynamics
do replicate those which would be expected for the standard public goods game, where the
population fixates to defection (〈a〉 = 0) for η less than 1 and to cooperation (〈a〉 = 5) for η ≥ 1.
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5.1.2 Analytical form for the mean strategy against the number of generations
I now derive an equation that accurately models the changes in the mean strategy in the well-
mixed population under the conditions that replicate the standard public goods game (large
initial contributions, small generation lengths and bimodal initial conditions). To do this I find
the group compositions where a cooperator’s payoff is larger than a defector’s, and vice versa.
When θ is one, it is not the values of the two strategies s0(t) and s1(t) that change, but the
number of players in the population playing each strategy. I define the number of players with
strategy sv in generation t as Sv(t) and so
S0(t+ 1) = S0(t)−Q01(t)S0(t) +Q10(t)S1(t) (5.5)
= S0(t)(1−Q01(t)) +Q10(t)S1(t), (5.6)
where Qvw(t) is the probability of player strategy sv imitating player strategy sw in generation
t, where v, w ∈ {0, 1}. For S1(t)
S1(t+ 1) = S1(t)(1−Q10(t)) +Q01(t)S0(t) (5.7)
and the mean strategy is
a¯(t+ 1) =
S0(t+ 1)s0 + S1(t+ 1)s1
N
(5.8)
=
s0(S0(t)(1−Q01(t)) +Q10(t)S1(t)) + s1(S1(t)(1−Q10(t)) +Q01(t)S0(t))
N
(5.9)
=
S0(t)(s0 +Q01(t)(s1 − s0)) + S1(t)(s1 +Q10(t)(s0 − s1))
N
(5.10)
= ρ0(t)(s0 +Q01(t)(s1 − s0)) + ρ1(t)(s1 +Q10(t)(s0 − s1)) (5.11)
= ρ0(t)s0 + ρ1(t)s1 + (s1 − s0)(ρ0(t)Q01(t)− ρ1(t)Q10(t)) (5.12)
= a¯(t) + (s1 − s0)(ρ0(t)Q01(t)− ρ1(t)Q10(t)). (5.13)
where, as before, N is the size of the population and ρv =
Sv
N is the proportion of strategy sv
players in the population. Because players imitate one another exactly the value of sv does not
change with time, and so this dependence has been dropped. In the bimodal population player
i can play one of only two strategies, and so ai = sv where v ∈ {0, 1}, and Pi = Πv where Πv
is the payoff of a player with strategy sv. The probability of player i with strategy sv imitating
player j with strategy sw is the probability that the payoff Pj is greater than Pi, and therefore
that Πw is larger than Πv. Over L = 2 iterations the cooperators donate two units to the group
and defectors nothing and so the payoff of a player with strategy s0 is
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Π0 = 2
r
G
(G− 1− n0), (5.14)
where n0 is the number of defectors in the G − 1 other players in the defector’s group (hence
there are G− n0 − 1 cooperators in the entire group), and the payoff of a player with strategy
s1 is
Π1 = 2
( r
G
(G− 1− n1 + 1)− 1
)
= 2
r
G
(G− 1− n1) + 2( r
G
− 1). (5.15)
where n1 is the number of defectors in the rest of the cooperator’s group. For Π1 > Π0
2
r
G
(G− 1− n1) + 2( r
G
− 1) > 2 r
G
(G− 1− n0) (5.16)
2
r
G
(n0 − n1) + 2 r
G
− 2 > 0 (5.17)
n0 − n1 > G
r
− 1 (5.18)
I define the difference between the two payoffs1 to be a function of the number of cooperators
in each players group giving
f(s1, s0, n1, n0) = Π1 −Π0 = n0 − n1 − G
r
+ 1 (5.19)
and
f(s0, s1, n0, n1) = Π0 −Π1 = n1 − n0 + G
r
− 1. (5.20)
The probability that player i with strategy sv imitates a randomly selected player with strategy
sw is the probability of selecting a player with strategy sw multiplied by the probability that
the selected player has a larger payoff, or
Qvw = ρw
G−1∑
nv=0
G−1∑
nw=0
q(nv)q(nw)H(f(sw, sv, nw, nv)) (5.21)
where H(x) is the Heaviside step function and q(nv) is the probability of a group with nw
defectors occurring. As the rest of the group is formed at random from a bimodal distribution
in the well-mixed case
q(nv) =
(
G− 1
nv
)
ρnv0 (1− ρ0)G−1−nv . (5.22)
1The strategy value is included in the definition of this function for consistency with the definition of the payoff
difference for smaller values of θ, used later in the chapter.
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5.1.3 The mean strategy plotted against generations
Iterating equation (5.13) by substituting equation (5.22) into equation (5.21) the mean strategy
in generation t+1 is calculated. I find good agreement with the numerical simulations, as shown
in figure 5.2 where I plot the mean strategy against the generations for both scaled enhancement
factor η = 0.2 and 0.5 and initial group contribution cg(0) = 0.5.
5.2 Approximate strategy imitation (θ = 0.1) well-mixed dynamics
The dynamics for less precise strategy imitation are understood by modelling the population as
two coherent peaks moving towards one another at different rates. Figure 5.3 is a cartoon of the
evolution of the two peaks over the generations. In this figure the bar to the right is strategy
s1(t) whilst the bar to the left is strategy s0(t), and s1(t) is larger than s0(t).
In this section I find an analytical result for this model that gives good agreement with
numerical simulations for the mean strategy across the generations for certain parameter values.
As in chapter 4, analytic and numerical simulation results are presented for three different
parameter regimes:
1. Short generation length L = 2 and small initial contribution cg(0) = 0.04.
2. Short generation length L = 2 and large initial contribution cg(0) =
1
3 .
3. Long generation length L = 10 and small initial contribution cg(0) = 0.04.
As previously explained, these three regimes are chosen to give a cross-section of possible
behaviour. In the first parameter regime the players never donate one unit to the group, and
therefore always act conditionally. The points at which players may begin to donate a unit are
either if the initial contribution is large, or the length of the generation is long. The latter two
regimes cover these possibilities.
5.2.1 Analytical form of the mean strategy for small imitation strength
I find an analytical form for the mean strategy across the generations which can be used in each
of the three parameter regimes above. The strict conditions of the standard public goods game
are now relaxed, where instead of a player imitating a better performing strategy precisely they
move towards it by an amount θ of the strategy difference. I initialise the strategies using the
bimodal initial conditions as in section 5.1, although because the imitation strength θ is less
than one, after one generation the population consists of four strategies (two corresponding to
players that do not alter their strategy, and two corresponding to players that do, as shown in
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Figure 5.2: The mean strategy plotted against the generations with bimodal initial conditions
s0(0) = 0 and s1(0) = 5. The numerics are run for exact imitation (θ = 1) scaled enhancement
factors η = 0.2 and η = 0.5, and the analytics follow equation (5.13). The initial group contri-
bution is cg(0) = 0.5, the population size is N = 250, the generation length is L = 2 and the
group size is G = 5.
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Figure 5.3: A cartoon depicting the evolution of the two strategies over the generations, s0(t)
and s1(t). Over time the players imitate others, and move closer before coalescing into the
single strategy at equilibrium. The final strategy depends on the values of the probability of one
strategy imitating another (Qvw). Different sized ratios lead to different equilibrium strategies.
5.2 Approximate strategy imitation (θ = 0.1) well-mixed dynamics 127
the cartoon in figure 5.4 b). The expected mean strategy of the players forming the lower pair
after a single generation is
s0(1) = (1−Q01(0))s0(0) +Q01(0)(s0(0) + θ(s1(0)− s0(0))) (5.23)
= s0(0)−Q01(0)s0(0) +Q01(0)s0(0) + θQ01(0)(s1(0)− s0(0)) (5.24)
= s0(0) + θQ01(0)(s1(0)− s0(0)), (5.25)
and for the upper pair
s1(1) = s1(0) + θQ10(0)(s0(0)− s1(0)). (5.26)
I showed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 that because a player’s payoff strongly depends on the com-
position of the group to which they contribute, if the distribution of strategies is uniform, the
calculated expected payoffs do not agree well with the numerics. However, if the population
consists of only two strategies the expected payoff shows much better agreement with computa-
tional results. I therefore make the approximation that the population remains bimodal for all
generations (figure 5.4 c)), and the two strategies evolve according to
s0(t+ 1) = s0(t) + θQ01(t)(s1(t)− s0(t)) (5.27)
and
s1(t+ 1) = s1(t) + θQ10(t)(s0(t)− s1(t)). (5.28)
I also assume that the fraction of the population playing each strategy s0(t) and s1(t) remains
constant (so ρ0(t) → ρ0 and ρ1(t) → ρ1). I have approximated the two strategies generated at
each step by a single population with their own expected strategy. I write the strategy of peak
v at generation t as sv(t), so the mean strategy of the whole population after a single generation
is
a¯(t+ 1) = ρ0s0(t+ 1) + ρ1s1(t+ 1) (5.29)
= ρ0 [s0(t) + θQ01(t)(s1(t)− s0(t))] + ρ1 [s1(t) + θQ10(t)(s0(t)− s1(t))] (5.30)
= ρ0s0(t) + ρ0θQ01(t)(s1(t)− s0(t)) + ρ1s1(t) + ρ1θQ10(t)(s0(t)− s1(t)) (5.31)
= ρ0s0(t) + ρ1s1(t) + θ(s1(t)− s0(t))(ρ0Q01(t)− ρ1Q10(t)) (5.32)
= a¯(t) + θ(s1(t)− s0(t))(ρ0Q01(t)− ρ1Q10(t)). (5.33)
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Figure 5.4: A cartoon depicting the evolution of the two strategies over the generations, s0(t)
and s1(t). Figure a) shows the initial conditions and figure b) shows the distribution of strategies
after a single generation. Figure c) demonstrates that after each generation, I assume that each
strategy is a coherent single peak centered at the mean of each strategy.
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5.2.2 Analytical form of the payoff difference for short generation length and small
group contribution
I find an explicit form for the payoff difference between two players for the short generation
length (L = 2) and small initial contribution (cg(0) = 0.04). To calculate the payoff I consider
a group containing one strategy ai ∈ {s0, s1} player and G − 1 other players with strategies
selected at random. I rewrite equation (4.17) slightly by substituting
ag(ai, ni) =
nis0 + (G− 1− ni)s1 + ai
G
(5.34)
where ni is the number of s0 players in the rest of player i’s group. Because the generation
length is short and the group contribution small all players donate less than one, and so this
equation is appropriate. Player i with strategy ai = sv therefore has payoff Pi = Πv which is
calculated as
Πv(sv, nv) = cg(0)
(
1 +
nvs0 + (G− 1− nv)s1 + sv
G
)(
r
nvs0 + (G− 1− nv)s1 + sv
G
− sv
)
.
(5.35)
As before, player i with strategy s0 imitates player j with strategy s1 player if Pj is greater than
Pi, and therefore if Π1 > Π0 i.e. if
(5.36)
(
1 +
n1s0 + (G− 1− n1)s1 + s1
G
)(
r
n1s0 + (G− 1− n1)s1 + s1
G
− s1
)
>
(
1 +
n0s0 + (G− 1− n0)s1 + s0
G
)(
r
n0s0 + (G− 1− n0)s1 + s0
G
− s0
)
and so
(5.37)(G+ n1s0 + (G− 1− n1)s1 + s1)(r(n1s0 + (G− 1− n1)s1 + s1)−Gs1)
> (G+ n0s0 + (G− 1− n0)s1 + s0)(r(n0s0 + (G− 1− n0)s1 + s0)−Gs0)
As in section 5.1 I set the difference between the two payoffs as
(5.38)f(s1, s0, n1, n0) = (G+n1s0 + (G− 1−n1)s1 + s1)(r(n1s0 + (G− 1−n1)s1 + s1)−Gs1)
− (G+n0s0 +(G−1−n0)s1 +s0)(r(n0s0 +(G−1−n0)s1 +s0)−Gs0)
and substitute this into equation (5.21) and (5.33) to calculate the probability of one player
imitating another.
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5.2.3 Numerical simulation results for the evolution of the mean strategy
In figure 5.5, the mean strategy as a function of the number of generations is shown for both
numerical simulations and the analytical expression given in equation (5.33). Bimodal initial
conditions (s1(0) = 5, s0(0) = 0) are used with ρ0(0) = ρ1(0) = 0.5, and results are plotted for
two different enhancement factors (η = 0.2 and 0.5).
The strong agreement between the numerics and analytics for enhancement factor η = 0.2
and η = 0.5 suggests that the assumptions made in the formulation of the analytical model are
broadly good ones. I deduce that the population evolves through two peaks moving towards
one another at a rate determined by their payoffs, and that equilibrium is reached when the two
peaks coalesce. The different equilibrium mean strategy for different values of η is explained
by the difference in the probability of one strategy imitating another, Qvw(t) (equation (5.21,
as shown in figure 5.3). The two peaks move towards one another at rates determined by the
probability of one strategy’s payoff being larger than the other. These rates are not the same for
both strategies, and depend on the enhancement factor. Therefore, for different enhancement
factors the peaks coalesce at different strategy values, and so the final equilibrium strategy is
different.
To understand the behaviour of the conditional cooperator public goods game, and why
certain strategies perform better than others, it is important to understand the function Qvw(t),
and in particular the payoff difference between two players, Πw and Πv, playing strategy sw
and sv, respectively (equation (5.38)). The payoff of a player with strategy sv in a bimodal
population is
Πv(sv, nv) =
cg(0)
G
(G+nvs0 + (G−1−nv)s1 +sv)(r(nvs0 + (G−1−nv)s1 +sv)−Gsv). (5.39)
Obviously, for each strategy the payoff can take a range of values depending on how many s0
players (nv) are in the rest of the group, as shown in figure 5.6, where the possible range of
payoffs for this player are plotted, along with the extreme values of the number of defectors in
the group, n.
In general, because they donate less to the group, the player with the lower strategy generates
a higher payoff. However, because players imitate others from different groups, for certain group
compositions a strategy s0 player will have a lower payoff than a player with strategy s1. There
are three possibilities for the range of payoffs, Π0 and Π1, that will result in the following strategy
imitations:
1. Π0 is larger than Π1 for all values of n1 and n0. A lower strategy will never imitate a
higher one if this is the case, so Q01(t) is always equal to zero.
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Figure 5.5: The mean strategy plotted against the generations for short generation lengths
(L = 2) and small initial conditions (cg(0) = 0.04), with bimodal initial conditions s0(0) = 0
and s1(1) = 5. The numerics are run for small imitation strength (θ = 0.1) scaled enhancement
factors η = 0.2 (black crosses) and η = 0.5 (blue circles). The analytics are calculated using
equation (5.33). The group size is G = 5, and the population size is N = 250.
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Figure 5.6: A plot of the range of a player’s payoff when playing strategy s1 = 5, calculated using
equation (5.39). The number of s0 = 0 players in the group (n) are labelled at the extremes.
The enhancement factor is η = 0.5, and the group size is G = 5.
2. Π1 is larger than Π0 for all values of n1 and n0. A lower strategy will always imitate a
higher one if this is the case, so Q01(t) is always equal to one.
3. Π1 is larger than Π0 for some values of n1 and n0. In this case whether a player with a
lower strategy imitates a player with a higher one will depend on the composition of the
groups.
Figure 5.7 plots each of the three different possibilities, along with the enhancement factor
at which they occur. Understanding the width of the overlap between the two payoffs in the
latter case helps to explain some of the behviour in this model, and enables the calculation of a
number of key points. To find which of the three regimes the system is in I compare the largest
payoff of a player with strategy s1 with the smallest payoff of a player with strategy s0.
I first calculate the size of the overlap between the two payoffs. This is the difference between
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(a) Enhancement factor η = 0.1.
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Figure 5.7: A plot of the range of a player’s payoff when playing strategy s1 = 5 and s0 = 0
respectively for three different enhancement factors: η = 0.1 (top), η = 0.2 (middle), and η = 0.5
(bottom). The payoffs are calculated using , calculated using equation (5.39). The group size is
G = 5.
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the minimum payoff of a player with strategy s0, Π
min
0 , and the maximum payoff of a player
with strategy s1, Π
max
1 . The maximum payoff of a player with strategy s1 occurs when n1 = 0
i.e. all of the players are playing the larger strategy. Therefore,
Πmax1 = (G+ (G− 1)s1 + s1)(r((G− 1)s1 + s1)−Gs1) (5.40)
= G2s1(1 + s1)(r − 1). (5.41)
Similarly, the smallest possible value of Π0 occurs when the players in the group are playing the
smallest strategy i.e. n0 = G− 1 and so
Πmin0 = (G+ (G− 1)s0 + (G− 1− (G− 1))s1 + s0)(r((G− 1)s0 + (G− 1− (G− 1))s1 + s0)−Gs0)
(5.42)
= G2s0(1 + s0)(r − 1). (5.43)
The difference is
∆Π = Πmax1 −Πmin0 (5.44)
= G2s1(1 + s1)(r − 1)−G2s0(1 + s0)(r − 1) (5.45)
= G2(r − 1)(s21 − s20 + s1 − s0) (5.46)
= G2(r − 1)((s1 − s0)(s1 + s0) + s1 − s0) (5.47)
= G2(r − 1)(s1 − s0)(s1 + s0 + 1) (5.48)
Examining equation (5.48), as the enhancement factor increases, the probability that a player
with strategy s0 imitates a player with strategy s1 also increases. Therefore, the size of Q01
increases, whilst at the same time, the value of Q10 decreases as there are now some values of Π1
larger than Π0. Hence, two peaks coalesce at a larger equilibrium strategy. This demonstrates
that increasing the enhancement factor leads to an increase in the mean strategy in the system.
This picture also explains the imbalance between the probability of a larger strategy imitating
a smaller one, and vice versa. The payoff range where one strategy can imitate another is not
the same for both strategies, and in extreme cases one strategy will never imitate another.
5.2.4 Critical enhancement factor for cooperation in the system
For any cooperation to persist in the system at equilibrium Πmax1 must be larger than Π
min
0 ,
and therefore ∆Π must be larger than zero (as shown in figure 5.7c)).
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Since the group size and the strategies are always positive, and s1 is by definition larger
than s0, equation (5.48) shows that for free-riders to imitate more cooperative strategies the
enhancement factor must be greater than one
r > 1 (5.49)
and therefore the critical enhancement factor at which this occurs is rc = 1 and so
ηc =
rc
G
=
1
G
. (5.50)
Later numerical results show that cooperation is indeed observed in the system for enhancement
factors larger than this (figure 5.15, for example).
5.2.5 Mean strategy evolution for other parameter regimes
In figure 5.8 the numerics and analytics for the mean strategy are plotted against the number
of generations for the second (large initial contributions and short generation lengths) and
third (small initial contributions and long generation lengths) parameter regimes. At each
generation the mean population strategy is plotted in the same way as in figure 5.5, calculating
the probability of player strategy sv imitating player strategy sw using equation (5.21), and
substituting this into equation (5.33). For both parameter regimes there is very good agreement
between the numerics and analytics for the small enhancement factor (η = 0.2 in figure 5.8a
and 5.8b). However, for the larger enhancement factor (η = 0.5) the agreement is less good,
particularly in figure 5.8a.
The discrepancy between the analytics and the numerics is explained by studying the distri-
bution of strategies. To recap, the central assumption in the derivation of the analytics is that
the population remains as two coherent peaks for every generation. Figures 5.10 and 5.9 plot
the strategy distribution for the second and third parameter regime for generations t = 1, 5, 10
and 20. In both figures I observe that whilst at t = 20 generations the strategies are grouped
into two peaks, these peaks consist of a number of strategies rather than consisting of a single
strategy. If the peaks are spread across a number of strategies then each strategy may have a
slightly different probability of imitating a strategy from the other peak, as demonstrated in the
cartoon in figure 5.11, where a distributed peak of strategies may contain players with different
imitation probability values (labelled as Qvw and Q
′
vw in the figure).
This is confirmed in figure 5.12, where the value of Qvw is plotted for all possible strategies,
sv ∈ [0, 5] and sw ∈ [0, 5], the three plots in this figure correspond to the three different strategy
regimes. For short generation length and small initial contribution (figure 5.12a) the value of
Qvw does not differ if the strategies are spread across a wide range. This is not the case in
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Figure 5.8: The mean strategy plotted against the generations with bimodal initial conditions
s0(0) = 0 and s1(0) = 5. Plots are for short generation lengths (L = 2) and large initial
conditions (cg(0) =
1
3) (left) and long generation lengths (L = 10) and small initial conditions
(cg(0) = 0.04) (right). The numerics are run for small imitation strength (θ = 0.1) scaled
enhancement factors η = 0.2 (black crosses) and η = 0.5 (blue circles). The analytics are
calculated using equation (5.33). The group size is G = 5, and the population size is N = 250.
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Figure 5.9: The distribution of strategies after t = 1, 5, 10 and 20 generations. Plotted from a
single run of the well-mixed dynamics for enhancement factor η = 0.5, generation length L = 2
and mean group contribution cg(0) =
1
3 . The group size is G = 5. Initial strategy values are
s0 = 0 and s1 = 1, and the population size is N = 250.
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Figure 5.10: The distribution of strategies after t = 1, 5, 10 and 20 generations. Plotted from a
single run of the well-mixed dynamics for enhancement factor η = 0.5, generation length L = 10
and mean group contribution cg(0) = 0.04. The group size is G = 5. Initial strategy values are
s0 = 0 and s1 = 1, and the population size is N = 250.
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Figure 5.11: A cartoon depicting the evolution of the two strategies over the generations, s0(t)
and s1(t) as observed in the numerical simulations.
figures 5.12b and 5.12c, however. In these plots the value of Qvw may be radically different if
the strategies are spread across a wide range. It is this difference that leads to the inaccuracy
of the analytics. The reason for the accuracy of the analytics for η = 0.2 is confirmed in figure
5.13. In this figure there is little difference between the imitation probability for each strategy
for all parameter regimes. In both figure 5.12b and ?? for player strategies si > 3 and sj > 3
(the top right hand corner of each plot) the probability of imitation is zero. The reason for
this is that for an initial contribution of cg(0) =
1
3 players with strategies larger than
1
cg(0)
= 3
donate one unit to the group. There will therefore be no difference between the payoffs garnered
by each player, and each player will therefore not imitate the other.
5.2.6 Calculation of analytical equilibrium strategy
Having formulated a good model for the evolution of the mean strategy for certain parameter
regimes, I now demonstrate that the ratio of the probabilities of one strategy imitating another
explains the behaviour of the mean strategy for increasing enhancement factor. To do this I find
an analytical expression for the equilibrium strategy by allowing the number of generations to
tend to infinity.
I form an expression for the mean strategy at equilibrium in terms of the probability of one
strategy imitating another, Qvw(t), and then demonstrate that it is the rate at which each of the
bimodal peaks approach one another that decides the mean strategy at equilibrium. I assume
that the probability of the one strategy imitating the other remains constant throughout all
generations for both strategies i.e. Qvw(t) = Qvw(0) = Qvw for all generations, and I therefore
calculate the equilibrium strategy a¯ as t→∞. Subtracting equations (5.27) and (5.28) gives
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Figure 5.12: The value of the probability of one strategy imitating another, Qvw, for strategy
sv and sw for each of the three parameter regimes: short generation length and small initial
contribution (L = 2, cg(0) = 0.04, top left); short generation length and large initial contribution
(L = 2, cg(0) =
1
3 , top right); and long generation length and small initial contribution (L =
10, cg(0) = 0.04, bottom). Each plot is for enhancement factor η = 0.5, equal strategy frequencies
and group size G = 5. Values taken at t = 0.
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Figure 5.13: The value of the probability of one strategy imitating another, Qvw, for strategy
sv and sw for each of the three parameter regimes: short generation length and small initial
contribution (L = 2, cg(0) = 0.04, top left); short generation length and large initial contribution
(L = 2, cg(0) =
1
3 , top right); and long generation length and small initial contribution (L =
10, cg(0) = 0.04, bottom). Each plot is for enhancement factor η = 0.2, equal strategy frequencies
and group size G = 5. Values taken at t = 0.
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s1(t+ 1)− s0(t+ 1) = s1(t)− s0(t) + θQ10(s0(t)− s1(t))− θQ01(s1(t)− s0(t)) (5.51)
= (s1(0)− s0(0)) (1− θQ10 − θQ01) (5.52)
and substituting ∆s(t) = s1(t)− s0(t)
∆s(t+ 1) = ∆s(t) (1− θQ10 − θQ01) . (5.53)
Writing β = 1− θQ10 − θQ01,
∆s(1) = β∆s(0) (5.54)
which by induction gives
∆s(t) = βt∆s(0). (5.55)
Rearranging equation (5.32) and using ρ0 + ρ1 = 1, this gives the mean strategy as
a¯(t+ 1) = ρ0s0(t) + ρ1s1(t) + θ(s1(t)− s0(t))(ρ0Q01 − ρ1Q10) (5.56)
= (1− ρ1)s0(t) + ρ1s1(t) + θ(s1(t)− s0(t))(ρ0Q01 − ρ1Q10) (5.57)
= s0(t) + ρ1(s1(t)− s0(t)) + θ(s1(t)− s0(t))(ρ0Q01 − ρ1Q10) (5.58)
= s0(t) + (s1(t)− s0(t))(ρ1 + θ(ρ0Q01 − ρ1Q10)) (5.59)
= s0(t) + ∆s(t)(ρ1 + θ(ρ0Q01 − ρ1Q10)) (5.60)
Substituting equation (5.55) and letting γ = ρ1 + θ(ρ0Q01 − ρ1Q10) gives
a¯(t+ 1) = s0(t) + β
t∆s(0)γ. (5.61)
Re-writing equation (5.27) as
s0(t+ 1) = s0(t) + θQ01∆s(t) (5.62)
= s0(t) + δ∆s(t) (5.63)
where δ = θQ01. The value of the smaller strategy after one generation is
s0(1) = s0(0) + δ∆s(0) (5.64)
and therefore after two generations is
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s0(2) = s0(1) + δ∆s(1) (5.65)
= s0(0) + δ∆s(0) + βδ∆s(0) (5.66)
= s0(0) + δ∆s(0)(1 + β). (5.67)
using equation (5.55). Similarly, after three generations
s0(3) = s0(2) + δ∆s(2) (5.68)
= s0(0) + δ∆s(0) + βδ∆s(0) + β
2δ∆s(0) (5.69)
= s0(0) + δ∆s(0)(1 + β + β
2) (5.70)
and generally
s0(t) = s0(0) + δ∆s(0)(1 + β + β
2 + ...+ βt−1) (5.71)
= s0(0) + δ∆s(0)
(
1− βt
1− β
)
. (5.72)
I combine this with equation (5.61) to give
a¯(t+ 1) = s0(0) + δ∆s(0)
(
1− βt
1− β
)
+ βt∆s(0)γ. (5.73)
Since the imitation strength θ and the probability of one strategy imitating another is positive,
and because the largest value that Qij can take is ρj , 0 < β < 1, so as t→∞,
a¯(∞) = lim
t→∞ a¯(t) = s0(0) +
δ∆s(0)
1− β . (5.74)
Substituting β and δ as defined above into this equation gives
a¯(∞) = s0(0) + θQ01∆s(0)
1− (1− θQ10 − θQ01) (5.75)
= s0(0) +
θQ01∆s(0)
θ(Q10 +Q01)
(5.76)
= s0(0) + ∆s(0)
Q01
Q10 +Q01
. (5.77)
From this equation I see that the final strategy is the ratio of the probability of one player
imitating another, multiplied by the initial difference between the strategies, and therefore that
the mean strategy is explained by the different rates at which each strategy imitates the other.
144 5.2 Approximate strategy imitation (θ = 0.1) well-mixed dynamics
This form also explains why the initial distribution of strategies is so important (as found
in the numerical simulations in section 3.4.1.1). The equilibrium strategy is the initial smallest
strategy plus a fraction of the initial range of strategies. Therefore, the initial distribution is a
critical factor in the equilibrium strategy. This confirms what was found in chapter 3.
5.2.7 Comparison of analytics and numerics for the equilibrium strategy
The mean strategy at equilibrium, for both numerics and equation (5.77), are plotted against
the scaled enhancement factor η in the three plots in figure 5.14 for each of the three parameter
regimes. Once again the initial strategies are s1(0) = 5 and s0(0) = 0.
The results in figure 5.14 show a large difference between the final mean strategy for the
standard public goods game (θ = 1) and less precise strategy imitation (θ = 0.1). In the standard
public goods game, players update their strategy by exactly imitating their better performing
neighbour, and the population fixates to free-riders for enhancement factors η less than one and
to cooperation for η greater than one. This is in contrast to the results for small imitation
strength (θ = 0.1) in the three parameter regimes, where the equilibrium strategy is somewhere
between the two initial strategies.
I observe in this plot that equation (5.77) is a good approximation for the equilibrium strategy
for a population with bimodal initial conditions. The numerics and analytical results agree
qualitatively for all enhancement factors, and agree quantitatively very well for enhancement
factors less than 0.2 for all parameter regimes, and at a number of other enhancement factors in
each plot. This agreement between equation (5.77) and the numerics show that the dynamics
that lead to the equilibrium strategy can be approximated by two independent peaks moving
towards one another, with the point at which the two subpopulations of strategies coalesce being
the equilibrium strategy. These dynamics are not available for the exact imitation case (θ = 1),
and so the final mean strategy is either a¯ = 5 or a¯ = 0. Disagreement between the analytics and
the numerics is caused by the assumption that Qvw(t) = Qvw(0) for all generations, which does
not always hold (as shown in figure 5.12).
5.2.8 Comparison between the three different parameter regimes, and how they can
be explained by the payoff difference in each case
I compare the mean strategy against the enhancement factor for all three parameter regimes in
figure 5.15.
I find that there are a number of distinct enhancement factors where different parameter
regimes reach the same equilibrium strategy. The differences and similarities between the three
parameter regimes can be explained by once again considering the probability that one strategy
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(d) L = 2, cg(0) = 0.5, θ = 1
Figure 5.14: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor η with bimodal
initial conditions s0(0) = 0 and s1(0) = 5 for numerics (single points) and analytics (dashed lines
from equation (5.77)). The first three plots are run for small imitation strength (θ = 0.1) and
correspond to the three parameter regimes: short generation length and small initial contribution
(top plot); short generation length and large initial contribution (middle) and long generation
length and small initial contribution (bottom). The final plot (figure 5.14d) is for the standard
public goods game with exact imitation (θ = 1). The group size G = 5, and the population size
is N = 250.
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Figure 5.15: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor for the well-
mixed dynamics and bimodal initial conditions. The blue circles show results for generation
length L = 2 and initial contributions cg(0) = 0.04; the black crosses for generation length
L = 2 and initial contribution cg(0) =
1
3 ; and red stars show results for generation length
L = 10 and initial contributions cg(0) = 0.04. The group size is G = 5, and the population size
is N = 250.
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imitates another. The first region is η less than 0.2, where there is exact agreement between
all of the parameter regimes, with free-riders dominating each population. The reason for this
is that only for η > 1G can the payoff of a cooperator be higher than that of a free-rider, as
explained for the first parameter regime in section 5.2.4. Similar arguments can be made for the
other two parameter regimes: only once η is greater than 0.2 is it possible for a more cooperative
strategy to generate a larger payoff than a free-rider, no matter what the group composition is.
For the remaining enhancement factors the largest strategy is found in the third parameter
regime i.e. long generation lengths and small initial contributions (red stars), whilst the smallest
is for the second parameter regime (small generation lengths and large initial contributions,
black crosses). The remaining parameter regime (short generation lengths and small initial
contributions, blue circles) exhibits behaviour between these two extremes.
For enhancement factors between 0.2 and 0.4 the mean strategy is the approximately the
same for the short generation length parameter regimes. To explain this it is important to
remember that in the first parameter regime (L = 2, cg(0) = 0.04) the parameters are chosen so
that the players never donate one unit to the group i.e. they always act conditionally. Using
the same logic as in the derivation of equation (4.9), when players are acting conditionally the
contribution at generation l of player i is
ci,g(l) = a
l
icg(0). (5.78)
Therefore, for a player to act conditionally across all generations requires
alicg(0) < 1 (5.79)
ai < l
√
1
cg(0)
. (5.80)
In the second parameter regime this means that players act conditionally when
ai <
√
1
1
3
<
√
3. (5.81)
At enhancement factors less than 0.4 the high strategy peak very quickly moves below this level,
and so both the first and second parameter regimes behave in a similar fashion, and therefore
both the first and second parameter regimes reach similar equilibrium strategies.
For enhancement factors above approximately 0.7 the parameter regimes with the smallest
initial contributions result in similar strategies. In this parameter regime the probability of one
strategy imitating another is more even, as the equilibrium strategies are approximately half the
range of the initial strategy distribution. For small initial contributions and large enhancement
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factors the larger strategies generate bigger payoffs than the smaller ones for the majority of
group compositions. Therefore, the rate at which each strategy imitates the other is similar in
both the first and third parameter regimes.
5.3 Conclusions
In conclusion, in finite populations each player updates its strategy by moving towards the
strategy of those that are performing better, and the strategies that perform better are heavily
dependent on the group composition. In the previous chapter I showed that the best approx-
imation for the expected payoff is achieved in bimodal populations. Using the expected payoff
of a player I found that on average, the higher the enhancement factor the more likely a large
strategy has a bigger payoff than a small strategy. When players imitate one another’s strategy
exactly and bimodal initial conditions are used the standard public goods game is recovered
by this model. However, when the condition of exact imitation is relaxed the final equilibrium
strategy is dictated by the rate at which subpopulations of players move towards one another,
and this increases cooperation dramatically when the scaled enhancement factor η is less than
one. If the initial contribution is increased then the mean strategy in the population is reduced,
suggesting that a way to increase how cooperative players are is to decrease the amount that
people initially contribute. However, if players play the game in the same group for longer much
larger strategies are found at lower enhancement factors. This all suggests that unlike the results
in chapter 3, the length of the generation is important when considering well-mixed populations.
In the next chapter I extend the dynamics to those on a structured population in the economic
layer only, before running the dynamics on the multiplex.
6
Dynamics on the economic and the social networks
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explained some of the results from chapter 3 by studying a well-mixed
population of players on the economic layer only. In this chapter I continue to build the model
from the simplest case of the well-mixed population on the economic layer up to the two-layer
(economic and social) multiplex. I find that there are two phases in the evolution of the mean
strategy on the economic network: initially the population behaves as if it were well-mixed; in
later generations there is a deviation from this caused by regions of similar strategies forming in
the network, or network reciprocity. The addition of the social layer onto the economic layer to
form the multiplex alters the mean strategy again, and causes the strategy on the economic layer
to tend towards the population mean (and therefore overcoming the network reciprocity), which
I show using both numerics and analytics. As in the previous chapter the initial populations are
selected from a bimodal distribution.
6.2 Dynamics on the economic network only
In this section I show that dynamics on the economic network are initially explained by the well-
mixed formulation of chapter 5, before the population mean strategy is increased after many
generations through network reciprocity.
6.2.1 Comparison between the well-mixed and structured economic network
In the following numerical simulations the probability of updating via the social layer is λ = 0,
which means the social layer has no impact on the dynamics. This is equivalent to studying the
economic layer only. As in the well-mixed case, each node is initially assigned a random strategy
from a bimodal distribution s0(0) = 0 or s1(0) = 5, accumulates its payoff from the groups in
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which it plays, and selects a neighbour at random in the economic layer to imitate. Once again,
if the neighbour has a higher payoff, player i updates its strategy in generation t via
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) + θH(Pj > Pi)(aj(t)− ai(t)) (6.1)
where θ is the imitation strength and Pj is the payoff of the randomly selected neighbour (as
defined in section 3.3.2). The main difference between the well-mixed and the network dynamics
is that now players are fixed in relation to the others. Each player is placed on a node, and players
are connected by edges. These edges do not change, and define the groups in which each player
plays. These dynamics are run on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network mean degree 〈k〉 = 4, generated as
described in section 3.3. The mean strategy is plotted against the scaled enhancement factor
in figure 6.1 for generation length L = 2 and initial contribution cg(0) = 0.04. The well-mixed
results (for the same parameter values, and group size G = 〈k〉 + 1 = 5) are also plotted for
comparison. The most striking result in this plot is that when the conditional public goods game
is played on a single network with bimodal initial conditions the final mean strategies are much
larger than in the well-mixed case. This is true for all enhancement factors η greater than 0.2,
and for enhancement factors η greater than 0.5 the final strategy is almost as large as possible,
with the mean strategy approaching a¯ = 5.
6.2.2 Four different network treatments
Due to multiple differences between the well-mixed and network dynamics identifying the crucial
causes of the increase in cooperation is difficult. First of all, on the network the players gain a
payoff from ki + 1 groups, as they donate to the group in which they are the focal player, and
also the groups where their neighbours are the focal players; and secondly, not all of the groups
are the same size because Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks have a heterogeneous degree distribution. To
identify the effect that each of these considerations has on the mean strategy on the network
I run four different versions of the dynamics, or treatments, increasing the complexity of the
dynamics from the completely unstructured well-mixed case to the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with
players contributing to multiple groups. By running these different treatments I show that the
most important factor in the increase in mean strategy on structured populations is players
sorting themselves into neighbourhoods of similar strategies. I study one of the treatments in
depth and derive analytical rules similar to those in the well-mixed dynamics, and show that
initially the populations on the network behave as if they were well-mixed.
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Figure 6.1: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor for generation
length L = 2 dynamics and bimodal initial conditions (s0(0) = 0 and s1(0) = 5). The black
crosses show results for the 〈k〉 = 4 Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network and the blue circles the well-mixed
G = 5. The population size is N = 250 and initial contribution is cg(0) = 0.04.
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6.2.2.1 The four treatments
The first treatment (which was studied in depth in chapter 5) is the well-mixed dynamics, where
groups are formed at random at the beginning of each generation. The second treatment is the
regular network where each player has degree k, but whilst each player donates to k+ 1 groups
it only accumulates payoffs from the group in which it is the focal player. The third treatment
is again played on a regular network, but now players derive payoffs from all of the groups in
which they play. The final treatment is the standard network dynamics, where players play on
an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network and accumulate payoffs from ki+1 groups. Each of the four treatments
is summarised in table 6.1, along with which aspects of the network dynamics they address.
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In the following sections I explore each of these treatments to understand the economic
layer dynamics and demonstrate that the differences between the well-mixed and single network
dynamics are caused both by network reciprocity (cooperative strategies grouping together to
avoid exploitation by free-riders), and by each player on a network playing in multiple groups.
6.2.3 Comparison of the mean strategy for each of the treatments
The empirical differences between the four treatments (as defined in table 6.1) are demonstrated
with numerical simulations in figure 6.2. The mean strategy is plotted against the scaled en-
hancement factor η, for well-mixed dynamics with group size G = 5, regular network degree
k = 4, and mean degree 〈k〉 = 4 for the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network. Once again I show that there is a
large difference in the mean strategy between the well-mixed dynamics and those on the network
where the mean strategy is higher. However, there is little qualitative difference between the
different network dynamics, showing that the effect of the network in this parameter regime
is quite weak. Comparing the two network dynamics where the players accrue payoffs from
multiple groups (regular network and standard network) at almost all enhancement factors the
mean strategy for each treatment is within a standard deviation of the others, which suggests
that running the dynamics on networks with heterogeneous degree distributions makes little
difference to the final mean strategy. For enhancement factors between 0.2 and 0.4 the focal
regular treatment gives the highest mean strategy. Therefore, the most cooperative treatment
occurs when players only gain a payoff from a single group, although the difference between the
network treatments is small.
In the next section I explore these results in more depth, finding analytical expressions for
the focal regular treatment, and demonstrating that the main difference between the structured
population and the well-mixed one is the arrangement of players into neighbourhoods of similar
strategies, thereby reducing the possibility of exploitation by free-riders.
6.2.3.1 Focal regular treatment: regular network with payoffs accumulated from the focal group
I now explore the focal regular treatment. As explained above, each player only accumulates a
payoff from the group in which they are the focal player and the degree k is the same for all
players. I calculate the analytics for the focal regular treatment in a similar way to the well-
mixed dynamics in chapter 5: once again I assume that the population consists of two coherent
and independent peaks, and that the composition of a player’s group is random. Equation (4.17)
(section 5.2) is used to calculate the payoff of player i in the network, but is altered to include
the fact that the player randomly selects another player in their own group to imitate. If player
i selects player j to imitate, strategies ai and aj are both present in the group and the payoff is
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Figure 6.2: The mean strategy plotted against scaled enhancement factor η for four different
dynamics: well-mixed group size G = 5 (blue circles), focal regular network degree k = 4 (green
diamonds), regular network k = 4 (red stars) and Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network mean degree 〈k〉 = 4.
Population size N = 250, initial contribution cg(0) = 0.04 and generation length L = 2. Initial
strategies are selected from a bimodal distribution (s0(0) = 0 and s1(0) = 5).
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Pi(ai, ni) =
(
1 +
nis0 + (G− 2− ni)s1 + ai + aj
k + 1
)(
r
nis0 + (G− 2− ni)s1 + ai + aj
k + 1
− ai
)
.
(6.2)
where ni is the number of s0 players in the G − 2 other members of the group. The payoff is
substituted into the equation for the probability of player i imitating player j with strategy sl
Qvw = ρw
G−1∑
nw=0
G−1∑
nv=0
q(nv)q(nw)H(f(sw, sv, nw, nv)) (6.3)
(c.f. (5.21)) where now
q(nv) =
(
G− 2
nv
)
ρnv0 (1− ρ0)G−2−nv . (6.4)
This is substituted into equation (5.33)
a¯(t+ 1) = ρ0a0(t) + ρ1a1(t) + θ(a1(t)− a0(t))(ρ0Q01(t)− ρ1Q10(t)). (6.5)
Equation (6.5) is compared to numerical simulations for two enhancement factors (η = 0.2 and
η = 0.5) on the regular network in figure 6.3.
These numerics and analytics agree very well for all generations for the smaller enhancement
factor (η = 0.2), and there is good agreement in the early generations for η = 0.5. But, as the
number of generations increase the analytics predict that the mean strategy is much lower than
observed. There are two reasons for this. The first is that the assumption that the population
consists of two coherent strategies which move towards one another is in this case not a good one,
as shown in figure 6.4 which plots the distribution of strategies for enhancement factor η = 0.5 at
generations t = 1, 10, 100 and 250. The second is hinted at by the mean strategy’s initial decline
to a minimum before increasing to a larger equilibrium strategy, which is generally considered a
sign of network reciprocity [42]. Initially the free-rider strategies perform better than their more
cooperative neighbours. As the number of generations increase, the more cooperative strategies
are sorted into neighbourhoods, increasing their performance compared to the free-riders, and
therefore increasing the mean cooperation in the system.
Network reciprocity is confirmed by plotting the strategy of each player against the mean
strategy of the player’s neighbours. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 plot this for the focal regular treatment
for enhancement factors η = 0.2 and η = 0.5 respectively. In each figure, plots are made at
four different generations (labelled at the top of the plot) along with the Pearson correlation
coefficient between the player’s strategy and the mean strategy of its nearest neighbours. The
results in figure 6.5 show that network reciprocity does indeed occur over time in the focal regular
treatment. In the first two plots (top row of figure 6.5) the scatter of points is not correlated,
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Figure 6.3: Numerical simulations for the analytical mean strategy in the focal regular treatment
(payoff of a player calculated using equation (6.2)) plotted against the number of generations for
the bimodal initial conditions. Two enhancement factors η = 0.2 (black crosses) and 0.5 (blue
circles) are plotted. The population size is N = 250, imitation strength is θ = 0.1, the number
of generations is L = 2 and the initial contribution is cg(0) = 0.04. Initial strategies are selected
from a bimodal distribution (s0(0) = 0 and s1(0) = 5).
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Figure 6.4: The distribution of strategies at generations t = 1, 10, 50 and 150 for the focal regular
treatment. The numerics are run for small imitation strength (θ = 0.1), scaled enhancement
factor η = 0.5, initial group contribution cg(0) = 0.04, population size N = 250 and group size
G = 5. Initial strategies are selected from a bimodal distribution s1(0) = 5, s0(0) = 0.
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and many of the extreme strategies have not changed. After t = 50 generations, however, a
very strong correlation between a player’s strategy and that of its neighbours emerges, with
correlation coefficient r = 0.77. Similar results are also observed for the higher enhancement
factor η = 0.5 (figure 6.6).
These results explain what is observed when I compare the numerics and the dynamics
governed by equation (6.2) (figure 6.3). Initially, the assumption that the rest of the group is
composed at random holds, and for small generations (t < 20) the analytics and the numerics
agree very well. However, as the number of generations increases the numerics and analytics
agree less well, because as correlations appear across the network the assumption that a player’s
group composition is chosen at random is no longer true.
The only difference between this treatment and the well-mixed dynamics is that the players
are placed on a structured network, and therefore repeatedly play one another (compared to the
well-mixed case where a new group forms at the beginning of each generation). The results in
figures 6.3, 6.5 and 6.6 demonstrate that the network reciprocity introduced by the network is
a major cause of this increase in the mean strategy observed when the conditional cooperators
play the game on the network.
To sum up, when the conditional cooperators are placed into structured populations with
bimodal initial conditions the final strategy is much higher than in the well-mixed case. This is
mainly due to more cooperative strategies insulating themselves from free-riders through network
reciprocity, although playing the game in many groups has a small impact on the final mean
strategy, as seen in figure 6.2. Having shown that the increased cooperation on the economic
network is caused by network reciprocity, I now add the social layer to the economic layer for
the well-mixed dynamics (section 6.3) and the network (section 6.4).
6.3 A well-mixed population with both economic and social layers
The previous section established that the key difference between the structured population and
the well-mixed dynamics on the economic layer is that network reciprocity shields cooperative
players from exploitation by free-riders. In this section I demonstrate that in a well-mixed
population the evolution of the mean strategy across both the economic and social layers is
accurately modelled as a weighted sum of the expected strategies on each layer.
6.3.1 Well-mixed multiplex analytic mean strategy: updates on the social layer only
As described in section 3.3, a player can update their strategy in two ways in the two-layer
multiplex: either through imitating a player in the economic network with a larger payoff (with
probability 1−λ), or through the social layer (with probability λ). If a player chooses to update
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Figure 6.5: The mean strategy of a node’s neighbours plotted against that node’s strategy in
the network at generations t = 1, 10, 50 and 150 for scaled enhancement factor η = 0.2. Each
subfigure is labelled with the generation from which the snapshot is taken and the Pearson
correlation coefficient. The numerics are run for small imitation strength (θ = 0.1), initial group
contribution cg(0) = 0.04, population size N = 250 and group size G = 5. Initial strategies are
selected from a bimodal distribution s1(0) = 5, s0(0) = 0.
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Figure 6.6: The mean strategy of a node’s neighbours plotted against that node’s strategy in
the network at generations t = 1, 10, 50 and 150 for scaled enhancement factor η = 0.5. Each
subfigure is labelled with the generation from which the snapshot is taken and the Pearson
correlation coefficient. The numerics are run for small imitation strength (θ = 0.1), initial group
contribution cg(0) = 0.04, population size N = 250 and group size G = 5. Initial strategies are
selected from a bimodal distribution s1(0) = 5, s0(0) = 0.
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using information via the social layer only the mean strategy of their nearest neighbours is
calculated and the player updates its strategy ai(t+ 1) by moving closer to that mean
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) + θ(a¯i(t)− ai(t)) (6.6)
where t is the generation, a¯i(t) is the mean of the player’s social network neighbours and θ is
the imitation strength. As a reminder, the initial mean strategy of the population is a¯(0) = 2.5.
Once again I initialise the strategies using a bimodal distribution. Using the same arguments as
in section 5.2, I assume that the population remains as two coherent strategies (s0(t) and s1(t))
for the duration of the dynamics, and therefore if the strategies are updated on the social layer
the smaller strategy updates by
s0(t+ 1) = s0(t) + θ(a¯i(t)− s0(t)), (6.7)
and similarly the larger strategy updates by
s1(t+ 1) = s1(t) + θ(a¯i(t)− s1(t)). (6.8)
The mean strategy is calculated as
a¯(t+ 1) = ρ0s0(t+ 1) + ρ1s1(t+ 1). (6.9)
Substituting equations (6.7) and (6.8) into (6.9) gives
a¯(t+ 1) = ρ0s0(t) + ρ0θ(a¯i(t)− s0(t)) + ρ1s1(t) + ρ1θ(a¯i(t)− s1(t)) (6.10)
= ρ0s0(t) + ρ1s1(t) + θ(a¯i(t)− (ρ0s0(t) + ρ1s1(t))). (6.11)
Since the social group is taken at random from the population, the numerical value mean a¯i(t)
equals the approximated population mean a¯(t) = ρ0s0(t) + ρ1s1(t) and so
a¯(t+ 1) = ρ0s0(t) + ρ1s1(t) = a¯(t). (6.12)
So when updating using information from the social layer, the expected strategy updates to the
previous population mean. This suggests that when social influence is the only factor in the
strategy update in a well-mixed population, the effect is large, and the equilibrium strategy is
reached very quickly.
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6.3.2 Well-mixed multiplex dynamics: updates on both the economic and social
layers
Before modelling the multiplex dynamics on a structured population, I first describe the two layer
updates in a well-mixed population. The evolution of the mean strategy across the generations
is modelled in the well-mixed case (where both the economic and the social groups are formed
at random at the beginning of each generation), by updating the strategy of a player in the
direction of a better performing economic neighbour with probability 1− λ and in the direction
of the mean of its social group with probability λ. Combining the update in the mean strategy
from the economic group (equation (5.32)) and from the social group the mean strategy of the
population in generation t+ 1 gives
a¯(t+ 1) = (1− λ)[ρ0s0(t) + ρ1s1(t) + θ(s1(t)− s0(t))(ρ0Q01(t)− ρ1Q10(t))] + λa¯(t). (6.13)
I calculate Qvw(t) in exactly the same way as in equation (5.21) when only the economic layer
is considered. Equation (6.13) is compared to numerics for the well-mixed dynamics in figure
6.7 for three different values of the probability of imitation on the social layer λ. Results are
presented for two different enhancement factors, η = 0.2 and η = 0.5.
I observe in figure 6.7 that initially the numerics and analytics agree for all values of λ for
the smaller enhancement factor (figure 6.7a), and that the equilibrium values do not disagree by
a large amount. For the larger enhancement factor (figure 6.7b) the numerics and the analytics
agree much less closely, but still agree qualitatively.
To sum up, when players only update using the social layer (λ = 1), the mean strategy fixes
at the initial population mean. When only the economic layer is used to update the strategy,
an equilibrium strategy is reached that is dependent on the enhancement factor. The plots
in this section show that when updates occur using information from both the payoff and the
social layers (λ > 0) the mean strategy of the population is a mix of these two outcomes. For
enhancement factors below η ≈ 0.7 the equilibrium strategy found on the economic layer is lower
than the initial population mean (figure 5.14 in section 5.2.7). At these enhancement factors
the mean strategy is therefore increased when social influence is introduced, and the strategy
shifts towards the initial mean of the population a¯(0) = ρ0s0(0) + ρ1s1(0) at large generations.
This is observed through an increased equilibrium strategy for increased λ.
The reason that the numerics and analytics do not agree when λ is greater than zero is that
the central assumption governing equation (6.13) does not hold. As discussed in section 5.2, I
assume that the population consists of two coherent strategies which move independently. This
is not the case when players update on the social layer. Some players move a fraction of the
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Figure 6.7: The evolution of the mean strategy in a well-mixed population plotted against the
number of generations for three different probabilities of updating via the social layer λ = 0
(black crosses), 0.1 (blue circles) and 0.5 (red stars). Results for enhancement factors η = 0.2
(figure 6.7a) and η = 0.5 (figure 6.7b) are plotted with group size G = 5, generation length
L = 2, initial contribution cg(0) = 0.04 and population size N = 250. The analytics are found
using equation (6.13) and the payoffs are calculated using equation (4.15)
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difference towards the better performing strategy, and some move towards the population mean,
and I therefore cannot describe the movement of a peak with a single rate.
6.4 A structured population with both the economic and social layers
In this final section I apply the analytics derived in section 6.3 to the structured multiplex, and
show that they initially describe the evolution of the mean strategy accurately. The analytics
and numerics once again agree for small generation lengths, before network reciprocity and the
effect of the social layer increase the mean strategy compared to the well-mixed dynamics. I find
that when the mean strategy is plotted against the enhancement factor for a number of different
parameter regimes the mean strategy is higher for players that take social influence into account
(λ > 0).
6.4.1 Evolution of the mean strategy on the structured multiplex
In the following I show that on the structured multiplex using the focal regular treatment the
analytics and numerics agree for very short generation lengths.
The dynamics are now run on a structured population. Each of the economic and social layers
are identical regular networks (economic and social layer degree kp = ks = 4), and each player
accumulates payoffs only from the group in which they are the focal player. The evolution of the
mean strategy is plotted in figure 6.8, once again for three different probabilities of imitation on
the social layer (λ) and two different enhancement factors (η) (figures 6.8a and 6.8b). Numerics
are compared to analytics which are calculated through equation (6.13), and Qvw is calculated
in the same way as on the single network (section 6.2).
Similar results are observed when the dynamics are run on a structured population compared
to the well-mixed case. For the initial generations the numerics follow the analytics closely, but
as the number of generations increases the agreement decreases. Comparing the results for
the three values of λ, as the probability of selecting updates from the social layer increases
(increased λ) the final mean strategy becomes closer to the initial mean of the population (in
this case a¯ = 2.5, the average of the initial strategies). The only parameter values for which this
is not true is for the larger enhancement factor (η = 0.5) and updates on the economic layer
only (λ = 0). Here, network reciprocity encourages cooperation so that the population fixes to
a state as cooperative as possible. When λ = 0.5 (red stars in figure 6.8) the population reaches
an equilibrium very quickly, deviating from the analytic prediction by a large amount. This
behaviour is explained by the structured nature of the population. Because the payoff network
is a subgraph of the social network the strategies that the players imitate are the same no matter
which layer is selected to update the strategy. If a neighbour updates on the economic layer,
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Figure 6.8: The evolution of the mean strategy for the focal regular treatment plotted against
the number of generations for three different probabilities of updating via the social layer λ = 0
(black crosses), 0.1 (blue circles) and 0.5 (red stars). Results for enhancement factors η = 0.2
(figure 6.8a) and η = 0.5 (figure 6.8b) are plotted with group size G = 5, generation length
L = 2, initial contribution cg(0) = 0.04 and population size N = 250. The analytics are found
using equation (6.13) and the payoff for each player is calculated using the form in section 6.2.3.1.
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many of its neighbours will have moved towards the population average through an update using
information on the social layer, and so for later generations an update on either layer will shift a
player’s strategy towards the population mean. Therefore, for high λ each player in each group
on the network approaches the population mean very quickly.
6.4.2 Variation of the mean strategy with the enhancement factor
In this section I reiterate the findings in chapter 3, namely that the addition of social influence
leads to more cooperative players at lower enhancement factors. I also show that generation
length and larger degree social networks do not alter the final mean strategy. I additionally plot
the results using uniform initial conditions, and show that social influence alters how cooperative
the network is more dramatically compared to when bimodal initial conditions are used.
6.4.2.1 Comparison between single and two-layer numerical simulations
Figure 6.9 plots the mean strategy for an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi economic and social network as a function
of the enhancement factor. The mean degree for each layer is the same (〈kp〉 = 〈ks〉 = 4) and
hence the two networks are identical. Results are plotted for bimodal initial conditions, with
λ = 0 and λ = 0.1. To compare the results in this section with those in chapter 3, results for the
uniform initial conditions (λ = 0.1, generation length L = 2) are also plotted. As a reminder,
these simulations select their initial strategies from the uniform distribution 0 < ai < 5.
The results for λ = 0 and λ = 0.1 for the bimodal initial conditions are broadly similar.
Note that the effect of the social influence is to increase the mean strategy at small enhancement
factors, but that at large enhancement factors the effect is to decrease it. This variation with
enhancement factor can be understood by considering the behaviour of the social layer on its
own. When λ = 1 the equilibrium mean is the average of the initial population distribution.
Therefore, the combined effect of both layers is to shift the mean strategy on the economic layer
towards the initial population mean. At small enhancement factors this is higher, but at large
enhancement factors this is lower.
Social influence is more of a factor at low enhancement factors than at high ones. Specifically,
social influence is most important when the equilibrium strategy on the economic layer is very
low, and therefore the system is dominated by free-riders. The influence of the social layer helps
more cooperative strategies resist invasion by maintaining a high mean population strategy.
At high enhancement factors the mean strategy on the economic layer is better performing
compared to the initial population mean (and also close to it), and therefore for both values of
λ the mean strategies are similar.
Comparing the results for the bimodal initial conditions (blue circles) and the uniform initial
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Figure 6.9: The mean strategy on a two-layer multiplex Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network plotted against the
scaled enhancement factor for two different probabilities of updating via the economic layer λ = 0
(black crosses) and 0.1 (blue circles) for bimodal initial conditions. Uniform initial conditions
are also plotted (λ = 0.1, red stars). Mean degree 〈kp〉 = 〈ks〉 = 4, generation length L = 2,
initial contribution cg(0) = 0.04, imitation parameter θ = 0.1 and population size N = 250.
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conditions (red stars in figure 6.9) large differences are observed. The mean strategies for
each enhancement factor are spread over a much smaller range for uniform initial conditions,
suggesting that social influence is more important in these simulations. The reason for this is
that the payoff of a player is less correlated with its strategy in the uniform case (as discussed
in section 4.2). Therefore, it is less likely that certain strategies perform better on the economic
network, and so the main factor in their choice of strategy is the social influence from the rest
of the population, and so players tend towards the initial population mean of a¯(0) = 2.5.
6.4.2.2 Different generation lengths
I find that increasing the generation length does not alter the equilibrium strategy. Figure 6.10
compares results for social layer probability λ = 0.1 for generation lengths L = 2 and L = 10. I
observe in this plot that there is very little difference between long and short generation lengths
when the social network is included. This result shows that if the conditional cooperator public
goods game is played and updates are taken from both the payoff and the social layer it does not
matter if the players are playing for a short or a long time. This is in contrast to the results found
previously when studying the game on the economic layer, and therefore suggests that repeated
interaction does not contribute to the maintenance of cooperation if the average strategy of a
player’s neighbours are taken into account. Once again the uniform initial conditions simulations
result in strategies that are much closer to the initial population mean.
6.4.2.3 Different degrees on each layer
A social layer with a higher degree than the economic layer does not alter the mean strategy.
The results in figure 6.11 compare the mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement
factor for equal degrees on each layer 〈kp〉 = 〈ks〉 = 4 (blue circles) and a higher degree on the
social layer 〈kp〉 = 4, 〈ks〉 = 8 (black crosses).
6.5 Conclusions
In the preceding three chapters I have explained in more detail the results described in chapter
3. By studying bimodal initial strategy distributions I have found that these results are caused
by three factors:
1. The mean strategy on the multiplex is a weighted sum of the mean strategy on the eco-
nomic layer and the initial population mean. The effect of the social layer is to shift the
mean strategy found on the economic layer through network reciprocity towards the initial
population mean.
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Figure 6.10: The mean strategy on a two-layer multiplex Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network plotted against
the scaled enhancement factor for two different generation lengths L = 2 (blue circles) and
L = 10 (black crosses) for bimodal initial conditions. The mean degrees are 〈kp〉 = 〈ks〉 = 4,
initial contribution cg(0) = 0.04, imitation parameter θ = 0.1, the population size is N = 250
and the probability of imitation occurring on the social layer is λ = 0.1.
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Figure 6.11: The mean strategy on a two-layer multiplex Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network plotted against
the scaled enhancement factor for two different mean degrees: 〈kp〉 = 〈ks〉 = 4 (blue circles)
and 〈kp〉 = 4, 〈ks〉 = 8 (black crosses). The population size is N = 250, the probability of
imitation occurring on the social layer is λ = 0.1, generation length L = 2, initial contribution
cg(0) = 0.04, and the imitation parameter is θ = 0.1.
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2. Initially the players behave as if they are in a well-mixed population. The probability of a
player’s neighbourhood being of a certain composition is the probability of those strategies
being selected at random.
3. On the economic layer, as the number of generations increases the players begin to sort
into neighbourhoods of similar strategies, thereby resisting exploitation by free-riders (as
shown in figures 6.5 and 6.6).
More generally, the expected payoff of a particular strategy, and the strength of the effect of
the inclusion of social influence depends on the distribution of strategies within a population.
If the strategies are distributed evenly across a range, social influence is a much larger factor in
the final mean strategy than if the strategies are bimodally distributed. The dominant effect in
each case is the influence from the social layer, where for even a small probability of considering
the social neighbour’s strategies (small λ) the mean strategy very quickly moves towards the
population mean.
7
Community Populations
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter I run the dynamics on population structures that more closely match the empirical
models described in section 3.1. Through these simulations I aim to understand better how the
model relates to these empirical findings, and provide suggestions on how cooperation can be
increased in these communities.
The model in chapter 3 has extended previous models of cooperation on networks by including
social influence and a conditional version of the public goods game on a multiplex network. The
results in chapter 3 and subsequent chapters demonstrate that cooperation is increased when
conditional strategies are included on networks, compared to a population of unconditional
strategies. In addition, the inclusion of social influence has a large effect on the frequency of
cooperation, especially at very low enhancement factors. Two key findings were that the initial
distribution of strategies is a key determinant of the final amount of cooperation, and that
the final distribution of strategies after the addition of social influence is homogeneous. This
is because the social influence attracts the population strategy towards the initial population
mean.
The initial motivation for this work was a set of empirical results, each of which showed
that players cooperate conditionally, and that how conditional they were was determined by a
number of factors [97–101]. To validate the model described in chapter 3 I compare the empirical
results described in section 3.1 with the results found in section 3.4. The problem in comparing
the results in this thesis with those in the empirical papers is that the strategies described in
each of the papers are not identical with each other or the form I have used in this model. To
compare the results in the empirical papers more closely with the results found in the model
described in this thesis I therefore group specific regimes of the conditional strategy a into more
general behaviours.
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In general, results in the empirical models show three distinct categories of strategies:
• free-riders, or a ≈ 0,
• conditional cooperators, or 0 < a < 1,
• unconditional cooperators, or a > 1.
I now cast the findings from the empirical papers using this structure. The first observation
from the empirical experiments is that each community consists of a mixture of different values
of a. For example, in Rustagi et al. [100] each community consists of three different strategies:
free-riders (a ≈ 0), weak conditional cooperators (a < 1) and conditional cooperators (a ≈ 1).
The second observation from the empirical papers is that social influence is a central factor
in the observed differences in the strategy frequencies. In general, those with stronger social
networks have larger a. In Carden˜as [98], students exhibit much smaller strategies than peasants.
Similarly, in the work by Gelcich et al. [99] non-union fishers play the game in the laboratory with
smaller strategies than well-performing unionised fishers. In other words, if the social influence
is strong the mean strategy is larger. Carpenter and Seki [101] find that the students play using
the smallest strategy, followed by the non-pooling fishers, and then the pooling fishers. In fact,
the pooling fishers often behave unconditionally, and so have a strategy larger than one.
Finally, those that play the game in a larger number of groups or more often (pooling fishers
compared to non-pooling fishers or rural fishers against students) have larger strategies. These
strategies, and the conditions under which they occur are summarised in table 7.1.
Paper authors Free-rider Weak conditional Conditional cooperator Unconditional
cooperator cooperator
a ≈ 0 a < 1 a ≈ 1 a > 1
Rustagi et al. Observed in Observed in Observed in
all groups all groups all groups
Carden˜as Students Peasants
Gelcich et al. Non-union fishers Union fishers
Carpenter and Seki Students Non-pooling fishers Pooling fishers
Table 7.1: The groups of strategies described in each empirical study, and the suggested com-
parator strategy in this model.
To sum up, in the empirical papers it was found that strategies varied across the population,
and both stronger social networks and playing the game against the same individuals repeatedly
results in more cooperation. This is not what is found in the results presented in chapter 3.
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Here players converge on a single strategy, and the generation length does not affect the final
strategy.
The main difference between the empirical results and the numerical simulations is the
population structures on which the game is played. Previously, I studied the model on two
different population structures. The first of these was the well-mixed population, where there
is no underlying structure and mean-field approaches provide accurate estimates of the mean
strategy. The second was to place the players on Erdo˝s-Reny´ı networks, which have a well-
defined degree distribution.
These two population structures were chosen to make the model analytically tractable. How-
ever, they do not match those populations described in the empirical papers well. For example,
the size of the populations studied in the previous chapters is relatively large compared to the
communities discussed in the empirical papers. Those communities tend to be small, with a high
number of connections between people. For example, in Carpenter and Seki the communities
are fishers all sharing boats, whilst in Gelcich et al. each community is small and rural. There-
fore, whilst well-mixed populations and Erdo˝s-Reny´ı networks were good choices of population
structure to understand the dynamics of the game and the effect of social influence, they do not
model the empirical populations well.
To replicate the empirical findings more closely I therefore need to alter the network structure
on which the game has previously been played. I model the observed differences in strategies
both between and within each of the studies described in section 3.1 by introducing a more
community focussed network structure. Players now play against one another in tight, all play
all groups. I also relax the rule that the economic network must be a sub-graph of the social
network. This is to investigate the role of social influence more closely. Strong social influence
can mean a large probability of updating on the social layer, λ, or it can mean many social
edges.
7.2 Methods
In the numerical simulations run in this chapter the game is exactly the same as previously
played (as described in section 3.3). As a reminder, player i is assigned strategy ai, which
determines how much they contribute to the group in generation l through
ci,g(l) =
aicg(l − 1) if cg(l − 1) <
1
ai
1 otherwise.
(7.1)
where cg(l) is the average contribution by all of the players in the group in the previous iteration.
Their payoff is the sum across all groups in which they play and in each generation is given by
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Pi =
ki+1∑
g=1
L∑
l=1
pi,g(l) (7.2)
where
pi,g(l) = r
ci,g(l) +
∑
j∈G cj,g(l)
G
− ci,g(l) = rcg(l)− ci,g(l) (7.3)
is player i’s payoff in generation l. Strategies are updated on the economic layer through com-
parison with a randomly selected neighbour j, with the strategy of player i in generation t+ 1
calculated as
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) + θH(Pj > Pi)(aj(t)− ai(t)). (7.4)
Players update their strategy on the social layer via
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t) + θ(a¯i(t)− ai(t)) (7.5)
where a¯i(t) is the mean of the strategies on the social layer. Updates occur on the social layer
with probability λ, and on the economic layer with probability 1− λ.
The difference between the simulations in this chapter and those in previous chapters is
the networks on which the game is played. These are now designed to resemble the smaller
community structures in the empirical papers more closely. The communities in each of the
empirical studies are small: in Rustagi et al. [100] 679 foresters are divided between 49 groups;
in Carpenter and Seki [101] the 30 pooling fishers are divided between seven boats whilst 30 non-
pooling fishers are divided between five boats; Carden˜as [98] selected participants from villages
of more than a hundred residents. In each of these communities, and especially in Carpenter
and Seki, it is a fair assumption that each of the participants know one another. Therefore, each
population will be composed of a number of complete networks.
To study the differences between in-group and between-group dynamics, initially the eco-
nomic and social networks for each community are built separately, before the between com-
munity networks are formed. The economic layer consists of Ncomm communities of complete
networks i.e. each player is connected to all others. The social layer is formed in the same way
as edges are formed on an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network, with mean degree 〈ks〉. Initially social net-
works are only formed between nodes in the same community. Edges between nodes in different
communities are formed on the economic layer with probability pe and on the social layer with
probability ps. An example of the networks used in this chapter is shown in figure 7.1.
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Economic layer Social layer
Figure 7.1: An example of the network of communities. Here the probability of forming a social
edge between nodes not in the same community is ps = 0.05 and an economic edge between
communities is pe = 0.01. Number of nodes N = 45 and number of communities Ncomm = 5.
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7.3.1 Single random network
The first set of results plot the distribution of strategies for a single realisation of the dynamics
on the network structure described in section 7.2.
7.3.1.1 Single run: Economic layer only
I first plot the distribution of strategies for a single run of these dynamics on the community
network, with strategy updates on the economic layer only (λ = 0). Figure 7.2 plots the strategy
of each player in the network, and also the distribution of these strategies, after 500 generations,
for scaled enhancement factor η = 0.5, generation length L = 2 and initial group contribution
cg(0) = 0.04. The left hand plot shows the final strategy of each player (the darker the blue,
the smaller the strategy and the more the player behaves as a free-rider). The right hand plot
is a histogram of the frequency of each strategy, where the strategies are placed in bins of width
10−3.
Figure 7.2 shows that most strategies are weakly conditionally cooperative, with only one
group playing more than conditionally cooperative (a larger than one). I also observe that each
group converges to a single identical strategy, and that the strategies are spread across a wide
range.
The dynamics are explained by considering each player’s payoff and that each player is
repeatedly and exclusively plays against the same members of the community. In each iteration
player i’s payoff in group g is
pi,g(l) = rcg(l)− ci,g(l) (7.6)
= ralgcg(0)− aial−1g cg(0) (7.7)
= cg(0)a
l−1
g (rag − ai) (7.8)
where equation (7.7) is used as in this parameter regime (short generations and small initial con-
tributions) every player acts conditionally (as long as a ≤ 5, which is true in these simulations).
When updating their strategy a player selects another from their own economic community to
imitate (as λ = 0). Therefore, for player i and j the mean strategy in the group, ag, is the same,
and the player with the lowest strategy has the largest payoff. Therefore, in each community
the final strategy is the lowest from the initial distribution within that group. I confirm this by
running the dynamics on the same network, but now including a free-rider in every community,
with the results plotted in figure 7.3.
7.3 Results 179
Economic layer
0 0.5 1 1.5
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
Strategy, a
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Figure 7.2: A plot of each player’s strategy (left) in a community network and the distribution
of these strategies after 500 generations, with updates on the economic layer only (λ = 0).
Low strategies are dark blue, high strategies are dark red. Initial strategies are uniformly
distributed. The enhancement factor is η = 0.5, the generation length is L = 2 and the initial
group contribution is cg(0) = 0.04. The probability of an edge between each community is
pe = 0. Number of nodes N = 105 and number of communities Ncomm = 11. Strategies initially
selected from a uniform distribution 0 < a < 5.
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Figure 7.3: A plot of each player’s strategy (left) in a community network and the distribution
of these strategies after 500 generations, with updates on the economic layer only (λ = 0). Low
strategies are dark blue, high strategies are dark red. Initial strategies uniformly distributed,
except that a player strategy a = 0 is included in each community. The enhancement factor
is η = 0.5, the generation length is L = 2 and the initial group contribution is cg(0) = 0.04.
Number of nodes N = 105 and number of communities Ncomm = 11. Strategies initially selected
from a uniform distribution 0 < a < 5, with a free-rider included in each community.
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The results in figure 7.3 confirm that in each community the players approach the lowest
strategy. The final distribution of strategies is very narrow, with nearly all of the players acting
as free-riders (note the scale of the x-axis in figure 7.3).
The wide distribution of strategies observed in figure 7.2 is an artefact of each community
fixing at the lowest initial strategy. To emphasise and understand the difference made to the
final strategy distribution by the introduction of the social layer, at the beginning of each of the
following simulations a free-rider is placed into each community.
7.3.1.2 Single run: Economic and social layers
Figure 7.4 plots a single run of the dynamics, now including a layer of social influence within
each community, and updating using information from the social layer 10% of the time (λ = 0.1).
This figure shows that even though a free-rider is included in each community, the introduc-
tion of social influence moves the system away from complete defection. As in figure 7.2, once
again each community approaches a single strategy. However, a variety of final strategies are
observed in the population, ranging between a = 0.3 and a = 0.8. So, in this case the popula-
tion behaves as weak conditional cooperators. In the following figures I plot the distribution of
strategies from 100 runs of the dynamics for λ = 0 (figure 7.5) and λ = 0.1 (figure 7.6).
The results in these two figures confirm what was found in the single run of each of the
dynamics. When only the economic layer is considered the population converges to almost total
defection. However, although free-riders are still observed to be the most frequent strategy on
the introduction of social influence, a wide range of other strategies are also observed, from weak
conditional cooperators to overly conditional cooperators (a > 1).
This concurs with what would be expected from the earlier chapters. Social influence in-
creases the strategies when compared to the dynamics only on the economic network. However,
the strategies are much smaller than when the dynamics are run on ER networks. This is due
to the dominance of the smaller strategies in the community network structure.
In conclusion, the introduction of social pressure results in a wider spread of larger strategies
compared to the dynamics on the economic layer only. When updates occur on the economic
layer the communities approach the lowest strategy present. Because of this, in the following
sections two sets of initial strategies are used: random allocation from a uniform distribution,
and those where free-riders are placed into each community. These two sets of initial conditions
are selected to study the contrast between dynamics only on the economic layer and dynamics
with social influence.
182 7.3 Results
Economic layer Social layer
0 0.5 1 1.5
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Strategy, a
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Figure 7.4: A plot of each player’s strategy on a community economic (left) and social (middle)
network and the distribution of these strategies after 500 generations, with updates using both
layers (λ = 0.1). Low strategies are dark blue, high strategies are dark red. Initial strategies
are uniformly distributed, but a player strategy a = 0 is included in each community. The
enhancement factor is η = 0.5, the generation length is L = 2 and the initial group contribution
is cg(0) = 0.04. Number of nodes N = 105 and number of communities Ncomm = 11. Strategies
initially selected from a uniform distribution 0 < a < 5.
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Figure 7.5: The distribution of strategies after 500 generations for 100 runs of the dynamics,
with updates using the economic layer only (λ = 0). The same network is used for each run,
but different initial strategies are generated. Initial strategies are uniformly distributed, but a
player strategy a = 0 is included in each community. The enhancement factor is η = 0.5, the
generation length is L = 2 and the initial group contribution is cg(0) = 0.04. Number of nodes
N = 77 and number of communities Ncomm = 11. Strategies initially selected from a uniform
distribution 0 < a < 5. Probability of edges between communities pe = 0.
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Figure 7.6: The distribution of strategies after 500 generations for 100 runs of the dynamics,
with updates using both economic and social layers (λ = 0.1). The same network is used for each
run, but different initial strategies are generated. Initial strategies are uniformly distributed,
but a player strategy a = 0 is included in each community. The enhancement factor is η = 0.5,
the generation length is L = 2 and the initial group contribution is cg(0) = 0.04. Number of
nodes N = 77 and number of communities Ncomm = 11. Strategies initially selected from a
uniform distribution 0 < a < 5. Probability of edges between communities pe = ps = 0.
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7.3.2 Varying the mean degree of the social network
I explain the results in section 7.3.1 by modelling a single economic community and varying the
mean degree of the social network on this community, 〈ks〉. Figure 7.7 plots the mean strategy
in a single community of size N = 12 averaged over one hundred separate runs of the dynamics.
Each run has the same economic network, but different social networks and initial conditions
are generated (although as before a single free-rider is included for each). The probability of
updating on the social layer is λ = 0.1. Results are plotted for initial conditions where free-riders
are placed in communities, and those where they are not.
The fact that widely distributed strategies are observed (through the large standard devi-
ations) in a single community in figure 7.7 explains the wide variation of strategies in figure
7.6. The results in figure 7.7 represent the mean strategy of a single community, whilst the
networks in figure 7.6 are made up of a number of communities, each with a social network with
a randomly selected mean degree.
The initial strategies vary widely due to the small population sizes, selected to mimic the
real-world populations on which this work is based. It is this that leads to a wide distribution
of equilibrium strategies, observed through the large standard deviation. This, and the large
number of separate communities in the economic network results in the wide distribution of
strategies, a result that captures the distribution of strategies observed by Rustagi et al. [100],
where each community exhibited different frequencies of conditional cooperation.
The fact that the mean strategy is consistently larger than zero for all values of the mean
social network degree above zero confirms that increased social pressure increases cooperation
on these community networks (as discussed in Gelcich et al. [99], where unionised fishers were
more cooperative than non-unionised ones). When the mean social degree is zero i.e. there is
no social network, the population strategy approaches zero, as expected (for 〈ks〉 = 0 a mean
strategy is plotted, but 〈a〉 = 0, and this is true for all runs and so there are no error bars).
The mean strategy increases for the next two data points (〈ks〉 = 1 and 2), before returning the
similar mean strategies for the remaining mean social degrees (〈ks〉 between 3 and 12).
Finally, the results in figure 7.7 show that the inclusion of free-riders into each community
is most important when there is no social network (〈ks〉 = 0). When a free-rider is included in
the community the population fixes to 〈a〉 = 0, but when a free-rider is not necessarily included
a larger strategy is observed. This is because when there is no social network the final strategy
is the smallest initial strategy.
For mean social network degree larger than zero, there is a systematic increase in mean
strategy when free-riders are not included. Once again, this is because the smallest possible
strategy in each group is not necessarily zero.
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Figure 7.7: The mean strategy plotted against the mean degree of the social network for a
single community, size N = 12. Updates occur on the social layer with probability λ = 0.1, the
generation length is L = 2 and the initial contribution is cg(0) = 0.04. Results are plotted for
the inclusion of free-riders (black crosses) and no inclusion (blue circles), and plotted points are
the mean of ten different iterations. Error bars are plotted for a single standard deviation of
the results. Strategies initially selected from a uniform distribution 0 < a < 5.
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To sum up, variation in the population mean strategy is caused by variation in the mean
strategy of a single group over each run. However, it is consistently observed that social influence
increases the cooperation in the community networks. In the following sections I run a number
of simulations, designed to resemble each of the empirical scenarios described in [98–101], and
show that this model mimics these findings under certain parameter regimes. Whether free-
riders are introduced by hand or not does not change the qualitative behaviour of the increase
in mean social degree, but including them does reduce the equilibrium strategy.
7.3.3 Inclusion of inter-community edges
The key finding in Carpenter and Seki [101] is that pooling fishers are more cooperative than
non-poolers. To test whether this model reproduces these results I vary the number of edges
between the economic communities.
Figure 7.8 plots the mean strategy against the probability of forming an edge between two
nodes in different economic communities, pe. Four sets of dynamics are plotted: the first two
contain no social edges between communities (ps = 0), with results plotted for dynamics with
no social influence (black crosses) and the inclusion of social influence (blue circles). The third
set plots networks where edges between social communities are also included, ps = 0.1. Also
plotted are the same parameters, but with free-riders not included.
Inspired by the number of fishers and boats in [101], the network consists of six communities,
each community composed of five players. So, each community represents a single boat. The
players on each boat derive the same payoff, but can also contribute to other boats if economic
edges are formed between each of them (pe is greater than zero). The results are plotted for 100
iterations of generation length 500.
The results in figure 7.8 appear to confirm what is found in Carpenter and Seki [101]. In
this model the pooling fishers are those where edges are formed between the communities. As
expected, when there are no inter-community edges (pe = 0) the mean strategy is low, due to the
small community size and the inclusion of a free-rider in each. But, for all parameter regimes
there is a peak in the mean strategy around pe = 0.05 for dynamics both with and without
social influence.
This peak may be explained by increased heterogeneity. For very low pe there are few edges
between the communities, and the population essentially behaves as a combination of distinct
groups. For very high pe the population is very well connected, and essentially acts as a single
community. However, for the intermediate values different communities are loosely connected
to one another. This means that cooperative strategies can spread between communities, but
that free-riders are not so connected that they dominate.
The three sets of results in figure 7.8 agree (within a standard deviation) for nearly all values
188 7.3 Results
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
M
ea
n 
st
ra
te
gy
, <
a>
Probability of inter−community economic edges, p
e
 
 
p
s
=0 λ=0
p
s
=0 λ=0.1
p
s
=0.1 λ=0.1
p
s
=0.1 λ=0.1, no free−riders
Figure 7.8: The mean strategy plotted against the probability of forming an edge between each
economic community, pe. Results are plotted for no inter-community edges on the social layer
(ps = 0) for λ = 0 (black crosses) and λ = 0.1 (blue circles). Results are also plotted for equal
probability of inter-community edges on each layer (ps = pe, λ = 0.1) for initial conditions with
free-riders included (red stars) and not (green dots). Results are averaged over 100 iterations,
each run for 500 generations. The number of nodes is N = 30, the number of communities is
six, generation length is L = 2 and the initial contribution is cg(0) = 0.04. Strategies initially
selected from a uniform distribution 0 < a < 5.
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of the inter-community probability, pe. The only point at which there is an obvious difference
between the three parameter sets are for the larger pe. In this parameter range the networks with
no social edges between communities are dominated by free-riders. However, the inclusion of
inter-community edges in the social network results in a small but finite strategy. This matches
the results previously observed, where the introduction of social influence increases the mean
strategy. The simulations using initial conditions with no free-riders included shows similar
behaviour to those simulations where free-riders are included, but as in the previous section
the mean strategy is increased. This is most obvious at larger values of pe, where the mean
strategy is much larger when free-riders are not included in each community, and in fact most
populations act as more than conditional cooperators.
These results demonstrate that there is a critical connectivity that leads to the highest coop-
eration. Interestingly, on this network social influence is not needed to encourage cooperation:
there is agreement between the λ = 0 and λ = 0.1 parameter regimes (black crosses and blue
circles). However, for very connected communities social influence is important, and increases
how cooperative the population is.
7.3.4 Comparison between the community structure and the Erdo˝s-Reny´ı network
The final result I wish to compare my model with is that found by both Carden˜as [98] and
Carpenter and Seki [101]: students from urban populations tend to be less cooperative than
subjects that interact with a common pool resource on a regular basis.
I test my model against this result by comparing two population structures. The first is the
community population described in section 7.3.1. This is designed to mimic those from more
rural communities that frequently interact with one another and a common pool resource. The
second is an Erdo˝s-Reny´ı network, as used in the previous chapters of this thesis. This network
is much more diffuse, connecting players across the population, and is therefore a better model
of the urban population. As I am interested in the effect of the structure of the economic
networks, the social network is kept the same, and only the economic network changes. Also,
in these simulations a free-rider is included in every community, and the same number of free-
riders are allocated in both sets of dynamics. However, for each of the one hundred iterations
the number of communities and the mean degree on the social network vary. I plot results for
both no social influence (λ = 0, figure 7.9a) and social influence (λ = 0.1, figure 7.9b) for both
community networks and an Erdo˝s-Reny´ı network, mean degree 〈kp〉 = 4.
In general, the results plotted in figure 7.9 do not agree with those found by Carden˜as [98]
and Carpenter and Seki [101]. In those cases I would expect the Erdo˝s-Reny´ı network to result
in the smaller mean strategy. For nearly all parameters the mean strategy on the Erdo˝s-Reny´ı
network is larger than that found on the communities network. The only point at which this
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Figure 7.9: The mean strategy plotted against the scaled enhancement factor, η. Results are
plotted for the community network structure (black crosses) and an Erdo˝s-Reny´ı network, mean
degree 〈kp〉 = 4 (blue circles) for updates on the economic layer only (λ = 0, figure 7.9a) and
updates on both layers (λ = 0.1, figure 7.9b). Results are averaged over 100 iterations, each run
for 500 generations. The generation length is L = 2 and the initial contribution is cg(0) = 0.04.
is not true is when the enhancement factor η ≤ 0.2 and the probability of updating using the
social layer is λ = 0.1. The reason for this is the diffuse nature of the Erdo˝s-Reny´ı network. In
this network players are more insulated from free-riders, something which does not happen in
the community networks.
Interestingly, the mean strategy on the community network does not vary with the enhance-
ment factor. The reason for this is that players in each of the communities are only playing
in a single game. Therefore a better performing player is always one with a low strategy (as
discussed in section 7.3.1.1), no matter what the enhancement factor is. This is in contrast with
the results on the Erdo˝s-Reny´ı network, where the mean strategy increases with enhancement
factor, as discussed in previous chapters. I also observe that mean strategy is lower on the
Erdo˝s-Reny´ı network when social influence is introduced, whereas on the communities network
the opposite is true. This is due to relative dominance of the free-riders, which is mitigated in
the community network.
7.3.5 Invasion of cooperators
Throughout this work, my motivation is to better understand social dilemmas in multilayered
systems, and make suggestions as to how to resolve them. The results in the previous sections
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show that when community structure is used in the economic and social layer multiplex model
it mimics behaviour found in empirical studies: a wide range of strategies are observed, stronger
social networks and those that pool resources demonstrate increased cooperation. However,
a larger question remains: how could we influence these systems and change how cooperative
players are? If a system does not reach a cooperative state on its own, outside intervention may
be desirable. One such intervention is to introduce a number of very cooperative individuals,
in the hope that they persuade others not to free-ride. In this section I study the equilibrium
strategy after a number of very cooperative individuals are placed into the population and
examine whether it is possible for a number of invading cooperators to switch the system into
a more cooperative state. I also study how many cooperators are needed to shift the system
towards this more cooperative state, and if there is an optimal mechanism for the introduction
of cooperators. Should they be spread at random througout the population, or placed so that
they populate each community one at a time?
To answer this, the dynamics are run in the same manner as in sections 7.3.1 to 7.3.4. I
initialise the simulations in exactly the same way as before, but now allocate a very cooperative
strategy to a subset of players (ai = 5, where i indicates the selected player). There are two ways
that the subset of players are selected: at random, or consecutively filling up one community at a
time. These dynamics are run on networks of five communities, with six players in each. Because
I am interested in the scenario where invading communities of cooperators only influence the
other players in the population socially, there are no economic edges between the communities
(pe = 0). I set the probability of forming a social edge between two communities to ps = 0.05,
the critical value observed in figure 7.8. Examples of the different initial conditions are shown
in figure 7.10, with whole communities of cooperators on the left (figure 7.10a) and cooperators
placed at random on the right (figure 7.10b). As before, the non-cooperators strategies are
selected from a uniform distribution (0 < ai < 5). I now vary the number of players selected
to act as cooperators, and call this the number of invading cooperators. Figure 7.11 plots the
mean population strategy after 1000 generations against the number of invading cooperators for
both randomly and community placed invading cooperators.
The results in figure 7.11 show that it is very difficult for a number of very cooperative indi-
viduals to substantially alter the amount of cooperation in the population. The mean strategy
increases with the number of invading cooperators, as would be expected. However, approxi-
mately twenty out of the thirty players must be allocated a high strategy in order for players to
act as more than conditional cooperators, mean strategy larger than one. Therefore, these com-
munities are resistant to the invasion of very cooperative players, unless a substantial number are
included. I also observe that whether the cooperative players are selected at random or allocated
to the same community does not affect the mean population strategy substantially, although
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Economic layer Social layer
(a) Cooperators placed into communities
Economic layer Social layer
(b) Cooperators placed at random
Figure 7.10: An example of the network with invading cooperators. Cooperators are either
placed in communities (left-hand figures) or at random (right-hand figures). The number of
invading cooperators is ten. Here the probability of forming a social edge between nodes not in
the same community is ps = 0.05 and an economic edge between communities is pe = 0. Dark
red nodes are cooperators (ai = 5) whilst dark blue nodes are free-riders (ai = 0).
there is a small increase if players are placed in communities. This increase is expected, as if
there are only cooperators in a community the mean strategy is high, and the social influence
over-rides the economic advantage any free-riders may have.
In conclusion, to increase the population strategy to a point where the amount donated to the
public good increases after each iteration, a large number of very cooperative individuals must
be introduced. However, whether these cooperators are introduced as entire communities or at
random is not important. The results in this section show that these communities are resilient
to this intervention, and that if the system is to be shifted to a more cooperative state additional
mechanisms are required, punishment of free-riders, for example. This may explain why, even
though social influence was shown in previous chapters to increase cooperation substantially,
high numbers of unconditional cooperators are rarely observed in the real world.
7.4 Conclusions
In conclusion, under certain parameter regimes I have been able to echo results found in empirical
papers by designing the population structure to more accurately mimic the societies described
in those papers. The aim of this chapter was to investigate whether the dynamics described in
previous chapters could produce strategies which matched those found in the empirical work. In
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Figure 7.11: The mean strategy plotted against the number of invading cooperators. Results
are plotted for cooperators placed at random (blue circles) or in communities (black crosses).
The probability of updating via the social network is λ = 0.1. Results are averaged over 100
iterations, each run for 500 generations. The number of nodes is N = 30, the number of
communities is five, generation length is L = 2 and the initial contribution is cg(0) = 0.04.
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order to reproduce the conditions in those empirical papers, I replaced the Erdo˝s-Reny´ı network
with ones that more closely matched the community structures observed in these papers. Each
set of numerical simulations were designed to mimic the results of one of the empirical papers.
In general, firstly, when only economic influence is considered players in each community
tend towards the least cooperative strategy. But, as observed in previous chapters cooperation
increases with the introduction of social influence. Once again, these simulations demonstrate
that social influence is very important. The equilibrium strategy on the community network
is 〈a〉 = 0 i.e. free-riders dominate. However, even with a small amount of social influence
(λ = 0.1) the final distribution of strategies is much larger, supporting more closely what is
observed in the real world. Therefore, it seems that even when rational self-interest suggests
defection, social influence can increase the amount of cooperation observed. Not including free-
riders into each community increases the mean population strategy, and has the largest effect
when only economic updates are considered (λ = 0). Matching these results to the appropriate
empirical work, these results agree with those found by Rustagi et al. [100], where different
communities exhibit different social preferences, and also the results by Gelcich et al. [99],
where unionised fishers are more cooperative than non-unionised ones. Secondly, the results
described by Carpenter and Seki [101] are mimicked by probabilistically connecting different
communities. For small non-zero probabilities cooperation is increased, echoing the finding that
communities that pool between themselves increase cooperation compared to those that work
alone. Finally, these results do not agree with the observation that students are less cooperative
than common-pool resource users (as described by Carden˜as and Carpenter and Seki [98, 101])
when comparing the community population with an Erdo˝s-Reny´ı network. Larger cooperation
in the community network is only observed at very low enhancement factors. However, this
may be the correct parameter regime to consider, as the return from managing a common-pool
resource may be low. These systems were also shown to be difficult to invade with a group of
cooperators, but if there are enough cooperators to invade the system, how they are initially
distributed is not important.
To sum up, these results echo what is observed, with the range of strategies between zero
(free-riders) and strategies just over one. However, one result not supported by this model is
that the social preferences observed in each community are heterogeneous in nature (as observed
in Rustagi et al. and Carpenter and Seki [100, 101]). A reason for this may be that the results
above are presented after a large numbers of generations of play, and this may not be realistic. It
is not known for how many generations these “games” are played in the real world, and therefore
intermediate time behaviour may be the most important. If the empirical measurements are
made after a small number of generations, this heterogeneity may be observed within the models
described in this chapter. Therefore, in order to validate the model further understanding the
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time scales involved is important, and investigating this would be a good next step to understand
the behaviour of these populations.

8
Conclusions
In this thesis I understand cooperation on networks in more depth by studying social dilemmas
on multiplex networks. This was achieved through two different models: the first, discussed in
chapter 2, studies the effect on cooperation of strategy updates across layers, whilst the second,
as described in chapters 3 to 7, models conditional cooperation on a multiplex, where strategy
updates occur by maximising both economic payoff and adhering to local social behaviour.
In chapter 2 I established the importance of the strategy update rules across a multilayered
network. I showed that the asynchronous update rule leads to higher frequencies of cooperation
compared to synchronous updates, and that this is due to the additional payoff calculation
between strategy imitations. The choice of social dilemma, and the probability for one strategy to
imitate another were the key factors for the importance of the update rule. Increased cooperation
is observed for two forms of the public goods game (fixed cost per individual and fixed cost per
group) and two forms of the imitation probability in the prisoner’s dilemma. The effect was
shown to be strongest in the FCI public goods game, because in these dynamics the imitation
probability was most sensitive to neighbourhood composition. This is because the more sensitive
the imitation probability is to the composition of the neighbourhood, the larger the difference
in cooperation between synchronous and asynchronous updates.
The second model was designed to investigate empirically measured levels of cooperation,
in which cooperation is found to be more prevalent than is predicted by standard game theory.
Inspired by these empirical results I model these systems as a conditional public goods game
on a multiplex. Using both analytics and numerical simulations on well-mixed and structured
populations, I showed that when conditional cooperation is included in the public goods game
cooperation is increased when compared to the unconditional version. In section 3.3 I proposed
three questions that I would like the model to answer:
1. if agents consider both their payoff, and the deviation of their behaviour from the local
average strategy, how does this affect contributions and frequencies of conditional cooper-
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ators in the public goods game?
2. What if the size of the economic and social networks are very different?
3. Does the number of times that a group interacts before a player updates its strategy affect
the final strategies of the players?
In answer to the first question, the results in section 3.4 show that social influence has a
strong effect on the final frequency of cooperation in the conditional public goods game, and
that the addition of social influence leads to the persistence of earlier established behaviours.
In section 3.4.1 I found that when the probability of updates via the social layer is λ = 0.1
there is a large increase in cooperation. Therefore, even when individuals are mainly moti-
vated to maximise their economic well-being, a small amount of social influence substantially
increases cooperation, supporting the finding that individuals are more cooperative than would
be expected by game theory alone. I found in section 3.4.1.1 that the key factor in how much
of an effect social influence has on the mean contribution is the initial distribution of strategies.
This is true for both structured and unstructured populations (as shown most clearly in section
5.2.6), and even for very low enhancement factors the inclusion of the social layer and a non-zero
λ leads to large amounts of cooperation. In section 3.4.2 these results were shown to be robust
to different methods of calculating the average neighbourhood strategy.
I investigated the second question by varying the mean degree of the social network in
section 3.4.1.2, and the third by varying the generation length in section 3.4.1.3. In both cases I
found that varying these parameters did not affect the strategy at equilibrium on the multiplex
network. This shows that the social influence is the key factor in the equilibrium strategy,
rather than the network structure or the number of iterations for which the game is played.
When investigating the well-mixed dynamics in section 5.2.8 I did find that longer generations
increased the frequency of cooperation at the mid-range enhancement factors.
8.1 Discussion
The key issue with both models discussed in this thesis is the lack of knowledge about how people
make decisions about their strategy. Many of the rules used in previous studies are inspired by
biology, and therefore a strategy is replicated in proportion to its fitness. As discussed in
earlier chapters, this is not necessarily the case in social systems. If the strategy update rules
used in the study of games on networks do not capture accurately how people really choose
their strategy, the conclusions from these models may not be correct. To mitigate against this
problem, in chapter 2 a number of methods of strategy imitation were tested, whilst in chapter
3 the parameter θ is introduced to model more accurately social strategy imitation. The choice
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of imitation rule was found to be important in the update rules model (described in chapter 2),
where the importance of the update rule selected depends on the way in which the imitation
probability is calculated. This shows that in future studies if other imitation rules are selected,
the effect may be less important. By contrast in the social influence model the chosen method
of calculating the average neighbourhood strategy was shown not to be important to the mean
strategy in section 3.4.2. So, whilst I tested the results for a range of imitation rules (and mean
strategy calculations in the social influence model), the choice of rule is still the assumption that
has the most impact on the results.
The second key assumption is the structure of the social networks. Population structures
are selected because they are analytically tractable, or because they resemble a cartoon of these
communities. However, quantitative networks for the communities discussed in this thesis is not
available. For each model there is increased cooperation on structured populations compared to
the well-mixed case. This demonstrates that structure is important, and the results in chapter
7 confirm this. In both the update rules and the social influence models network reciprocity
is an important mechanism for the maintenance of cooperation, and therefore networks with
more heterogeneous degree distributions may increase the difference between the conditional
and unconditional versions of the public goods game.
A third assumption is that the players and the model parameters are considered to be iden-
tical for the whole population. In each of the models, before an initial strategy and population
structure is imposed, each member of the population is indistinguishable. Players are equally
likely to play a certain strategy, and behave identically in the identical situations. As well as
this, the parameters of the model are the same for all individuals i.e. in both models the return
from the public good is the same value across the whole population, and in the social influ-
ence model each player has the same preference for updating on the social or economic layers.
Different public goods games often give higher or lower returns, which may have a large effect
on the results in both of the models. This is not necessarily the case in the real world, and
different individuals may put more or less emphasis on their preferences. Some may place more
emphasis on their social status, others on their economic well being. In the update rules model
the enhancement factor was shown to have a large effect on the difference between the two rules,
whilst the size of the social influence in the latter model drastically altered the amount of co-
operation. Therefore, the result of the introduction of heterogeneity between players may have
a large effect on the results. Alongside this, each player is assumed to use the same strategy
no matter how well they know or trust their opponents. In reality people are more likely to
cooperate with someone that they know will reciprocate, and so their strategy in this case may
be larger.
Finally, in these games there is no minimum threshold of survival. If a player switches to a
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less cooperative strategy, the payoff of their group is reduced, with no penalty to the player’s
welfare. In the empirical societies on which the conditional strategies are based, each community
needs to manage the common pool resource to a minimum level in order to survive. However,
in these models the tragedy of the commons has no realistic consequences.
8.2 Future work
This work has investigated a number of novel effects on cooperation in multiplex networks, but
as discussed in the previous section, there are a number of outstanding issues to be explored.
The first of these is to test the impact of different network structures on both models. This could
be implemented simply by increasing the network mean degree, or introducing different network
architectures. These could be networks closer in degree distribution to those observed in general
social systems e.g. scale-free networks, where the degree distribution is more heterogeneous.
Alongside this, there are a number of network measures unique to multiplex networks that
could also be tested. The most important of these is the similarity between the layers, but also
the correlation of node degrees across the layers.
The impact of heterogeneous players should also be tested. As discussed in the previous
section, an obvious improvement to the model is the introduction of trust. Here, players may
be more cooperative with those previously observed donating large amounts to the public good.
This could be implemented by players observing others contributions rather than, or as well as,
other player’s strategies. Another possibility includes assigning different enhancement factors to
different groups, and different players different probabilities of updating using the social layer
(λ). A further extension may be to include some “coevolution” of λ for each player. Allowing the
value of λ to change over time may explain why social influence is observed to be an important
factor.
Other extensions include assigning more complex conditional cooperation strategies to the
players. In this work the strategy is represented as a simple gradient. However, as shown in
figure 3.1, individuals often exhibit far more complicated strategies. It would be very interesting
to try and generate similar strategies on the multiplex.
It is also the case that the strategies in this model are continuous, from player’s acting as
free-riders (a = 0) to very cooperative (a = 5). However, to map these strategies within the
model to those empirical results described in section 3.1 it may be more appropriate to consider
groups, or catergories, of strategies e.g. free-rider, conditional cooperator, very cooperative. In
future models studying the change in these categories of strategy may prove more useful, and
therefore the evolution of certain social norms may begin to emerge from the model.
Finally, one question that needs further exploration is the possibility of introducing social
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update calculations that reduce the amount of cooperation. The three update calculations
tested in this thesis (mean, median and random neighbour imitation) all increase the strategy
at low enhancement factors. However, there may be other rules that decrease it. Finding and
understanding these rules is important for investigating the generality of the result.
These models contribute novel mechanisms for increased cooperation on multiplex networks.
However, more generally more empirical data is needed to validate each of the models discussed
in this thesis. Actually measuring how people cooperate, and the social networks on which they
are based, in scenarios closely related to those discussed will improve these models. Running
these dynamics on empirically measured social networks would provide extra validation of the
results in this thesis, extending the work in chapter 7.
8.3 Summary
To sum up, each of the models discussed in this thesis extend the understanding of cooperation in
social systems. I have helped to illuminate why cooperation is increased on multiplexes in chapter
2, by showing that updating strategies asynchronously increases cooperation, and therefore that
the implicit decisions about update rules in previous models should not be ignored. I have also
shown that the amount of cooperation observed in the laboratory can be explained through both
the inclusion of conditional cooperation and social influence. This investigation of the effect of
social influence on conditional cooperation shed light on why people are observed to cooperate
in the way that they do.
I extend our knowledge of social cooperation by introducing additional mechanisms, whereby
cooperation dominates in parameter regimes where it would not normally be expected to. This
work provides an important foundation for the continued study of cooperation in multilayered,
networked social systems, and offers insight into the future resolution of social dilemmas.
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